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ABSTRACT
Traynor and Surrey made proposals for judicial 
reform in 1938* They specifically included recommenda­
tions that exclusive original jurisdiction in federal tax 
cases he vested in a single Tax Court and that a single 
Court of Tax Appeals he created to hear all tax appeals 
with appeal from the latter court hy certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. Subsequently, other writers debated the 
merits of these recommendations.
The purpose of the present study was to make an 
evaluation of equity in the judicial administration of 
the accumulated earnings tax cases. This study examined 
cases at the trial court level for conflicting decisions 
on each one of three broad topics. Analysis of these 
conflicts proceeded from the trial courts up to the 
Supreme Court. The three topics researched were two 
substantive rules of law, a procedural rule of law, and 
applications of basic accounting concepts*
The two substantive rules of law investigated 
were interpretations of the term “purpose** and interpre­
tations of the relationship of "purpose” to the “reason­
able needs of the business." During a period of almost 
four decades, four distinctly different interpretations
vii
v i i i
of the prohibited purpose were used by the courts* With 
four different interpretations of purpose in use, in­
equitable treatment of taxpayers is a highly probable re­
sult. An analysis of the relationship of "purpose*' to 
the "reasonable needs of the business" revealed eight 
paths were available to reach a final decision, assuming 
only one definition of purpose. A total of twenty-six 
possible paths are available for a final decision when the 
four interpretations of purpose are combined with the 
eight paths presented. Considering this large number of 
possible paths to a final decision, the probability of 
equity for past years is quite low.
The procedural rule of law investigated was the 
operation of the burden of proof under section In­
equity has resulted from the Tax Court's failure to make 
a determination of the section 53^ issue in all appro­
priate cases. However, the magnitude of the inequity 
is substantially less than in the instance of the sub­
stantive rules of law discussed above.
A determination of the reasonable needs of the 
business requires the application of such basic account­
ing concepts as earnings, depreciation, working capital, 
and appropriation of earnings. The confusion over the 
accounting relationships has been apparent in the cases 
in which the courts have explained the application of
i x
accounting concepts. Overall, the courts* treatment of 
accounting concepts is considered to he an additional 
indication of a lack of equity.
The investigation of final determinations enabled 
the evaluation, based upon a comparison of identical 
issues, to be placed in perspective. The increasing per­
centage of cases taken to the district courts by tax­
payers indicates that taxpayers believe they will re­
ceive more favorable treatment in the district courts 
than in the Tax Court. The final determinations of in­
cidents decided by jury trials seems to support this 
apparent difference in attitudes. The pattern of appeals 
suggests that both the Commissioner and taxpayers sense 
the difference in attitudes among the forums. The re­
versals obtained corroborate the suggestion of bias.
Thus the conclusion is made that in the past, equity has 
been mostly a matter of random chance, rather than the 
inexorable process of justice.
No individual judge or court can be singled out 
as being responsible for the lack of equity. The judic­
ial system for federal tax cases must bear the blame. 
Therefore, the Traynor and Surrey recommendations, that 
exclusive original jurisdiction in federal tax cases be 
vested in a single Tax Court and that a single Court of 
Tax Appeals be established, are endorsed.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
The income tax as it is known today developed 
from the Sixteenth ..Amendment to the United States Consti­
tution, which was adopted in 1913* This amendment per­
mitted the assessment and collection of taxes on incomes 
without requiring apportionment between the stateB and 
without regard to any census or enumeration* For several 
years any litigation arising in income tax cases was 
handled within the existing federal judicial structure.
In 192^ a Board of Tax Appeals was established as an 
independent agency within the Executive Branch of the 
Federal Government. At first, the decisions of the 
Board were not binding upon the parties, and either party 
could sue in the United States District Court. Any ques­
tions of fact determined by the Board were tried de novo 
by the district court.
In 1926 the law was changed to permit appeals 
directly from the Board to one of the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals and to prevent the taxpayer from ob­
taining a retrial in another court once he permitted the 
case to come before the Board. In 19^2 the Internal 
Revenue Code was amended to change the name of the Board 
of Tax Appeals to the Tax Court of the United States and
to give the title of "judge" to each of its members. The 
authority of the Board was expressly stated to remain the 
same.1
Although the Tax Court was not a de .jure court, it 
2
was a de facto court. However, the Tax Court was not con
tent with being accepted merely as a de facto court and de
clared its independence from the Courts of Appeals in Ed- 
3
monds. Later the Tax Court exercised this independence 
and refused to follow a contrary rule set out by a court 
of appeals which had jurisdiction to review the decision 
of the Tax Court. In defense of its position the Tax 
Court stated*
The Tax Court has always believed that Congress in­
tended it to decide all cases uniformly, regardless 
of where, in its nationwide jurisdiction, they may 
arise, and that it could not perform its assigned 
functions properly were it to decide one case one 
way and another differently merely because appeals 
in such cases might go to different Courts of Ap­
peals. Congress, in the,case of the TaxrCourt, 
•inverted the triangle' so that from a single . 
national jurisdiction, the Tax Court appeals would 
spread out among eleven Courts of Appeals, each 
for a different circuit or portion of the United 
States. Congress faced the problem in the begin­
ning as to whether the Tax Court jurisdiction and 
approach was to be local or nationwide and made it 
nationwide. Congress expected the Tax Court to
1
Lawrence F. Casey, Federal Tax Practice (Chicago* 
Callagham & Company, 1955)* 295-297*
2
Kav v. Commissioner. 178 F. 2d 773 (3 cir. 1950). 
Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett. I**? F. 2d 66 (1 Cir. 19^5). 
Fairmont Aluminum Co.. 22 TC 1377 (19^8).
W^illiam E. Edmonds. 16 TC 117 (1940).
^Arthur L. Lawrence. 27 TC 716 (1953).
set precedents for the uniform application of the^ 
tax laws, insofar as it would he able to do that.-*
Since appeals from the Tax Court go to the various circuit 
courts, the Tax Court does have a problem with conflicting 
decisions of the circuit courts. However, the solution 
of the Tax Court left much to be desired since this solu­
tion forced a taxpayer to expend additional effort and 
money in orde*' to win his case.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969^ changed the status of 
the Tax Court from an "independent agency in the Executive 
Branch of the Government" to a court of record "under 
Article I of the United States Constitution."^ Further­
more, the name of the court was changed from "Tax Court 
of the United States" to "United States Tax C o u r t . A l ­
though one can only speculate as to whether these changes 
had any influence in the recent change from the indepen­
dent position discussed above in the Lawrence case, the 
Tax Court explained the shift as follows:
In thus concluding that we must follow Goldman, we 
recognize the contrary thrust of the oft-criticized 
case of Arthur L. Lawrence. 2? T.C. 713. Notwith­
standing a number of the considerations which ori­
ginally led us to that decision, it is our best 
judgment that better judicial administration re­
quires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision
^Ibid.. p. 718.
683 Stat. ^87 (1969).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 195^* Sec. 7 ^ 1  (Tax Reform Act 
of 1969. Sec. 951).
8Ibid.
which is squarely in point where appeal from our 
decision lies to that Court of Appeals and to that 
court alone. . . . Moreover the practice we are 
adopting does not jeopardize the Federal interest 
in uniform application of the internal revenue 
laws which we emphasized in Lawrence. We shall 
remain able to foster uniformity by giving effect 
to our own views in cases appealable to courts 
whose views have not yet been expressed, and, 
even where the relevant Court of Appeals has al­
ready made its views known, by explaining why we 
agree or disagree withQthe precedent that we feel 
constrained to follow.“
This change should result in some reduction of the
number of conflicting cases. However, the United States
Tax Court, the United States District Courts and the United
States Court of Claims all share original jurisdiction in
federal income tax cases. The difference is that in the
Tax Court the taxpayer has not paid the deficiency, while
in the other courts he has paid the deficiency and brings
suit for a refund. Furthermore, appeals from the Tax Court
and the District Courts go to the eleven different United
States Courts of Appeals, while appeal from the Court of
1 0Claims is to the United States Supreme Court. From all 
of the foregoing one should not be surprised to discover 
that conflicting decisions occur in federal tax cases.
9Jack E. Golsen. TC 756-57 (1970).
10Stanley S. Surrey and William C. Warren, Federal 
Income Taxation, Cases and Materials (Brooklyn: Foundation
Press, Inc., 19537> PP* 51-53.
THE PROBLEM
5
Statement of the Problem
The overall purpose of this study is to relate 
the above discussion of conflicting decisions to one area 
of the federal tax law— the accumulated earnings tax cases. 
Specific objectives are*
1. to determine the characteristics of conflicting 
decisions as they exist in accumulated earnings 
tax cases?
2. to analyze the conflicting cases in order to de­
termine the basis for the court's decisions;
3* to evaluate the equity of the judicial administra­
tion in such cases; and
to analyze the cases in order to evaluate the 
future prospects for equity in the accumulated 
earnings tax cases.
Importance of the Study
There are constant pressures for changes in the tax
system. Critics are constantly calling for reforms in the
1 1legislative, administrative, and judicial systems. if 
changes are deemed desirable, then evidence to support these 
changes must be accumulated; if a change is believed to be 
detrimental, then evidence must be accumulated to oppose it.
Litigation is expensive in terms of time as well 
as in money. Accountants and attorneys have a formidable 
task when the law is clear and only the facts are to be 
argued and proved. V/hen the potential element of conflicts
11These criticisms are summarized in the review of 
the literature presented later in this chapter.
in the law is added to an already difficult situation, 
the situation becomes much more difficult and more 
hazardous for the client as well as for the accountant 
or attorney advising him. Unfortunately, the existence 
of conflicts in the law probably encourages litigation 
because any party has excellent legal authority to support 
whichever position is to his advantage.
The accumulated earnings tax cases were selected 
for study for two reasons. First, this tax area is of 
great concern to corporations and their financial officers 
and directors as well as to accountants and attorneys. 
Second, there are numerous cases available which can be 
analyzed for conflicts.
Scope of the Study
Since this study is concerned with the equity of 
the judicial administration in the accumulated earnings 
tax cases, a definition of equity must be developed that 
applies to the judicial administration of cases in general 
Accumulated earnings tax cases will be evaluated to de­
termine if equity does exist in these cases.
The provisions covering the accumulated earnings 
tax in the 195^ Internal Revenue Code are sections 531 
through 537* Section 531 provides for the tax and gives 
the tax rates. Section 532 provides that the tax shall 
fall upon every corporation, "formed or availed of for
7for the purpose of avoiding the income tax . . . t«12 
Section 533 states that for operating companies the pro­
hibited purpose exists if the earnings are accumulated
“beyond the reasonable needs of the business."3--^ Another
litsubsection applies to holding companies. Section 
53^ provides for a shift of the burden of proof to the 
Commissioner in certain instances. Section 535 sets out 
the adjustments necessary in making a calculation of 
"accumulated taxable income" including a minimum credit 
and a general credit for earnings that " . . .  are retained 
for the reasonable needs of the business."3'-* Section 536 
merely provides for the inapplicability of section *j43(b) 
to Section 531. Section 537 modifies the section 533(a) 
phrase, "reasonable needs" to include "the reasonably 
anticipated needs of the business."
The salient points of the Code provisions have 
been presented to show that there are three broad elements 
to be considered in evaluating the accumulated earnings 
tax cases. First, sections 532 and 533 present two rules 
of substantive law which could be subject to conflicting
12Internal Revenue Code of 195^* section 532(a). 
1^Ibid., section 533(a),
•^ Ibid.. section 533(b).
^ Ibid.. section 535(c).
^ Ibid., section 537*
interpretation by the courts. Second, section 53^ - pre­
sents a procedural rule of law which could have some 
effect upon equity in these cases. Third, a determina­
tion of the reasonable needs of the business, as incor­
porated into sections 533* 53 *^ 535* and 537 requires an 
application of accounting concepts. While these three 
elements are substantially different, they are pervasive 
and must be considered in an evaluation of equity in the 
judicial administration of the accumulated earnings tax 
cases.
This study is limited to a case analysis of these 
three broad topics. In addition, an investigation based 
upon the final decisions of all the cases is presented.
This study will not attempt to evaluate the equity of other 
judicial areas of either a tax or nontax nature. Neither 
is this study a research of the legislative history of 
the accumulated earnings tax or any other topic. However, 
if some portion of the legislative history of this subject 
becomes relevant to the case at hand, then it may be dis­
cussed. Finally, it is assumed that the reader possesses 
a knowledge of the accumulated earnings tax as provided 
for in sections 531 through 537 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 195^ and related Regulations. Also, the reader 
is expected to be well versed in the basic legal and ac­
counting concepts required of a competent tax practitioner. 
However, this level is presumed to be somewhat below the
9level of knowledge expected of an attorney or CPA for 
their respective fields.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
The terms below are defined as they are used in 
the context of this study.
Equity
Ideally, changes in the tax law should enhance 
equity to taxpayers and promote stability at less expense 
in achieving political objectives. Sometimes all of these 
elements cannot be satisfied, and sometimes they may even 
be at odds. In the latter event, common sense would indi­
cate that the merits and disadvantages of those in oppo­
sition be weighed and the element with the most sound 
support would take precedence in that instance. Equity 
is recommended as the most important element to be dis­
tinguished from the others although it also relates to the 
others In varying degrees.
Equity takes on different meanings in different 
situations* One definition of equity, according to 
Webster, is:
A free and reasonable conformity to accepted stan­
dards of natural right, law, and justice without 
prejudice, favoritism, or fraud and without rigor 
entailing undue hardship.^
17fWebster's Third New International Dictionary 
(Springfield, Mass.i G. & C. Merriam Company, 1969), 
p. 769.
10
He lists fairness and, impartiality as two synonyms for 
equity.^ -8 In defining "fair" Webster says, "EQUITABLE im­
plies a fair and equal treatment of all concerned, sug­
gesting often a less rigid standard than JUST • . . .
The federal system for collecting income taxes is 
unique in that the taxpayer assesses himself for his in­
come tax liability. How long can such a system endure if 
it is unfair? Is it not unfair for similar transactions 
to be taxed differently throughout the country? One writer 
believes that the success of this system is due to "the gen­
eral attitude of most taxpayers that they do not mind pay-
20ing taxes so long as everyone else is similarly taxed."
Senator Russell B. Long has called for both greater
21equity and simplification of the federal tax system.
Secretary Barr has stated:
The middle classes are likely to revolt against in­
come taxes not because of the level or amount of the 
taxes they must pay but because certain provisions 
of the tax laws unfairly lighten the burden of others 
who can afford to pay. People are concerned and in­
deed angered about the high-income recipients who 
pay little or no Federal taxes.22
*8Ibid.
19Ibid.. p. 815.
20
Peter K. Nevitt, "Achieving Uniformity Among the 
11 Courts of Last Resort," Taxes. 34:312, 1956.
21Russell B. Long, "The Federal Tax Structure, Sim­
plification and Equity: Consistent Goals," Taxes, 47:194.
1969.
22Statement by the Honorable Joseph W. Barr, Secre­
tary of the Treasury, before the Joint Economic Committee, 
January 17, 1969.
11
Such statements indicate a concern toy responsible govern­
ment officials that fairness should permeate the tax system.
Another dictionary makes the following comment 
about equity.
In a more limited application, it denotes equal justice 
between contending parties. This is its moral signi­
fication, in reference to the rights of parties 
having conflicting claims . . .
But what does "equal" mean? There are various concepts
2 it
of equality. In a formal sense equality means that men
?<
in similar circumstances should be treated the same. J 
This thought is a common thread woven throughout the 
preceding discussion. It is simply stated, easily per­
ceived, and hardly arguable in the abstract. The diffi­
culty arises in a concrete application to the cases.
Consider two high school graduates who desire a 
college education. One wants to become an engineer and 
the other an accountant. If both are given scholarships 
in accounting, then they are treated alike in terms of 
what they received, but not in terms of what they desired. 
Suppose that one student has blue eyes, but the other does 
not. If the one with blue eyes receives a scholarship, but 
the other does not, then they are treated equally under a
23
^John Bouvier, Bouvier's Law Dictionary (St. Paul* 
West Publishing Company, 191*0, p. 1057* 
oh
For an excellent discussion of equality in social 
and political theory see, "Equal Protection," Harvard Law 
Review. 82*1159-1173, 1969*
25Ibid., p. 1163.
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rule that says only persons with blue eyes receive scholar­
ships, but they are treated unequally with respect to
26what each one receives.
Reasonable Classification
These examples illustrate that the concept of 
equality is without meaning unless relevant differences 
are considered. Thus, in granting scholarships one must 
determine whether or not the academic preference of a 
student and the color of his eyes are relevant differ­
ences in making a decision. Once the concept of relevant 
differences is wedded to the concept of equality, then 
the application of this new concept demands an evaluation 
of the empirical realities and the development of a value 
system. This system must weigh differences and simi­
larities between alternatives and determine " . . .  the 
relevance thereof with references to the nature and purpose 
of the treatment it is proposed that each receive."27
Adam Smith was also concerned with equality and 
listed it first among the canons that he set forth. His
use of the term equity referred to reasonable classifi- 
28cation. Thus, if the classification does not violate
26Ibid.. p. 116**.
27Ibid.
28Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (TJew Yorki I'he Modern Library, 
ftandom House, £nc., 1957)» PP* 777-778.
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the principle of equity then taxpayers may be classified 
in tax cases. Furthermore, the principle of equity is 
upheld so long as the classifications are reasonable.
Schultz and Harriss have considered the matter and
expressed their thoughts as follows:
Equity— relates differences in treatment to reason­
able or relevant bases or sources. Equal treatment 
is not always equitable— and neither is unequal 
treatment. The crucial factor in deciding whether 
inequity is equitable is the adequacy or relevancgg 
of the element which accounts for the difference. y
A reasonable classification derived from relevant differ­
ences forms the basis for an evaluation of the judicial 
administration of income tax cases.
Incident
In order to classify the final decisions in the 
accumulated earnings tax cases the meaning of the word 
"case" must be considered. The term "case" is probably 
most frequently used to denote the citation for a single 
judicial determination. However, in the accumulated 
earnings tax cases, a single judicial determination often 
represents the consolidation for trial of several cases 
on the docket. Each docketed case usually involves more 
than one taxable year. Since the accumulated earnings tax 
is to be determined separately for each taxable year, 
then the final determination for a given case citation
297William J. Schultz and C. Lowell Harriss, American 
Public Finance (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1959) p. 85*
could be in favor of the taxpayer for one or more years 
and also in favor of the Commissioner for one or more years. 
Thus a cited case cannot necessarily be classified as 
being in favor of only one of the parties. On the other 
hand, some cited cases involve several taxable years, while 
others involve only one taxable year. A classification 
system which classifies the determination for each taxable 
year would give undue weight to the cases involving several 
years in which no significant change occurred. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this study an incident is defined as 
a decision in a cited case in favor of one party for one 
or more taxable years. Consequently, a cited case could 
contain two incidents.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The investigation of the subject at hand is a 
very small subset of a vast whole. The whole can be 
described in general terms as a concern over the degree 
of equity inherent in the entire judicial structure for 
federal tax cases. Although a concern over equity in 
federal tax matters is not limited to the judicial admin­
istration of those matters, the following discussion is 
a very brief summary of the major contributions arising 
out of a concern for equity in the judicial administration 
of cases in the federal tax area.
15
The Traynor and Surrey Proposal
The shot that was heard 'round the tax world was 
fired by R. J. Traynor and Stanley Surrey in 1938.30 In 
a comprehensive examination of both the administrative 
and judicial procedures in federal tax cases, Traynor out­
lined existing deficiencies, the causes of the deficiencies, 
and set forth propositions to remedy the deficiencies. 
Traynor was particularly disturbed by the long delays and 
uncertainty that is costly to all parties. He found that 
a typical case in 193^ spent three years with the Internal 
Revenue Service and another three years in the Board of Tax 
Appeals— a six year period from the date the return was 
filed until the first judicial decision was rendered. An 
appeal to the Circuit Courts of Appeals would add another 
two years, and a further appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court would add another year. With the potential 
requirement of a nine year period in order to ultimately
settle tax disputes, one can easily see the virtual cer-
31tainty of the impairment of tax administration.
Traynor observed that an average of 68.9 percent 
of the cases closed by the Board of Tax Appeals for three 
consecutive fiscal years beginning in 1935 were settled
3°R. J. Traynor, "Administrative and Judicial Pro­
cedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes— A Crit­
icism and a Proposal," Columbia Law Review, 38:1392, 1938.
31Ibid.
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administratively without ever coming to trial. The re­
sult was unnecessary delay due to the appeal to the Board, 
and expensive duplication of the administrative functions 
of the Internal Revenue Service within the judiciary.-^2 
Furthermore, the delay in reaching a final determination 
resulted in a substantial loss due to the inability of 
the government to collect deficiencies finally determined. 
Many taxpayers became insolvent during the time the matter 
was before the Board. '
The Commissioner should look to the decisions ren­
dered by the Board for guidance in administering the In­
ternal Revenue Code. However, the delay means that he 
must exercise his initiative during the years he is waiting 
for a determination. Taxpayers must also institute actions 
in order to safeguard themselves. The delay also hinders 
Congress in its attempts to strengthen those areas de- 
termined by the judges to be weak.
Traynor found the defects in administrative pro­
cedure to be due to overly elaborate provisions for re­
view of decisions made by revenue department personnel 
and the inability of the Commissioner to obtain necessary 
factual information which the taxpayer could more easily 
provide. He pointed out that one cause of inefficiency
32Ibid., pp. 1394-1395* 
33Ibid,. pp. 1396-1397* 
3ZfIbid.. pp. 1397-1398.
in the judicial system was the result of having exclusive 
original jurisdiction in cases in which taxpayers wish to 
litigate without payment of the deficiency in the Board of 
Tax Appeals, while original jurisdiction in taxpayer 
suits for a refund rests jointly in the district courts 
and the Court of Claims. Whether or not the claimed de­
ficiency has been paid is irrelevant in determining the 
issues as to whether or not a deficiency actually exists. 
Thus, multi-forums for such affairs are unnecessary, and 
the forum most skilled in such matters should be the only 
forum. The several forums for original jurisdiction re-
rtc
suit in a lack of uniformity in tax cases. ^ Traynor 
concluded:
Instead of being a tribunal to whom both taxpayers 
and the Commissioner could look for authoritative 
guidance, the Board is merely one of 8? tax tribu­
nals of original jurisdiction whose decisions have 
equal rank as precedents.3®
He believed that the high degree of centralization of the
Board of Tax Appeals was another factor leading to judicial
inefficiency. Finally, he thought the method of appellate
review in income, estate, and gift tax cases was a great
contributor to the problem.
In support of the latter point Traynor noted that 
normal judicial theory was analogous to a pyramid.
3^Ibid.. pp. 1398-1^03. 
36Ibid., p. 1^03.
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Original jurisdiction should constitute a broad base with 
such jurisdiction among many courts. Appeal from these 
courts would be to a smaller number of courts, and appel­
late review of these appeals courts limited to one final 
court. However, in tax cases the pyramid had been inverted 
with appeals from the Board of Tax Appeals going to eleven 
Courts of Appeals. Thus, the Board is faced with a dilemma 
when there is a disagreement, among these courts. ^
Traynor made several suggestions to correct the 
administrative and judicial deficiencies. His most sig­
nificant suggestions in the judicial area were*
(1) To transfer the original jurisdiction of the 
district courts and the Court of Claims to the 
Board of Tax Appeals, thus giving the Board ex­
clusive original jurisdiction in all income, 
estate, and gift tax cases;
(2) To decentralize the Board of Tax Appeals; and
(3) To create a single Court of Tax Appeals and limit 
appeals to this Court with appeal from the Court 
of Tax Appeals by certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.3°
He explained the benefits of his suggestions as
follows:
Under the proposed system as an issue could reach 
the Supreme Court only through the Court of Tax 
Appeals, both the Commissioner and all taxpayers 
would be forced to acquiese in a decision of the 
Court of Tax Appeals if certiorari were denied, 
so that denial of certiorari would settle a ques­
tion instead of being an invitation to litigation.
The consequent reduction in the number of decisions
37Ibid., pp. 1404-1407. 
38Ibid.. pp. 1425-1428.
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and hence of precedents, should do much to strengthen 
the uniformity achieved "by consolidation of original 
jurisdiction in the Board. As Board decisions would 
no longer be jeopardized by the prospect of running 
the gauntlet of eleven tribunals, the disruptive 
factor of legal uncertainty in the administrative 
state would largely disappear, and controversies 
between taxpayer and Commissioner would be fewer 
in number and more readily settled. ^
Criticisms of the Traynor Proposal
E. B. Prettyman presented a contrary view to the 
Traynor suggestions. He agreed with Traynor and Surrey as 
to the existence of the problem, but disagreed as to the 
solution. In support of the existing provision for judi­
cial review he argued against the consolidation of juris­
diction in the Board for several reasons and against 
the establishment of a Court of Tax Appeals on the basis
that conflicting opinions acted as a deterrent to arbi-
Lq
trary or hasty judgment. The reason Prettyman agreed 
with Traynor as to the problem, but not as to the solution, 
was because he also disagreed with Traynor as to the causes 
of the problem. Prettyman believed that three elements—  
personnel, policy, and procedure— were essential to solve 
disputes administratively.
Prettyman concluded that since there was a high 
quality of personnel, the fault must lie in one of the 
other elements. However, he thought the fault was in the
39Ibid., pp. 1^28-1^29*
^0E. B. Prettyman, "The Traynor Proposals— Come 
Considerations," Taxes, l?t397, 1939*
policy, while Traynor felt that it was in the procedure.
In particular the Treasury Department should urge its em­
ployees to find the "right answer" in every case regard­
less of whether or not any tax would be collected. The 
cause is that the men are required, or think they are 
required, to collect a tax in every case, according to 
Prettyman. he believes that subsequent to the adoption 
of such a policy, a spirit of co-operation would descend 
upon the land and taxpayers would stop at only perceived
abuses of power in submitting to government determination
h,-}
of deficiencies.
h,2Other critics quickly spoke out on the subject. 
Although some of the defects pointed out by Traynor and 
Surrey were acknowledged, several writers disagreed with 
the causes and many disagreed with more than one of the 
suggestions. Angell expressed a fear that the suggested 
remedies of Traynor would so shatter the confidence of the 
American taxpayer in his government that the collapse of 
the tax collection system could be a likely result. 
Youngquist believed that cases were being heard with suffi­
cient rapidity and that if undue tax litigation did exist
^Ibid., p. 398*
^2See Traynor, p. 1184.
-'Montgomery G. Angell, "Procedural Reform in the 
Judicial Review of Controversies Under the Internal Revenue 
Statutesi An Answer to a Proposal," Illinois Law Review, 
34-1151, 1939.
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the fault was a result of the frequent changes made by
liL\,
Congress m  the Revenue Acts.
The Griswold Proposal
The furor over Professor Traynor*s Proposal had 
mostly subsided when Professor Erwin Griswold of the Har-
kc.
vard Law School renewed the controversy. J Six years had 
elapsed since the Traynor proposal and changes had taken 
place. First, a decentralization of the Bureau had oc­
curred somewhat along the lines Traynor and Surrey had 
recommended and some noticeable improvement had been 
effected. Second, revenues from the federal income tax 
were expected to increase suddenly to ten times the aver­
age of the preceding decade. Such a great increase was 
expected to bring a large increase in the number and 
complexity of tax cases.
Griswold had studied both the Traynor proposal 
and the criticisms of it. He avoided much of the same 
criticism by omitting several recommendations made by 
Traynor and Surrey. Instead, he settled upon the single 
element in their proposal which could bring about a sub­
stantial improvement in light of the changes discussed
Zf,k
G. A. Youngquist, "Proposed Radical Changes in 
the Federal Tax Machinery," American Bar Association Jour- 
nal, 25:353, 1939*
4-5
-\Erwin N . Griswold, "The Need for a Court of Tax 
Appeals," Harvard Law Review, 57:1153* 1944,
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above— a Court of Tax Appeals. Of course, Griswold pro­
posed refinements to the suggestion based upon the cri­
ticisms that the proposed single court for tax appeals had 
drawn earlier.
Professor Griswold eloquently covered every facet 
of the problem in building support for his position. One 
interesting rebuttal which he made was against the argu­
ment for the status quo. The status quo argument was that 
delays and conflicts are not necessarily undesirable
because, "a second consideration by a second tribunal of-
46
ten corrects an initial error." Griswold found the 
assumption of a "right answer" in tax questions interesting 
and joined with Surrey in. the position that many tax 
questions were no closer to a "right" decision after four 
or five circuit courts of appeal had fought over them, than
Ilo
when the first court had rendered judgment. '
Criticisms of the Griswold Proposal
Criticism of Griswold's proposal centered around 
two main points. First, Robert Miller explained how the 
existing process for settling a tax dispute could be di- 
ded into five stages. He noted that Griswold based his 
position heavily upon the potential total time delay of 
nine years, and Miller argued that Griswold's suggestion
^Prettyman, p. 440.
47
Griswold, pp. 1190-1191 *
^8Ibid., p. 1162.
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would only save substantial time in the fourth stage while 
ignoring the longest delays which were in other stages.
The other major point made by Miller was that about 96 
percent of the cases reaching the circuit courts were dis­
posed of without undue delay. Miller relied upon a study
Ilq
made by Remmlein for this statistic. 7
Madeline Remmlein conducted a study-' in an effort 
to evaluate Professor Griswold's charges. Her study 
covered a five-year period (October, 1939. to September,
194/f) 0f civil tax litigation of both the Supreme Court 
and the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Remmlein*s 
method of study was to review the Supreme Court decisions 
for those cases involving civil tax issues and categorize 
them so as to isolate the conflict cases from the others.'*1’ 
Then she traced both sets of cases back to their origin 
to develop a comparison of the time required in the various 
stages for each class of cases.
One finding of her study was that there were long 
delays only in unusual c a s e s . R e m m l e i n  interpreted 
the data to indicate a fallacy in the charge that
l±Q
^Robert N. Miller, "Can Tax Appeals be Central­
ized?" Taxes. 23j303-305# 1945* See also Robert N. Miller, 
"The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases* A Specialized 
Court of Tax Appeals," American Bar Association Journal. 
40*563, 1945.
-*°Madeline Remmlein, "Tax Controversies," George 
Washington Law Review, 13*416, 1944-45.
51Ibid., p. 419.
52Ibid., p. 431.
conflicting circuit court decisions delayed settlement 
of tax controversies. ^ She also took exception to the 
charge that there is a lack of certainty in circuit court 
decisions. To support her contention she points out that 
only 3*8 percent of the circuit court decisions were re­
viewed "by the Supreme Court because of a conflict and 1.5 
percent for other reasons. From this she concluded that
almost 95 percent of all circuit court decisions are final
<Il
and thereby certainty reigns. Although her figures are 
undoubtedly accurate, she seems to have missed the issue 
in the lack-of-certainty charge. Obviously, the Supreme 
Court can only review a small percentage of all cases—  
either a vain attempt, or a successful one, in reviewing 
a substantial percentage of cases would frustrate the 
objectives of the judicial system. The matter is not a 
lack of certainty in those particular cases, but a lack of 
certainty in those cases subsequently arising that contain 
the same issues. Remmlein conducted another study for a 
three year period immediately following the period of the 
first study. This latter study merely supported the for­
mer, but it did indicate a possible trend toward a greater 
total elapsed time until final settlement of a case.-^
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
-^Madeline Remmlein, "A Time Study of Certain Tax 
Controversies," George Washington Law Review. 16:238, 19^7- 
i*8.
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New Comments in the Fifties
One article published in 1953 is interesting be­
cause it was written by a judge of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. After careful consideration Judge 
Walter Pope concluded that the objections to the Court of 
Tax Appeals by the American Bar Association could be re­
duced to one substantial objection— a fear that the creation 
of a new court with seven or nine members to be appointed 
at one time by a single appointing authority would result 
in the appointment of judges of doubtful judicial quali­
fications and ability because of political considerations. 
However, he noted that the great weakness shown to exist 
by Traynor and Griswold at the circuit court level was 
still in existence. Judge Pope then set forth a plan for 
appointing members to a Tax Court of Appeals which would 
avoid the above objections, and he called upon others to 
improve his recommendations. After expressing the belief 
that for prospective use a "right" rule does not exist and 
that one answer is as good as any other for future guidance, 
he, too, adopted the words of Justice Brandeis in tax 
matters: "It is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled than that it be settled right.
^Walter L. Pope, "A Court of Tax Appeals: A Call
for Reexamination," American Bar Association Journal. 39: 
275-276, 1953- ------------------- -------------
57Ibid., pp. 275, 27?.
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Peter Nevitt conducted a cursory examination of 
the results of the appeals from the Tax Court for the four 
years 1952 through 1955 "to all of the courts of appeals. 
While he acknowledged the danger in making conclusions from 
a comparison of the number of cases affirmed with the 
number reversed without particular knowledge of each case, 
he suggested that taxpayers had a good chance of obtaining 
a reversal of an adverse Tax Court case (33>7%) and that 
some circuit courts had a tendency to favor taxpayers, 
while others favored the government. Such a high percen­
tage of reversals indicated the lack of uniformity in tax 
decisions. Nevitt recommended increased review of circuit 
court decisions by the Supreme Court as the most practical 
way of achieving uniformity.
Comments in the Sixties
The early 1960's found several writers again dis­
cussing a Court of Tax Appeals. All were in favor of
59such a court. x One study was made by Professor Lowndes. 
Lowndes* thesis was simple: "It is time to rescue the
Supreme Court from federal taxation; it is time to rescue
-^Nevitt, pp. 311-316.
59-^Philip E. Heckerling, "The Quest for Tax Certain­
ty: A Court of Tax Appeals," Taxes. ^0*37, 1962. Earnest
J. Brown, "The Growing ’Common Law* of Taxation," Southern 
California Law Review, 3^ 1235* 1960-61. Charles L. B. 
Lowndes, "Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court," Supreme 
Court Review, p. 222, i960. Louis A. Del Cotto, "The Need 
for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and A Study," 
Buffalo Law Review, 12:5, 1962-63.
federal -taxation from the Supreme Court.u^° In support 
of his contention Professor Lowndes first reviewed all of 
the federal income, estate, and gift tax cases going to 
the Supreme Court since ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment through the 1959 term. He classified the 618 
cases into the three categories of criminal cases, con­
stitutional cases, and construction cases. The purpose
of this classification was to evaluate whether or not the
61Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction in tax cases.
Professor Lowndes found that only 22 of the cases 
were criminal cases involving income tax evasion. He be­
lieved that since these cases generally involved elements 
of criminal law rather than technical interpretation of 
tax laws, the Supreme Court should continue jurisdiction 
in order to protect the rights of defendents. Twenty-two 
cases over approximately fifty years should not be con­
sidered a heavy burden for the Court. Furthermore, the 
constitutional cases upholding the tax laws have served 
to substantially reduce the probability of a significant 
number of constitutional issues. Since the Supreme Court 
already has the power to make final determinations in con­
stitutional cases, it should continue to do so regardless 
of whether they come up through the present system or
6o
Lowndes, p. 222. 
6lIbid., p. 223*
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through a Court of Tax Appeals.
The cases involving the construction of statutes 
constitute a preponderance of the cases reaching the 
Supreme Court. An examination of the class prompted 
Lowndes to comment that such cases are characterized by 
triviality and futility. Part of the problem was explained 
as follows:
Apart from exposure to the constant changes of 
Congressional nullification, Supreme Court cases 
construing the federal income tax make poor pre­
cedents because they frequently involve the appli­
cation of a statutory standard to a specific 
factual situation rather than the formulation of 
a legal rule of general application.
His final conclusion was that no reason could be found
to have the Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction in these
64cases instead of a Court of Tax Appeals.
Louis Del Cotto conducted a study similar to the 
one undertaken by Remmlein. Professor Del Cotto*s study 
covered a five year term beginning in October, 1955— 16 
years after the beginning of the period investigated by 
Remmlein. This latter study is interesting because 
the passage of time affords a better answer to some ques­
tions raised by the earlier one. A specific example is 
the question as to whether or not a trend for increasing
62Ibid., p. 224.
63Ibid.. p. 226.
6^Ibid.. p. 257.
6^
JDel Cotto, p. 12.
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the total required time until final settlement of tax 
cases had developed at the end of the Remmlein study, or 
whether the increase was the result of a random aberration.
Del Cotto found that the median time for a tax case 
until final disposition by the Supreme Court had increased 
by about one year over the earlier study. In the later 
study the median time was eight years, four months, and 
ninteen days. He classified all these cases into either 
the conflict group or the non-conflict group and found a 
median time of eight years, ten months, and thirteen days 
for the conflict cases and seven years, eight months, and 
seventeen days for the others. In comparison to the Remm­
lein study, the time for the conflict cases has increased 
considerably (from 7.6 years) while the time required for 
the others has decreased slightly (from 8.25 years).^
Professor Del Cotto was quite interested in time
67periods which he called the "conflict-developing period" '
Z Q
and the "conflict-resolving period" as well as the total
66Ibid.. p. 16.
67'ibid.. p. 2^. This period was defined ast 
". . . the time between the first decision of a circuit 
court of appeals deciding a particular issue and a later de 
cision of another circuit which is reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, because it conflicts either with that first decision 
or some intervening court of appeals decision on that 
issue."
68
Ibid., p. 25* This period is defined asi ". . . 
the total time an issue remains unsettled because of the 
possibility of review by the Supreme Court upon the develop 
ment of a conflict."
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time until the final determination of a case. Jn his 
study the conflict-resolving time had increased to l/l 
years from the 2 3/^ years of the earlier study. His 
awareness of the need for rapid, final answers on questions 
that affect planning by taxpayers and the daily administra­
tion of revenue laws led him to make the value judgment 
that even 2 3/^ years was too long for a tax question to 
remain in doubt. He commented:
The evidence clearly demonstrates that conflicts 
do not discriminate as to whether they will de­
velop slowly or rapidly depending on the complex­
ity of the issue, or the number of taxpayers it 
affects. Conflicts involving the simplest issues, 
with the most widespread effect, can develop very 
slowly . . .  or very rapidly . . . .  And issues 
involved in slow-developing conflicts are generally 
decided many times in the courts of appeals before 
resolution by the Supreme Court. This is not an 
encouraging situation, expecially since conflict- 
developing periods are becoming substantially 
longer.
Present Status
The study by Professor Del Cotto is the latest sig­
nificant work on the judicial system in tax cases. The 
relatively recent comments by Senator Long and the publi­
city given by the various new agencies in regard to fair­
ness in tax matters, as the Tax Reform Act of 1969 became 
part of the law, indicate dissatisfaction still exists. In
69Ibid., p. 31.
a similar vein another circuit court of appeals judge 
has spoken out on the judicial system in g e n e r a l . H e  
notes that increasing legislation on civil rights and 
social welfare is also constantly increasing litigation 
and the burden upon the courts. Rather than calling for 
more judges, he calls for advanced techniques to produce 
more and shorter opinions and new methods that simplify 
and expedite the process of resolving issues because, 
"Justice delayed, amounts in many cases, to no justice at 
all— the parties are dead, conditions have changed, oppor­
tunities are lost, and time, our most valuable asset, is
71wasted."
Collectively, all of these writers reflect the con­
cern of American society for equity in the federal tax 
system. More particularly, the controversy over the pro­
posal for a single Court of Tax Appeals represents this 
concern in an important subset of the tax system— the judi­
cial administration of cases. The present study reflects 
this writer's concern for equity in an even smaller subset 
of the latter one— the accumulated earnings tax cases. How­
ever, it is expected that this study will bear directly 
upon the issue concerning a Court of Tax Appeals.
70Floyd R. Gibson, "Some Observations on Our United 
States Court of Appeals," University of Missouri at Kansas 
City Law Review. 35:261, 1967.
71Ibid., p. 31.
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THE METHODOLOGY
All of the aforementioned research on conflicting 
cases was done vertically from the top to the bottom. Such 
an approach serves two purposes* (1) It substantially re­
duces the number of cases that must be reviewed due to 
the inherent filtering of cases that takes place before 
a case can reach the Supreme Court* and (2) the problem 
of classification is solved because the Supreme Court 
generally states whether or not the case is being reviewed 
due to a conflict. A particular advantage of this approach 
is that all of the areas of taxation that contain a con­
flict have a possibility of being reviewed by the Supreme 
Court. Thus, one is somewhat assured that his study will 
cover a broad range of tax issues. Unfortunately, this 
approach has some severe inadequacies. Due to the manner 
in which cases are selected for review by the Supreme Court, 
one has no way of knowing whether or not the cases selected 
are actually representative of all the types of conflicts 
that exist. One can only assume that they are. More im­
portantly, one has no idea as to the extent of the exis-r* 
tence of conflict cases at the trial court level.
This study is predominantly one involving a hori­
zontal analysis at the level of original jurisdiction in 
tax cases— the Tax Court, the United States District 
Courts, and the Court of Claims. Vertical analysis is
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is made from this level to the Supreme Court in contrast 
to the earlier studies. The court decisions constitute 
the original data for the study. The sample size will be 
the whole universe. This study has been limited as ex­
plained previously.
All of the issues in any lawsuit can be classified 
as either questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed 
questions of law and fact. The heterogeneous nature of 
the cases presents a considerable obstacle to a comparison 
based upon the final decisions. This type of comparison 
would' be the best one possible for an evaluation of equity, 
but the constraint of reasonable classification is extreme­
ly difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in accumulated 
earnings tax cases. However, cases may be examined for 
the existence of a given issue. Cases having a common 
issue may be compared for the judicial treatment of that 
issue and satisfy the criteria of equity and reasonable 
classification as to that issue. This method of comparison 
could be expected to result in a comparison of issues out­
side of the context of the entire case. Consequently, an 
evaluation of equity in specific cases based upon a com­
parison of the judicial treatments of a single issue would 
be as questionable as a similar evaluation based upon a 
comparison of cases having heterogeneous issues and facts 
in violation of the principle of reasonable classification. 
Yet, a comparison of the judicial treatments of a specific 
issue in conformity to equity and reasonable classification
under an assumption of ceteris paribus does have a sig­
nificant advantage. The advantage is that an objective 
comparison may be made. By deduction from this type of 
comparison within a framework of the acknowledged signi- 
ficance of the specified issues by the courts, a general 
evaluation of equity may be made for the past and for the 
future, too. Perhaps the validity of this general evalu­
ation is somewhat based upon this reasoning: If cases
could be found that were compatible with the requirements 
of reasonable classification, but with contrary results, 
the logical explanation would be that the judicial atti­
tudes toward the given issues and facts were different.
The objective comparison described above permits judicial 
attitudes to be ascertained for an evaluation of equity, 
and it is utilized in this study.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
CHAPTER I has presented an introduction to the 
study, the problem, definitions of some terms, a review 
of the literature and the methodology to be utilized.
The presentation of the problem included a statement 
thereof and an explanation of the importance and scope 
of the study, The terms equity, reasonable classification.
incident have been defined specifically for this 
study. The review of the literature noted various propo­
sals and criticism^ relevant to the present study.
CHAPTER TT presents the development of two sub­
stantive rules of law* The legislative history is briefly 
reviewed for applicable provisions and potentially signi­
ficant changes. This chapter investigates the two rules 
of law that involve "purpose" and its relationships to 
the "reasonable needs of the business."
CHAPTER III investigates the development of sec­
tions 53^ and 535* Particular attention is given to the 
early controversy that surrounded the judicial treatment 
of section 53^* This chapter traces the development of 
section 53^ through the cases litigated since the early 
controversy. Also, the chapter presents the courts' in­
creasing awareness of section 535* Finally, a proposal 
is presented for the interaction of the two sections.
CHAPTER IV examines the application of accounting 
concepts in the determination of the reasonable needs 
of the business. Particular attention is given to the 
judicial misunderstanding of basic accounting concepts.
The specific accounting concepts which are analyzed are 
accumulated earnings, depreciation, working capital, and 
appropriation of retained earnings. In addition to the 
examination of these concepts, an accounting rationale 
to support the courts’ approach to analyze the reasonable­
ness of accumulations is presented.
CHAPTER V is an investigation of the final deter­
minations in the accumulated earnings tax cases. Tables 
are presented with the decisions classified by various
jurisdictions. Although such tabulations violate the 
principle of reasonable classification, the results still 
provide limited insight into judicial attitudes.
CHAPTER VI contains the summary and conclusions 
for this study. The conclusions Include an evaluation 
of past equity, an evaluation of future equity, and recom­
mendations. The recommendations are based upon previous 
recommendations and criticisms examined with regard 
to the results of the present study.
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO RULES OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION
The ultimate step in evaluating equity would be to 
compare cases in which the facts conform to the constraint 
of reasonable classification. If one assumes that the 
facts in all of the accumulated earnings tax cases are 
exactly alike, one would expect the same outcome in all 
cases because every case arising ■ during a specified time 
interval would be governed by the same Internal Revenue 
Code provisions. This expectation is contingent upon the 
Code being interpreted exactly the same in each case. If 
the Code is not interpreted exactly the same, the results 
in the cases might not be the same— a potentially inequi­
table result.
In accumulated earnings tax cases the applicable 
Code sections have not been interpreted the same, and the 
different constructions have been noted." A presentation
Robert M. Britton, "Corporate Taxation— Accumulated 
Earnings--Section 531 Accumulated Earnings Tax is Levied 
If Any Purpose For The Accumulation Is Tax Avoidance," 
Villanova Law Review, 1^:5^. 19&9* Van Wert, "Donruss and 
the Accumulated Earnings Tax," Tax Law Review. 26:171.
1970i Donald J. Holzman, "Burden of Proof in Accumulated 
Earnings Tax Cases and Its Development on the Second Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals," Buffalo Law Review, 11:328, 1962.
37
of the different interpretations is sufficient to estab­
lish the fact of their existence. However, such pre­
sentations do not reveal the interplay between the trial 
courts and the appeliate courts. Also, they do not reveal 
the extent of their adoption by the trial courts. This 
chapter traces the full development of two rules of law 
that are essential to an evaluation of equity in accumu­
lated earnings tax cases. The two rules of law to be con­
sidered ares (1) the definition of “purpose," and (2) the 
effect of a determination of the "reasonable needs of the 
business" upon "purpose,"
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The first personal income tax statute passed after 
the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified contained the ori­
ginal accumulated earnings tax provision. However, instead 
of imposing the tax upon the corporation, Section 11(A)(2), 
33 Stat. 166 imposed the tax upon the shareholders of any 
corporation "formed or fraudulently availed of for the 
purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through 
the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accu­
mulate instead of being divided or distributed . . . ."
One should note that the word "fraudently" modifies 
"availed of." A provision was made that accumulations be­
yond the reasonable needs of the business "shall be prima 
facie evidence of a fraudulent purpose to escape
39
p
such tax . . .
In the 1918 Act the modifier "fraudently" was 
3
omitted. The Revenue Act of 1921 shifted the burden of
the accumulated earnings tax from the taxpayer to the
corporation, and the accumulated tax rate was 25 percent
as seen belowi
Sec. 220. That if any corporation, however created 
or organized, is formed or availed of for the purpose 
of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon its 
stockholders or members through the medium of permit­
ting its gains and profits to accumulate instead of 
being divided or distributed, there shall be levied, 
collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the 
net income of such corporation a tax equal to 25 
per centum of the amount thereof, which shall be in 
addition to the tax imposed by section 230 of this 
title . . . .  The fact that any corporation is a 
mere holding company, or that the gains and profits 
are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable 
needs of the business, shall be prima facie evidence 
of a purpose to escape the surtax} but the fact that 
the gains and profits are in any case permitted to 
accumulate and become surplus shall not be construed 
as evidence of a purpose to escape the tax in such
case unless the Commissioner certifies that in his
opinion such accumulation is unreasonable for the 
purposes of the business . . .
Section 220 of the Revenue Acts of 1924- and 1926 and Sec­
tion lOif- of the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932 are essen­
tially identical. Although the arrangement of the wording 
in this series of. acts differs somewhat from the Revenue 
Act of 1921, the most significant change appears to be an
^Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 167. One should 
note "a” preceding "fraudulent purpose."
^Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 220, *K) Stat. 1072. 
l±
Revenue Act of 1921, Sec. 220, k2 Stat. 2^7.
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increase in the accumulated tax rate to 50 percent be- 
ginning with the Revenue Act of 1924.
The 1934 Act excluded personal holding companies 
from the accumulated earnings tax, but they became subject 
to a tax on undistributed income regardless of the pur­
pose for the accumulation. Another change was a decline 
in the 50 percent rate to graduated rates of 25 and 35 
percent. Finally, the word "escape" was changed to "avoid" 
in the provision for the prima facie evidence clause.^
The 1936 Act was essentially similar to the 1934 
Act. However, the Revenue Act of 1938 made a change in 
the prima facie evidence rule, A review of the 1921 Act 
quoted above shows that the prima facie evidence provision 
applied to both holding companies and operating companies 
that accumulated earnings beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business. The 1938 Act removed the latter group from 
the clause and provided for it as follows:
Sec. 102(c) Evidence Determinative of Purpose.
The fact that the earnings or profits of a corpo­
ration are permitted to accumulate beyond the rea­
sonable needs of the business shall be determinative 
of the purpose to avoid surtax upon shareholders 
unless the corporation by the clear preponderance 
of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
In this evidentiary clause "purpose" is preceded by "the,"
while in the prima facie evidence clause "purpose" is still
preceded by "a" as in the 1921 Act. This is the second
^Revenue Act of 1924, Sec. 220, 43 Stat. 277.
^Revenue Act of 1934, Sec. 102, 358, 48 Stat. 680,
751*
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time that this difference in the articles used before
purpose has been pointed out. A general reading of the
statutes seems to indicate that the change was most likely
inadvertent. However, one may argue that the difference
7
was intentional. The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 con­
tained provisions similar ta those in the Revenue Act 
of 1938. The next substantial changes came in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 195^»
The significant changes in the 195^ Code included 
a new burden of proof provision for Tax Court cases, a 
minimum and general credit against the tax, and the ex­
press extension of the reasonable needs of business to
Q
include the reasonably anticipated needs of the business. 
Thus one can see that there has been no significant change 
to indicate a congressional intent to alter the original 
meaning of purpose. Instead, the changes have been to 
affect the application of purpose indirectly through 
changes in the "reasonable needs of business" and burden 
of proof provisions.
The brief legislative history above reveals the 
close relationship of "purpose" and "reasonable needs of 
the business." This relationship is examined In a later 
section. Since this writer believes that the relationship
^U. S. v. The Donruss Co;, 89 S.Ct. 501 (I969),
393 U.S. 297.
Internal Revenue Code of 195^» sections 531-537.
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can be best understood after one has a full, understanding 
of the various views of "purpose," the next section 
examines the development of "purpose" in detail.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PURPOLK
An extrication of a judicial view of purpose from 
the greater relationship is not always feasible. Ln 
those instances, the reader should concentrate his atten­
tion on the definition of purpose. The two early cases 
below illustrate this problem. In United Business Corpo­
ration. which was promulgated in 1930, the calendar year 
1921, governed by Section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1921, 
was under scrutiny. The Board of Tax Appeals grappled 
with the statute and expressed this opinion:
The emphasis in the statute is place.d upon the 
purpose, and if this purpose clearly appears, 
the corporation is subject to the tax, whether 
the accumulation be large or small. Accumulations 
in excess of the needs of the business are evi­
dence of the purpose but are not necessary to 
subject the corporation to the tax.9
Taxes were collected in R.C. Tway Coal Sales Co. v. U.D.
for the years 1922 and 1923 under the 1921 Act. However,
this District Court viewed the matter as follows:
Even if it should clearly appear that the accumu­
lations were in excess of the reasonable needs 
of the corporate business, section 220 would not 
apply unless it further appears that the accu­
mulations were intentionally permitted for the
0
United Business Corp. of America, 19 BTA 809, 
828 (1930).
^3
express purpose of enabling; the stockholders 
to evade the surtax.
One may find it difficult to blot out the "reasonable
needs of the business" and concentrate on "purpose." If
one is able to do so, then in the former quote the idi.-a
is that the tax applies if the purpose "clearly appears,"
and in the Hatter quote it appHies if the accumulations
were for the "express purpose."
Certainly an express purpose would be the one that
clearly appears. Yet "express" can also have a meaning
that goes beyond "clear" to indicate limitation. Express
can meani "Of a special sort; . . * Adapted to or in-
11tended for a particular purpose." If this shade of 
difference in meaning seems to be too fine, then another 
reading in the full context of the quotes shows the ob­
vious attitude of the district court to be more reluctant 
in applying the accumulated earnings tax than the Board, 
Thus, inferentially, the Board would be apt to find a 
clear purpose existing with other legitimate business 
purposes, while the district court would be disposed to 
conlcude that the prohibited purpose did not exist if 
other legitimate business purposes were present. This 
latter construction would be most favorable to taxpayers.
1012 AFTR 1073, 1076 (DC, Ky.; 1933)# 3 F. Supp.
688.
11Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Spring­
field, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co.', 1970), p. 29^.
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One should note that in the former case the Board held
for the government and that in the latter case the district
court held for the taxpayer. Furthermore, upon appeal
12both decisions were affirmed.
Another early district court decision implied that 
the prohibited purpose could exist with legitimate busi­
ness purposes and that if there was "a" purpose or "any" 
purpose the tax would be applicable. This deduction was 
required because the court did not deal directly with 
any of the possible constructions of purpose. In contrast 
to the cases above, the district court stated in referring 
to the taxpayer:
It took no action whatsoever for the purpose of 
preventing the imposition of surtaxes upon its 
shareholders . . . .  Neither the plaintiff nor 
its officers or directors entertained at any time 
a purpose to avoid the.imposition of surtaxes 
upon its shareholders. J
Any Illegal purpose is further refuted by the 
fact . . . .
I am of the opinion . . . that neither the petitioner 
nor its officers entertained a purpose to avoid 
the imposition of surtaxes upon its shareholders. 
Accordingly, it follows that the petitioner was 
not formed or available of . . . for the purpose 
of preventing the imposition of the surtax upon 
its shareholders. . . . ^
1211 AFTR 1373 (2 cir. 1933)i 15 AFTR 189 (6 Cir.
1935).
13^Charleston Lumber Co._v. U.S., 20 AFTR 54-, 57- 
58 (DC W. Va.; 1937. 20 F. Supp. 83, dismissed 93 F. 2d 
1018 (4- Cir. 1937), 20 AFTR 64*2.
1^Ibid., p. 60.
^ Ibid. i p. 6l.
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A direct, positive adoption of the "a*' or "any" 
purpose construction for the purpose would normally lead 
one to conclude that the court's position was the most 
unfavorable one possible for the taxpayer. Should an 
indirect adoption of the same interpretation usually 
lead to the same conclusion? One would think so. Yet 
the approach evidenced here resulted in a district court 
decision just as favorable to the taxpayer as the pre­
ceding district court decision by negating this unfavor­
able construction of purpose. However, not all district 
court decisions are favorable to taxpayers in either legal 
interpretation or factual determination.
The Beim Company was found to be a holding com­
pany, and the tax was assessed for the years 1932 and 
1933. District Court Justice Nordbye took the position 
that the evidence indicated the primary purpose of the
corporation was to keep dividends from going to the share-
1 6holder, Mr. Beim. In another case a district court
acknowledged the Board’s view in United Business while
17holding against the taxpayer.
18
In National Grocery Company the Board found as
x Beim Co. v. Landy, 26 AFTR 1189, 1195 (DC,
Minn, j 193YH
^World Pub. Co. v. United States, 35 AFTR I671 
(DC, Okla. 'T7^7)~
1835 BTA 163. 167 (1936).
a fact that earnings had been accumulated far beyond
a corporation’s reasonable business needs. The Board
formed the opinion that the prima facie evidence of
purpose resulting from this fact and the statute had
1 9not been rebutted. Upon appeal 7 the Third Circuit sub­
stituted its judgment for that of the Board in handing 
down a reversa.1. On the matter of purpose this appellate 
court frtnnd proof that the dominant nurpose for the accu- 
rn'ilntion was to expand the size of an already large gro­
cery store chain. The dissenting opinion pointed out that 
such purpose could exist with the proscribed purpose. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
the Third Circuit for exceeding its limited power of re-
20view in substituting its judgment for that of the Board. 
However, the contrary views of the majority and dissenting 
opinions on purpose were ignored.
Slightly more than a year before Beim, the Board 
had a holding company case before it. The R. L. Blaffer 
and Company case was promulgated in 1938 for fiscal years 
ending in 1932, 1933. and 193^* On this occasion the 
Board took an especially strong position in evaluating the 
prima facie evidence rule with the purpose as follows: 
Drastic as the tax may be, the statute clearly
19^ National Grocery Co. v. Helvering, 20 AFTR 3^7, 
3^8, 350 (3 Cir.; 1937).
20
Helvering v. National Grocery Co.. 20 AFTR 1269, 
1275 (1938), 304 U.S. 282.
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expresses the legislative intent to apply it to a 
mere holding or investment corporation unless the 
corporation succeeds in establishing its purpose 
to be wholly other than that of preventing sur­
tax upon its shareholders— not only that there 
was another, purpose, but that there was a com­
plete absence of the disapproved purpose. Ob- 
biously, a holding or investment corporation may 
be formed or availed of for several purposes, but 
it cannot escape this tax unless it proves that 21 
it had no purpose to enable the escape of surtax.
The First Circuit examined the Board's position
Blaffer and commented in Chicago Stock Yards,
Perhaps this is too strong a statement! but at least 
it is clear that section 104 would apply if in the 
totality of reasons which induced the continuing 
of the accumulation the forbidden motive of surtax 
avoidance played a substantial part. 2
This case also went to the Supreme Court after the Cir­
cuit reversed the Board. Again, the Supreme Court rein­
stated the Board's decision. Without taking a positive 
position on the correct interpretation of purpose the 
Supreme Court did say:
A corporate practice adopted for mere convenience 
or other reasons, and without tax significance when 
adopted, may have been continued with the addi­
tional motive of avoiding surtax on the stockholders.‘ 
The Board's conclusion may justifiably have been 
reached in the view that, whatever the motive when 
the practice of accumulation was adopted, the pur­
pose of avoiding surtax induced or aided in inducing 
the continuance of the practice. ^
This passage was also quoted by the Second Circuit as it
2137 BTA 851, 856 (1938).
22ChJoago Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 29 AFTR 
1013, 1014 (1 Cir. 1942).
23•^Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co*. 30 AFTR 
1091, 1094 11934), 318 U.S. 693*
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rejected the dominant purpose definition in 1934.
Five years later the Tenth Circuit adopted a test which 
seems slightly different in effect than this view. The 
Court said, "Such purpose need not be the sole purpose 
behind the accumulation. It is sufficient if it is one 
of the determining purposes." J The Eighth Circuit 
adopted the same test as did several district courts.2^
The word "determining" creates a test that requires more 
than just the one or any purpose-test, but less than is 
required by the primary or dominant purpose test. In
other district court cases the jury has been charged with
2 8the one purpose test.
The Blaffer case apparently represents a crystalli­
zation of the Board's position on the subject as that view
24
Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner. 31 AFTR 
394, 396 (2 Cir. 1943).
2-^World Publishing Co. v. U.S.. 37 AFTR 150, 153 
(10 Cir. 1948).
26Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 AFTR 2d 
1109 (8 Cir. 1958).
2^Koma. Inc. v. Jones. 44 AFTR 1267, 1270 (DC 
Okla.; 1953)t Hattiesburg Compress Co. v. U.S.. 6 AFTR 2d 
5012, 5017 (DC, M i s s . 1960/i Whitfield King"& Co.. Inc. v. 
U.S., 7 AFTR 2d 1339> 1340 (DC, Tenn.1 19^1){ Mobile Stove 
and Pulley Manufacturing Co. v. U.S., 11 AFTR 21 944, 951 
(DC, Ala. ; “1962J.
28
Fischer Lime & Cement Co. v. U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d 
5540, 5541 (DC, Tenn.; 1963); American Lawn Mower Co. v. 
U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d 6l62, 6l66, 6172 (DC, Ind.1 1963); 
Harrison Bolt & Nut Co. v. U.S.. 14 AFTR 2d 5360, 5361,
5465 (DC, Md.; 1964).
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was cited approvingly in several subsequent decisions.29
However, almost fifteen years later the 'fax Court made
some digression from the above view in Gazette Telegraph 
30Company. In Gazette the Tax Court saidi "There were 
bona fide business reasons . . . .  We cannot find on 
the facts that the dominant motive in formation of peti­
tioner was to avoid s u r t a x . T h i s  departure seems to 
be limited to this particular case. Yet it was another 
six years in Young Motor Company before this Court ex­
pressly reaffirmed its former position.-*2
In remanding the Young Motor Company case, the 
First Circuit Court observed comments in the Tax Court's 
ouinion that preventing the imposition of the surtax up­
on stockholders was "one" of the taxpayer's purposes and 
that the accumulated earnings tax would apply even though 
legitimate business purposes could justify an accumu­
lation of earnings. In finding the prohibited purpose the 
Tax Court seemingly attributed heavy weight to the tax­
payer's knowledge of the tax results of accumulating ear­
nings. The First Circuit then concluded!
29Mead Corporation, 38 BTA 68?, 69? (1938); Trico 
Products Corporation, 46 BTA 346, 3?4 (1942); Whitney 
Chain & Manufacturing Co.. 3 TC 1109, 1120.
3°19 TC 692 (1935).
31Ibid., p. 707,
3232 TC 1336, 1344-45 (1959).
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The statute does not say "a" purpose, but "the" 
purpose. The issue is not what are the necessary, 
and to that extent contemplated consequences of 
the accumulation, but what was the primary or dom­
inant prupose which lead to the decision . . . .
The Tax Court's test was altogether too favorable 
to the government. 33
Thus this Court changed the wording that it used pre­
viously in Chicago Stock Yards. An interesting contrast 
to this value .judgment was given by the Fifth Circuit 
in Barrow Manufacturing Company. There the Court found 
no error in a failure of the Tax Court to apply the 
primary or dominant purpose test and said,
The utility of the badly needed presumption arising 
from the accumulation of earnings or profits beyond 
the reasonable needs of the business is well nigh 
destroyed if that presumption in turn is saddled with 
requirement of proof of the primary or dominant 
purpose of the accumulation.^
This issue was presented in Donruss Co. v. U . S .35 
to the Sixth Circuit. in that case the District Judge 
had refused to clarify the interpretation of purpose. 
Instead, he insisted upon giving only the exact statutory 
wording in his charge to the jury. The Circuit Court 
believed that the charge in its entirety might have induced 
the jury to think- that tax pvoidance would have to he the 
only purpose in order to assess the accumulated earnings 
tax. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "tax avoidance must
33Young Motor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner 6 AFTR 2d 
5350 (1 CirT 1960)7 281 F. 2d 488.
^Barrow Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Commissioner 
8 AFTR 2d 5330V 5333” (5 Cir. 1961), 29^ F. 2d 74.
3520 AFTR 2d 5505 (6 Cir. 196?).
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be the dominant, controlling, or impelling motive behind 
an accumulation in order to impose the accumulated earnings 
tax."
The Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari 
by the Government due to the conflict among the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals. In reaching a decision the Supreme 
Court examined the legislative history in detail including 
various committee reports in an attempt to discern the 
intent of Congress. The "one of the purposes" test was 
adopted. A part of the Court’s analysis followst
Respondent would have us adopt a test that requires 
that tax avoidance purpose heed be dominant, impelling, 
or controlling. It seems to us that such a test would 
exacerbate the problems that Congress was trying to 
avoid. Rarely is there one motive, or even one domi­
nant motive, for corporate decisions. Numerous factors 
contribute to the action ultimately decided upon. 
Respondent’s test would allow taxpayers to escape the 
tax when it is proved that at least one other motive 
was equal to tax avoidance. We doubt that such a 
determination can be made with any accuracy, and it 
is certainly one which will depend almost exclusively 
on the interested testimony of corporate management. 
Respondent’s test would thus go a long way toward 
destroying the presumption that Congress created to 
meet this very problem, , . ,
Finally, we cannot subscribe to respondent’s 
suggestion that our holding would make purpose totally 
irrelevant. It still serves to isolate those cases in 
which tax avoidance motives did not contribute to the
^6 Ibid,. n. 5500.
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decision to accumulate. Obviously in such a case 
imposition of the tax would be futile. In addition, 
"purpose" means more than mere knowledge, undoubtedly 
present in nearly every case. It is still open for 
the taxpayer to show that even though knowledge of the 
tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not 
contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings.37
Although this 1969 decision finally laid the matter to rest,
the case contained one final touch of irony in the dissent.
The surprising thing is not that Justices Harlan, Douglas,
and Stewart dissented from the construction of purpose by
the majority, but that they suggested yet another test as
follows*
. . . the jury should be instructed to impose the tax
if it finds that the taxpayer would not have accumulated 
earnings but for Its knowledge that a tax saving would 
result. This "but for cause" test would be consistent 
with the statutory language. . . .38
Thus, after almost four decades, a clear interpretation
of purpose became the settled law of the land.
In spite of the various interpretations of "purpose"
presented in the preceding cases, a view represented by a
significant proportion of the cases has not been mentioned.
That view is the lack of any stated construction of purpose.
These cases merely use the language of the statutes in
finding that the purpose did or did not exist. Typically,
the opinions in these decisions devoted a substantial
amount of attention to the matter of the reasonable needs
3723 AFTR 2d 69-418, 423 (1969). 
38lbl<i., p. 69-425.
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of the business. One may now consider the effect of the 
"reasonable needs of the business" upon the "purpose."
This relationship will be considered without regard to any 
specific interpretation of "purpose."
THIS RELATIONSHIP OP THE REASONABLE 
NEEDS OF THE BUSINESS 
TO THE PURPOSE
As a prelude to the investigation of this relation­
ship, one might consider the ways that these two factors 
may be jointly or severally utilized in reaching a decision 
in an accumulated earnings tax case. Table 1 sets out the 
eight paths in diagram form. Although there are eight 
possibilities in an abstract consideration of the matter, 
once an interpretation of the relationship is made only 
some of the paths are available to reach a decision. Each 
time a different interpretation of the relationship is 
introduced by a court opinion the appropriate paths 
required will be noted.
Returning to the early cases, one can see that 
this relationship was the focal point of controversy. One 
will recall this part of an earlier quote from the Board 
of Tax Appeals in United Business Corporation, "Accumula­
tions in excess of the needs of the business are evidence 
of the purpose but are not necessary to subject the corpor- 
ation to the t a x . " T h e  Court also said, "Although the
-^19 BTA 809. 828.
TABLE 1
The Joint and Several Ways that the Issues of the "Reasonable Reeds 
of the Business" and the "Purpose" Kay Be Related
WERE ACCUMULATIONS BEYOND 
THE REASONABLE NEEDS 
OF THE BUSINESS?
WERE ACCUMULATIONS BEYOND 
THE REASONABLE NEEDS 
OF THE BUSINESS?
THE REASONABLE NEEDS 
OF THE BUSINESS 
ARE IGNORED,
) No < 
)
) Yes.
) No
)
)
) Yes.
Does the Accumulated 
Earnings Tax Apply?
. . No (1
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR 
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE?
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR 
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE?
)No • 
)
)Yes
)No.
)
)Yes
)No.
WERE ACCUMULATIONS FOR )
THE PROHIBITED PURPOSE? )Yes
. Yes (2
• NO- <3
. Yes
• (5 
. Yes (6
. No. (7 
. Yes (8
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statute provides that certain facts shall be prima facie
evidence of the purpose, the same purpose may appear from 
40other facts.” The Board found the purpose without 
malting a determination of the reasonable needs of the 
business* Thus, this decision indicates paths seven and 
eight are to be followed.
This position on the reasonable needs of the 
business was the chief subject of the dissenting opinion. 
■Judge Trammell pointed out that this interpretation would 
anply the accumulated earnings tax, not only without con­
sideration of reasonable business needs, but also to small 
accumulations. He believed that the issue of purpose did
not become important until accumulations surpassed reason-
41able business needs. He stated:
The real question for consideration, in my opinion, 
is whether or not the corporation was formed or availed 
of for the purpose of preventing the imoositior; of 
the surtex upon the stockholders through the medium 
of nerm.itting the profits to accumulate beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business. In my opinion both 
intent or purpose and an overt act are necessary to 
bring a eornoration within the penal provisions, and 
the overt act is the accumulation beyond business needs, 
not simply an accumulation, except in a case where it 
is shown that a corporation is formed for the pro­
hibited p u r p o s e . ^2
This view of the relationship would require paths one,
p. 833- 
p. 837*
40
41 
4?
Ibid. 
Ibid. ,
Ibid..
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five, and six to be taken.
The District Court in R .C . Tway did not have as 
much difficulty with this matter as the Board did, but the 
District Court still claimed to have given the matter 
adequate attention in this statement*
A careful study of section 220 discloses that 
before there can be an assessment under its provisions, 
. . . there must be not only an accumulation of gains 
and profits beyond the reasonable business needs of 
the corporation, but such accumulation must have been 
. . . for the purpose . . .  to evade the payment of 
surtaxes . . . .
Upon the appeal of United Business Corporation the
Second Circuit explicitly considered both constructions
of the relationship and concluded that such accumulations
were not necessary in order to find the purpose. They
were deemed to be presumptive evidence of the purpose.
The Court commented upon the relationship in this manner:
A statute which stands on the footing of the parti­
cipants' state of mind may need the support of pre­
sumption, indeed be practically unenforceable with­
out it, but the test remains the state of mind 
itself, and the presumption does no more than make 
the taxpayer show his hand.^
When R .C. Tway was appealed, the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged the soundness of the Second Circuit's view 
and said:
The practical application of the interpretation may, 
however, in most circumstances be of little importance.
^ 1 2  AFTR 1073, 1076. 
^11 AFTR 1373. 137^.
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The condemned purpose in the forming or utilization 
of corporations described in the section is the 
avoidance by stockholders of surtaxes* This purpose 
may be proved unaided by presumption, but the fact 
that the surplus is not unreasonably large in respect 
to the needs of the corporation's business is repug­
nant to the existence of such purpose, and, while 
not conclusive, must be accepted as substantial evi­
dence in denial of proofs or inferences that it
exists.^5
This appeal indicates that paths three, four, five, and 
six should be followed.
In fairness to the rejected construction it should
be noted that Article 352, Regulations 45, adopted for
section 220 of the Revenue Act of 1918 presented the test
and the presumption as though both were required. Justice
Trammell presented this and other support for his own 
46position. At this point the two constructions seem to 
be mutually exclusive. That is, the reasonableness issue 
is a condition that must be met before the purpose becomes 
an issue, or purpose is an issue, even though accumulations 
are reasonable. The two views are not compatible.
When this matter came before the Third Circuit in 
National Grocery Company appeal, that Court's position 
was difficult to reconcile with one or the other of the 
preceding views. The Court said:
The taxes here involved are for the year 1930, and 
from th» above-quoted terms of the law it is clear that 
Congress did not force the distribution with nenaliza-
AFTR 189, 190.
46 19 i»mn 80°. 833-39.
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t-ion of all corporate profits but only where the profits 
'are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable 
needs of the business.* Such being the conditions 
warranting taxation, it follows that the basic question 
is whether the profits here involved were accumulated 
beyond the reasonable needs of its business. If this 
basic fact is established, then, and then only, is 
such accumulation by the statute made 'prima facie 
evidence of a purpose to escape the surtax.’^ 7
Until the last sentence above, the distinct impression is 
given that both elements are required before the tax can 
be levied. Then, as if there was no way around the pre­
sumptive evidence aspect of the statute, the Court recog­
nized it as such. Did this Court deliberately combine the 
two views discussed above? That is, did the Third Circuit 
in bend to make accumulations beyond the reasonable needs 
of the business a condition precedent to a finding of the 
purpose, and then, upon an affirmative showing of this 
element, also make this element presumptive evidence of 
the purpose? The apparent inconsistency is an illusion.
The two views are incompatible when the accumulations do 
not exceed the reasonable needs of the business, but are 
compatible once accumulations become excessive.
In the original decision eight members of the 
Board of Tax Appeals united to render a decision in favor 
of the government while seven members joined in a dissent. 
The disagreement was in weighing the evidence. The dis­
senters agreed with the majority and the Second Circuit
^ 2 0  AFTR 34?, 3^8.
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view in United Business Corporation on this relationship. 
Upon appeal the majority of the Third Circuit agreed with 
the dissent below as to the result, but not as to the law. 
Thus the Third Circuit adopted an interpretation of law 
at odds with that of the Second and Sixth Circuits. A 
dissent on appeal was in favor of the pure presumption 
construction. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir­
cuit in this case without discussion of this issue although 
the evidentiary provision, section lO^-(b), was referred
to as a "presumption."^
In the Chicago Stock Yards case the First Circuit
adopted the presumption construction of the Second Circuit, 
but reversed the Board on other grounds.^0 The Supreme 
Court reversed the First Circuit to reinstate the Board's 
judgment in favor of the government. This time the Supreme 
Court expressly acknowledged the existence of the issue, 
but said: "We find it unnecessary to consider this con­
tention, since we think the Board's decision may be 
supported apart from any presumption arising under the 
Act.”^1
In some subsequent cases the views of the courts
^835 BTA 163» 167-72.
^920 AFTR 1269, 1275*
5°29 AFTR 1003, 1016-19.
5130 AFTR 1090, 1093.
6o
on this relationship are much more difficult to determine. 
For example, if phraseology is used in a case in one place 
to indicate only the presumption construction, hut in 
another place phraseology is used to indicate the reason­
able needs of the business is determinative of the matter, 
what does one conclude?
One explanation could be that this development of 
a shift in emphasis is due to the change in statutory 
language in the Revenue Act of 1938* Previously, section 
102(b) of the 1936 Act provided that the fact that accu­
mulations were beyond the reasonable needs of the business 
was prima facie evidence of the prohibited purpose.
Section 102(c) of the 1938 Act made the same fact deter­
minative of the purpose unless the contrary could be 
proven by the clear preponderence of the evidence. In 
United Business the Second Circuit said that the prima 
facie rule only made the taxpayer "show his hand."^
Given this interpretation, the later rule seemingly 
requires the corporation to go beyond a showing of its 
hand and bear the burden of persuasion upon the factual 
showing required. The First Circuit has twice analyzed 
the difference in the statutory language of the two rules 
and has concluded that the only effect of either provision 
is to increase the taxpayer's burden of proof by an
5211 AFTR 1373. 137^*
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c 3
insignificant amount.
Although this difference in language may seem 
great, its practical significance diminishes greatly in 
the face of a finding on reasonableness. One must remem­
ber the part of the comment in R.C. Tway, under the prima 
facie rule, that reasonableness "must be accepted as sub-
<lL
stantial evidence . . . . This comment sounds similar
to this statement under the determinative rule in Young
Motor Company:
While the ultimate question here is not the reason­
able needs of the business, the answer to that ques­
tion may well be the single most important considera­
tion in concluding whether taxpayer acted with a 
proper purpose in mind, or the proscribed one.55
However one views this matter, it is still a significant 
step from either of these positions to an assumption that 
the reasonable needs of the business disposes of the pur­
pose issue.
In a memorandum opinion of the Board of Tax 
Appeals the Court used appropriate statutory language in 
the findings of fact, but in the last paragraph of the 
opinion the Court seems to have disposed of the purpose 
automatically in deciding the issue of the reasonable 
needs of the business. The Court said:
o
-^Chicago Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 29 AFTR 
1003, lOl^ fi Commissioner v. Young Motor Company, Inc., 11 
AFTR 2d 1361, 1364 (1 CirT 1963).
5^15 AFTR 189* 190.
556 AFTR 2d 5350, 5353*
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The evidence does not overcome the determination 
of respondent that petitioner was availed of for the 
purpose of preventing the imposition of surtax upon 
its shareholders by permitting gains and profits to 
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business 
instead of being distributed.56
The reader can easily see the distinct difference in mean­
ing by rereading this quote and omitting the phrase, 
"beyond the reasonable needs of the business." The Ninth 
Circuit vacated and remanded this case^^ upon a misinter­
pretation of the significance of the Commissioner's 
determination. The fact that two of the appellate judges 
concentrated their attention upon this relationship of the 
burden of proof to the reasonable needs of the business 
is significant. The third judge wrote a brief concurring 
opinion in order to emphasize that a determination of 
purpose must be made after the reasonable needs issue has 
been decided.
In Universal Steel Company the Board claimed to
have considered the "whole picture" in concluding that
the petitioner
. . . has proven by a clear preponderance of the 
evidence that it did not permit its earnings or 
profits to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs
^ Hemuhill Schools. Inc.. 1^2,285 P-H Memo TC.
*57•^Hemphill Schools, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 AFTR 
610 (9 Cir. 19^3)•
58Ibid.
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of the business* It follows Cemphasis supplied^ that 
it has justified the nonpayment of dividends . • . and 
that petitioner is not subject to the provisions of 
section 102.
Yet, in the next paragraph the Board found some confirma­
tion of the absence of the purpose due to a lack of evi­
dence that the purpose existed. In Wilson & Greene 
Lumber Co. the District Court adequately explained the 
relationship in part of the charge to the jury, but only 
submitted one issue to the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, in order to keep it as 
simple as possible, your verdict will take this form: 
You will find a verdict for the plaintiff if you find 
that the plaintiff has established that the accumula­
tion of profits for the year 19^6 was reasonably 
necessary for the transaction of this company's busi­
ness according to the circumstances existing.
If you find it.was not, then your verdict will be 
for the defendant. 0
For a view that contains a hedge on the matter, one may
£ 1
turn to World Publishing Co. v. United States. There 
the District Court said:
When it has been determined that the failure of 
a corporation to distribute earnings to shareholders 
does not result in an accumulation in excess of the 
reasonable business needs of the corporation, it is 
not necessary to inquire into the motive and purpose 
of such accumulation. Upon the theory, however, 
that this view of the court may not be accepted, a 
finding has been made upon consideratidn of all of
■^Universal Steel Company. 5 TC 627, 638-39 (1945). 
60Wilson &' Greene Lumber Co.. Inc. v. Shaughnessy. 
AFTR 1259, 1265 (DC, N. Y. * 1953) .
6l*f-2 AFTR 67 {DC, Okla.; 1952).
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the evidence in the case that the retention by the 
World in its treasury of its net earnings for 1944 
was not for the purpose of avoiding the imposition 
of a surtax on its sole shareholder.6*
Of course this view is also compatible with the condition
interpretation since the accumulations are reasonable.
Other cases seem to treat the reasonable needs of business
as determinative of purpose without elaboration.^ Thus,
some courts seem to indicate that paths one and two are
to be followed.
Some cases provide limited insight for taking that
64view. In Smcot Sand & Gravel Corp. the Tax Court noted
the lack of any proof by the petitioner to contravert the
presumption of purpose if accumulations should be found
to be beyond reasonable business needs. The comment on
the respondent was of greater interest:
. . . respondent apparently concedes that if petitioner 
has shown that the surplus was not in excess of the 
reasonable needs of the business, nothing further is 
required.65
The use of the word "apparently" indicates that such 
position was not expressly taken, but that the Court 
inferred the position from something that the respondent 
did or said. In a later opinion the same judge expressed
62Ibid., p. 70.
^ Crawford County Printing & Publishing Co., 1?
TC 1404, 1413 [1952)t R.C. Tway Company v. U.s7. 23 AFTR 
2d 69-596 (DC, Ky. 1 19^7;
56, 082 P-H Memo TC.
6^Ibid., p. 56-341.
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a belief that both parties had litigated the case as
though a determination of reasonable needs would settle 
66the matter. A court could become confused on the rela­
tionship by looking too closely at the wording in the 
Commissioner's notice of deficiency to the taxpayer.
Such notices have been known to associate the two issues
67as though they were one. f But in a footnote in Smith.
68Inc. v. Commissioner the Ninth Circuit explained that 
the Commissioner's answer to the taxpayer's petition, 
rather than the notice of deficiency, led it to conclude 
that the Commissioner had based his determination of 
purpose upon unreasonable accumulations.
In Donruss the Sixth Circuit was faced with 
evaluating contradictory statements made by the trial 
court as to the law on the relationship. In part of the 
charge to the jury, the trial court stated the law to be 
that a determination of the reasonable needs of the 
business would settle the matter. However, that court 
also correctly explained that an accumulation beyond the 
reasonable needs of the business would be determinative 
of the purpose, unless the taxpayer proved the contrary
66Breitfeller Sales. Inc.. 28 TC 1164, II69 (1957).
6?Young Motor Co.. Inc., 32 TC 1336, 13^3 (1959).
68
8 AFTR 2d 5119, 5122 (9 Cir. I96I).
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by a preponderance of the evidence. The Circuit Court 
did not believe that the charge had misled the jury on the 
issue. However, two important factors mitigate the Cir­
cuit Court's stand. First, the government’s counsel 
failed to object and thus was deemed to have waived the
objection. Second, the Court reversed based on the
69District Court's failure to interpret purpose. 7
Although the language in some cases was confusing,
clear statements making only the presumption construction
70were handed down in others. In still others positive 
statements were made making accumulations beyond reason­
able business needs a condition precedent to a considera-
71tion of the purpose issue.
There is one other event that must be considered 
for its impact upon this relationship. That event was 
the adoption of the 195^ Code because it contained sec­
tion 535* Section 535(c) provides for a general credit 
in computing the accumulated earnings tax. The gen-: 
eral credit is "equal to such part of the earnings 
and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the
6920 AFTR 2d 5505, 5506-7, 5510.
7°Pelton Steel Casting Co.. 28 TC 153 (1957)?
American Lawn Mower Co. v. U.S.. 12 AFTR 2d 6162 (DC,_____
^ Hattiesburg Compress Co. v. U.S., 6 AFTR 2d 5012 
(DC, Miss.; 1960)? Harrison Bolt & Nut CoT v. U.S., 14 
AFTR 2d 5360 (DC, MdTV 19 64^ 1 "Times Publishing Co.. Inc. 
v. U.S.. 11 AFTR 2d 1228 (DC, Penn.; 1963).
reasonable needs of the business . . . ."72 strictly- 
construed, this provision has no direct effect upon the 
relationship. As set forth in the Code, it Should only 
come into play after a determination has been made that 
the accumulated earnings tax is to applied. Then this 
credit would be considered in calculating the actual tax 
due. However, the indirect result of the provision is 
to give effect to the dissenting Board opinion in United 
Business Corporation and makes the majority position a 
rather moot view. The relevant paths for decision now 
seem to be one, five, and six.
Some of the cases cited previously in footnotes 
for the various interpretations were tried after the 195^ 
Code took effect. The section 535 credit was not mentioned 
in any of them, so one can only wonder whether it had any 
effect upon the positions taken. In others cases the
credit definitely played a part.
71In Fotocrafters. Inc.. J a memorandum decision, 
the judge concluded that earnings had not been accumulated 
beyond the reasonable needs of the business. He acknow­
ledged that the taxpayer still had the burden of proving 
an absence of the purpose and that the reasonableness of 
the accumulation would be a strong indication the purpose
"^Internal Revenue Code of 195^. Sec. 535(c). 
73U60,254 P-H Memo TC.
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was not present. He stated further that the problem had 
been ’•simplified" due to the. credit, which made the 
accumulated taxable income "zero."7** In other cases no 
consideration was given to the purpose issue due to the 
section 535 credit.7-* This issue, however, is just 
beginning to reach full development. The entire matter 
has been clouded by the addition of section 53** &t ‘the 
same time. The effect of the section 535(c) credit upon 
the relationship of the reasonable needs of the business 
to the purpose is uncertain, and therefore the effect of 
section 53** upon all of this is also uncertain.
SUMMARY
The legislative history shows that there has been 
no significant change in the statutory language as to 
"purpose" since the first application of the accumulated 
earnings tax to corporations in the Revenue Act of 1921. 
However, there have been notable attempts to influence 
the operation of "purpose." The taxation rates have been 
altered several times. Personal holding companies were 
separately provided for in the 193*1- Act. A questionable 
attempt was made in the 1938 Act to increase the taxpayer's
7**Ibid.. pp. 60-1562-63.
7^John P. Serious Newspapers, **** TC **53 (1965)1 
Faber Cement Block Co., Inc.. 50 TC 3171 Magic Mart. Inc.. 
51 TC 775 (1969)1 Dielectric Materials Company, 57 TO 
No. 61 (19?2). Also, see 1 Sorgel v. U.S.. 29 AFTR 2d 70- 
1035 (SC, Wis.j 1972).
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burden of proof as to "purpose." Previously, accumulations 
beyond the reasonable needs of the business were prima 
facie evidence of the "purpose," but such a showing 
became determinative of the "purpose" in that Act. The 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 made extensive changes in 
the operation of the tax. All were aimed at shifting 
the emphasis from the subjective test of "purpose" to the 
more objective test of the "reasonable needs of the 
business."
During a period of approximately four decades, 
several different interpretations of purpose were in 
vogue. They are, in the order of decreasing favorableness 
to the taxpayer, as follows:
1. The "sole" or "express" purpose test,
2. The "primary" or "dominant" purpose test,
3« The "one of the determining purposes" test, and
4. The "a," "any," or "one of the purposes" test,
compatible with the "complete absence of purpose" 
test.
i
The Supreme Court settled the issue in favor of the fourth 
construction in 19&9 in Donruss.
The development of eight possible paths for a 
final determination of the accumulated earnings tax has 
been presented. The relationship of the "reasonable 
needs of the business" to the "purpose" has been partially 
settled. However, the burden of proof under section 534 
and the general credit provided under section 535(c) have
70
raised new questions, 
are considered in the
The influence of these two sections 
next chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 53^ AND 
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SECTION 535
The adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 
195^ signaled the beginning of a new era in the accumu­
lated earnings tax cases. This chapter investigates the 
development of sections 53^ and 535 of the Internal Rev­
enue Code in an attempt to determine their effect upon 
equity as defined in CHAPTER I. Section 53^ governs the 
operation of the burden of proof in accumulated earnings 
tax cases before the Tax Court. Since the burden of 
proof is a procedural rule of law, its effect upon equity 
differs from substantive rules of law and offers a con­
trast to the preceding chapter.
Section 53^ became controversial rather quickly. 
This chapter presents the controversy, the case development 
of section 53^» and an inquiry into the relationship of 
section 53^ to section 535* The criticism leveled at the 
Tax Court and the Commissioner is considered in the light 
of pertinent cases. A critical analysis will be made of 
this controversy and relevant cases as a basis for the 
development of a proposal for settling the controversy 
through the interaction of section 53^ and section 535*
71
THE CONTROVERSY
72
The First Level
The burden of proof in cases before *the Tax Court 
is normally upon the taxpayer. Section 53^ of the In­
ternal Revenue Code of 195^ contains provisions whereby 
the burden of proving the reasonableness of accumulations 
for the needs of the business may be shifted from the 
taxpayer to the Commissioner. The conditions apply only 
to cases coming before the Tax Court. However, in such 
cases the burden of proof shifts automatically to the 
Commissioner unless he takes action to prevent it. The 
action required of the Commissioner is that he must give 
notice of his intent to render an assessment under section 
531 before he sends a notice of deficiency. If the Com­
missioner takes such action, then the .taxpayer is given 
an opportunity to shift the burden to the Commissioner in 
spite of the notice. In order to do so, however, the 
taxpayer must timely answer the Commissioner's notice with 
a statement of the grounds upon which he is relying to 
establish that earnings and profits have not been allowed 
to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business. 
This statement must include sufficient facts to show the
^Rule 32, Rules of Practice of the Tax Court of 
the United States.
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basis for the grounds upon which the taxpayer r e l i e s . 2 
Thus.it is possible that some grounds (and/or facts) 
might be inadequate to shift the burden of proof to the 
Commissioner, while others would adequate, and only a 
partial shift in the burden of proof would result.
When compared to the basic provision that the 
taxpayer bear the burden of proof, the complexity of 
section 534 causes one to wonder why such an involved 
statute was enacted. The answer is that Congress was 
thereby attempting to eliminate the cause of various com­
plaints. The reasons were summarized in a Senate report 
which agreed with the House as follows:
The poor record of the Government in the litigated 
cases in this area indicates that deficiencies have 
been asserted in many cases which were not adequate­
ly screened or analyzed. At the same time taxpayers 
were put to substantial expense and effort in proving 
that the accumulation was for the reasonable needs 
of the business. Moreover, the complaints of tax­
payers that the tax is used as a threat by revenue 
agents to induce settlement on other issues appear 
to have a connection with the burden of proof which 
the taxpayer is required to assume. It also appears 
probable that many small taxpayers may have yielded 
to a proposed deficiency because of the expense and 
difficulty of litigating their case under the present
rules.3
The controversy arose over the effect given to section 534 
by the Commissioner and the Tax Court. The typical pat­
tern that developed was a refusal by the Tax Court to
2
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 534(a), 
(b), and (c).
% .  Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2 Sess. 70 (1954).
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rule positively on whether or not the hurden of proof 
had shifted to the Commissioner* This refusal was ef­
fected in several ways.
k
In Pelton Steel Casting Co* the Tax Court found 
that it was not necessary to determine whether or not 
accumulated earnings were beyond the reasonable needs of 
the business as other evidence was sufficient to show the 
presence of the prohibited purpose. The Court further 
stated that even If the matter (section 534) were impor­
tant and if the burden had shifted, the evidence affir­
matively proved that the accumulations were quite exces-
<
sive. In Breitfeller Sales. Inc.*' the decision was for 
the taxpayer, but the Tax Court found it unnecessary 
to determine where the section 534 burden of proof rested 
as the decision was based "on the record as a whole."^
The taxpayer did not seem to fare much better on this 
Issue when the Tax Court made a decision in the matter.
The taxpayer found the hedge coming after a conclusion 
that his statement was inadequate to shift the burden of 
proof in J. Gordon Turnbull, Inc*7 The Court explained 
that regardless of the burden of proof the record
**28 TC 153 (1957).
528 TC 1164 (1957).
^Ibid., p. 1168.
74l TC 358, 371 (1963).
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demonstrated that the accumulations were unreasonable 
and that the purpose existed. Taxpayers have had diffi­
culty in drafting adequate statements to effectuate a
Q
shift both as to the grounds and the facts.
These approaches show only one aspect of the 
problem. They reveal the methods of disposing of the 
issue upon a trial of the case. This is a corollary of 
the practice of refusing to dispose of the matter before 
trial. Kppperud and Donaldson have pointed out that the 
Commissioner had followed the practice of opposing pre­
liminary motions to settle this issue. They have found 
that the Tax Court supports the Commissioner.^ Other 
critics have also strongly opposed the behavior of the 
Tax Court and the Commissioner on the section 53^ issue. 
The general tenor of the complaint is that Congressional
intent has been thwarted.by the failure of the Tax Court
loto determine this issue. The best way to interpret 
section 53^ to give effect to that intent is subject
8Pixie. Inc.. 31 TC (1958); I. A. Dress Co.. 
32 TC 93 (1959)1 American Metal Products Corn.. 3ft TC 89 
(I960).
o
^Kopperud and Donaldson# "The Burden of Proof in 
Accumulated Surplus Cases," Taxes. 35*82?, 8?6 (1957).
10Holzman, "Burden of Proof in Accumulated Earn­
ings Tax Cases and its Development in the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals," Buffalo Law Review. 11:328, 1962; Bar­
ker, "Penalty Tax bn Corporation Improperly Accumulating 
Surplus," Taxes. 35*9^9 (1957); Forman, "The Burden of 
Proof." Taxes. 39:737 (1961); Hall, "The Accumulated 
Earnings Tax," Taxes. 38:8^9 (i960); Wagman, "Taxation 
of Accumulated Earnings and Profits: A Procedural
Wrangle," Taxes 35*573 (1959).
to significant disagreement, and the confusing nature of 
the burden of proof provides a basis for the opposing 
views.
In essence there are actually two conceptually
distinct aspects of the burden of proof. One element
is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden
of producing evidence, or going forward with the evidence.
Often, as in section 53^» no distinction is made in these
two elements. In most tax cases the distinction is not
11required because one party must bear the whole burden. 
However, the position of the Tax Court had made it de­
finitely clear that the burden of producing evidence had 
not shifted to the Commissioner. And it is questionable 
that the burden of persuasion passed when a determination 
that it had passed was made after hearing all the 
evidence.
Percentages may be used to explain the burden of 
persuasion. If a party bearing the burden of proof is 
able to present evidence in support of his position that 
is only worth 25% of all the evidence, then he will fail. 
Even though the same party is able to show that 50% of 
the evidence is in favor of his position, he must still 
fail because he must go beyond 50% in order to carry the
■^Holzman, pp. 330-31* 
12Barker, p. 952*
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burden of proof. Thus in a 50-50 case the burden of proof 
determines the outcome. Since the taxpayer normally must 
carry the. burden, one can understand the reluctance of 
the Commissioner to have the burden placed upon himself.^ 
Kipperman analyzed the statutes and the cases and de­
veloped a strategy for taxpayers. He believed that in 
strong cases the result would be the same, regardless of 
whether or not either party took any action required by 
section 53^» Also, in weak cases he would expect the 
same result. However, in close cases the burden of 
proof becomes important, and he believed the taxpayer 
would benefit by meeting; the conditions required by sec- 
tion 53^. A subsequent analysis in this chapter shows 
that the taxpayer benefits only if the tribunal making 
the final determination recognizes that the case is a 
close case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has also 
spoken out on the subject of close cases and the section 
53^ issue. In R. Gsell & Co.. Inc..1-* the Tax Court had 
found that the accumulations were beyond reasonable 
business needs. However, in So doing the Tax Court
^Holzman, p. 332.
iZi
Kipperman, "Accumulated Earnings Tax: Burdens
of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose," California Law 
Review 5^:1050, 1068 (1966): Holzman, p. 355.
i53lf TC H  (i960).
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refused to make a determination as to the adequacy of
the taxpayer's statement to shift the burden of proof.
The Second Circuit reversed and reprimanded the Tax Court
for its position and said:
Although in some cases where the proof is convincing 
that there is no justification in a taxpayer's busi­
ness for the alleged accumulations it may be un­
necessary to determine whether the Commissioner 
or the taxpayer has the burden of proof on the 
question, . . . in close cases the determination 
of who has the burden of proof on the unreasonable 
accumulations issue must be resolved. The party 
having the burden of proof does not merely have the 
burden of coming forward with evidence; it has the 
burden of persuasion and once fixed that burden 
does not shift , ♦ . .10
An observation may be made concerning this appeal. Al­
though the Court has acknowledged that the burden of 
producing evidence and the burden of persuasion shift 
together, the emphasis seems to be placed upon the latter 
burden. The case gave some hope to those who thought 
that the Congressional intent had been frustrated.
Although the critics were concerned that both 
burdens pass under the appropriate conditions, the 
greater concern was that the burden of producing evidence 
should pass. The weight of this burden was the one pri­
marily believed to put the taxpayer to substantial 
expense and effort. Furthermore, this burden provided 
a powerful weapon in the hands of revenue agents to
l68 AFTR 2d 5507, 5511 (2 Cir. 1961), 294 F. 2d 321. 
*^Holzman, p. 352.
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induce settlement on other issues. There seems to he
some suggestion that the expense and effort of preparing
for a trial in which one must produce the evidence is
substantially greater than if one merely has to negate
i 8the evidence produced by the other side. If it is 
difficult for a taxpayer to develop an affirmative case 
with the information at his disposal, how much more diffi- 
■cult'iwould it be for the Commissioner to'acquire that in­
formation to.build a comparable case? Nevertheless, the 
critics were not unanimous in their views on this point.
Wagman made a case for the view that Congressional 
intent is best served by interpreting section 534 so that 
only the burden of persuasion could be passed to the 
Commissioner, while the taxpayer would always have the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. Wagman noted 
that: (1) the section 53*Kb) notice would not consti­
tute the first awareness of the taxpayer to the danger 
of a section 531 penalty, and (2) a significant amount 
of expense and effort would have to be incurred before 
the receipt of the section 534 notice in order to meet 
the time and quality requirements of section 534(c) for
I Q
a statement. 7 He said:
'I ft
Hall, p. 849t Kopperud and Donaldson, p. 827* 
Barker, p , 949.
■^Wagman, p. 578.
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All the equities are not on the side of the taxpayer. 
Critical purpose is really only within the taxpayers 
ken (or those responsible for its actions) . . . .
It is not to be realistically expected that Congress 
would enact legislation that would negate the penalty 
aspects of the accumulated earnings tax. All 
Congress must have sought was that justice be done 
in accumulated earnings tax cases . . . .20
Wagman recognized the taxpayer’s need for some bargaining
leverage at the conference stages. He believed that the
section 535 credit along with section 53^ would provide 
21that leverage.
The Gsell case roughly marks the dividing line 
between two eras. Most of the controversy discussed 
above arose in the light of cases in which section 53^ 
was evaluated with respect to the 1939 Code, rather than 
to the 195^ Code. Gsell was one of the last of such 
cases, yet the Second Circuit's opinion indicated how 
decisions on cases involving 195^ Code years might be 
treated. The section 535 credit could logically be ex­
pected to make a significant difference from the prior 
law that levied the tax upon all the earnings accumu­
lated during the year if even a small part was accumulated 
for the forbidden purpose. The stage was set for the next 
level in the burden of proof controversy.
The Second Level
At this level attention was focused upon the rela-
20Ibid., p. 579.
21Ibid.
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tionahip of section 534 to section 535* The question 
was: Does section 534 determine who must hear the
burden of proof as to the extent that earnings accumulated 
were for the reasonable needs of the business in order 
to compute the credit allowed under section 535(c)?
Berger believes that Regulation 1.534-1 was a concession 
that the Commissioner must bear the burden of proving
the extent of the credit if the burden of proof shifts
22to him under section 534. More specifically, the ques­
tion is an extension of the “burden of producing evidence/ 
burden of persuasion** considerations to the section 535 
credit.2-^ Gbldfein believes that the burden of producing 
evidence is significant only if the Commissioner must 
bear the burden of persuasion as to the credit. He has 
explained how a trial would probably proceed depending
upon where the burden of proof lies with respect to the
oh,
section 535 credit.
More than a decade has elapsed since the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Gsell. In the intervening years 
the vast majority of cases coming before the Tax Court
22Berger, “How to Litigate the 531 Casei Choice 
of Forum and Procedural Problems," Journal of Taxation. 
20:139. 140 (1964).
23"Tye, "Section 534 statements* how they can be 
used to blunt the IRS* 531 attacks," Journal of Taxation.. 
25*148 (1966).
24
Goldfein, "Tax Court in Chatham Corp. clarifies 
timing of shift of burden in 531 cases," Journal of Taxa­
tion. 2?»2, 4 (1969).
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have involved taxable years governed by the 195^ Code.
Such cases provide an opportunity to evaluate the effect 
that section 53^ and the Gsell case have had. The fol­
lowing two sections are devoted to an investigation and 
evalutaion of these cases and the appeals resulting from 
these cases.
CASE DEVELOPMENT SINCE GSELL
The Classification
After screening all of the cases decided by the 
Tax Court (including memorandum decisions), those having 
two characteristics were collected. The two requirements 
were: (1) that taxable years in issue be governed by
the 195^ Internal Revenue Code, and (2) that taxpayers 
had made an apparently bona fide attempt to shift the 
burden of proof to the Commissioner with the required 
statement.2-’ This process produced 29 cases. Since the 
Tax Court had been heavily criticized for not making a 
determination on this issue, one objective in this study 
was to evaluate the Court on this point. As noted earlier, 
there were several ways of refusing to give effect to 
the statute. Thus, three categories were chosen for fur­
ther classification. They are: (1) undecided,
2^Thus Charles TurneE H 65.100 P-H Memo TC was o- 
mitted. Taxpayer had submitted a statement, but on brief 
expressly stated a lack of contention that it was adequate 
to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner.
(2) decided-but, and (3) decided.
The undecided cases are those in which the Issue
was not determined, regardless of the reasons given.
Perhaps a statement peculiar to none, but representative
of all would bei "It is unnecessary to decide whether
the statement was adequate to shift the burden of proof
for assuming that it was, the respondent has successfully
carried his burden." The decided-but cases are those
in which a determination was made, but some type of
qualifying statement was made that seemed to detract from
the significance of the determination. This position
could be expressed as follows* "Petitioner’s statement
was adequate to shift the burden of proof. However, we
need not rely upon the burden of proof because the record
as a whole is sufficient to determine that petitioner’s
27accumulations were reasonable." The decided cases are 
those in which the Court appeared to consider the burden 
of proof as an issue to be determined separately from the 
weighing of the evidence.
A problem with this classification scheme was that 
some parts of a statement were adequate to shift the 
burden as to some of the grounds, but not as to others. 
Consequently, one was faced with cases in which the Court
26See Sandy Estate Co., 43 TC 361, 374 (1964).
2^See Vuono-Lione. Inc.. 1165,096 P-H Memo TC.
had decided the shift issue on some grounds, but had not 
made a determination on others. Rather than attempt a 
fractional measurement which would imply an unfounded 
accuracy, the procedure used was to evaluate the entire 
case to determine which of the alleged grounds (and facts)
pO
that the Court seemed to emphasize the most. The case 
was then classified based upon the Court*s treatment of 
those grounds.
The results revealed that eight cases were classi­
fied as undecided, seven cases were classified as 
decided-but, and fourteen cases were classified as 
decided. In this last class there are six cases in which 
the decision was that the burden of proof did not shift.
In seven cases the burden did shift, and one case held 
that section 53^ did not apply to holding companies.^
The 29 cases were also examined to see if the final outcome 
of the decision was in favor of the taxpayer or the 
Commissioner. The result was then checked against the 
holding on the section 53^ issue to see if any discernible 
pattern existed. In the undecided and decided cases none 
was found. However, in the seven decided-but cases there 
was perfect correlation between the resolution of this 
proof issue and the outcome. That is, in the four cases
2 8
Ted Bates & Co., Inc.. *865,251 P-H Memo TC, was 
particularly difficult, but was classed as decided since 
the burden did not shift on the two items requiring most 
of the accumulations.
^Rhombar Co.. Inc.. 47 TC 75*
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in which the burden shifted to the Commissioner, the tax­
payer won. In the three cases In which the burden did not 
shift, the Commissioner won. The appeals taken upon the 
29 cases provide additional insight.
Eight appeals were taken upon the 29 cases. Of 
the eight appeals one was from the undecided group, one 
was from the decided-but group, and six were from the 
decided group. Of the eight appeals four were to the 
Second Circuit, three to the Sixth Circuit, and one to the 
Tenth Circuit.
The Second Circuit
Apparently the position of the Second Circuit on 
section 534 as set out in Gsell was well noted by the Tax 
Court. All four of the cases going to the Second Circuit 
were from the decided group. The Second Circuit affirmed 
three of the decisions. In two^° of those affirmed by 
the Second Circuit, the Court noted that the Tax Court 
had determined that the section 534 statements were ade­
quate to shift the burden to the Commissioner and that he 
had carried his burden.
In the third affirmed case, Rhombar Co.. Inc. v. 
Comm.~^ the Tax Court did not decide whether the statement
^Factories Investment Corn, v. Comm.. 13 AFTR £d 
880 (2 Cir. 1964), 32§ F. 2d 781; Youngs Rubber Corp. v. 
Comm.. 13 AFTR 2d 1251 (2 Cir. 1964}, 331 F. 2d 12.
3120 AFTR 2d 5764 (2 Cir. 1967).
86
was adequate to shift the burden as to the reasonable needs 
of the business. Instead it found that Rhombar Company 
was a holding company and that section 53^ could not be 
used by the petitioner to prove that it was not a mere 
holding or investment company. Therefore* the proper pre­
sumption to be determined was under section 533(b), rather 
than under 533(a)* The Second Circuit approved the Tax 
Court's determination of this matter. Also, it focused 
attention on the taxpayer's contention as to the relation­
ship between section 53^ and the section 535 general 
credit. The Second Circuit saidi
It is conceded that if a proper seetion 53^ state­
ment had been submitted, the Commissioner had the 
burden of proving the amount of the credit to which 
the taxpayer was entitled, i.e., the amount of the 
accumulation retained for reasonable business needs. 
Rhombar argues from this that if the credit is to be 
limited because a taxpayer is a mere holding or invest­
ment company, the burden of proving this must be on 
the Commissioner 'since it is a necessary part of the 
. . . admitted burden of proving the amount of the 
credit to which a taxpayer is entitled under section 
535(c)(1).*32
Primary attention was upon the section 53^_535 relationship 
as it applied to a holding company. Yet the first sentence 
quoted affirmatively answered the query presented earlier 
as to the extension of the section 53^ burden of proof to 
section 535* A further comment in this case provides 
additional insight into the Court's view in the matter.
The Court commented that Code provisions could seldom be
32Ibid., p. 5767.
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interpreted as if they were in a vacuum and saidi
In any event, it is hardly likely that Congress in­
tended that section 53^ and section 535» enacted at 
the same time, would work at cross purposes. Indeed, 
to permit the credit section to overpower.or submerge 
and dilute the burden of proof section would be to 
permit the tail to wag the dog.33
These comments give a clear indication that in an appro­
priate operating company case the Commissioner will have 
to carry the burden of proof as to the extent of the 
reasonableness of the accumulations.
Electric Regulator Corp. v. Comm.-^ is the case 
reversed by the Second Circuit. The Tax Court had deter­
mined that the petitioner's statement was adequate to 
shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner on the 
stated grounds. However, the Tax Court found that the 
Commissioner had discharged that burden and that the 
statutory presumption of purpose arose. The Tax Court 
held the petitioner had failed to meet his burden on the 
ultimate question of purpose. This determination was 
buttressed by finding factors indicating the existence 
of the prohibited purpose.
The Second Circuit held that the Tax Court had 
erred in concluding that the Commissioner had carried his 
burden of proof and in concluding that the petitioner was
33Ibid.
AFTR 2d 5447 (2 Cir. 196*0, 232 F. .Supp. 5^3. 
•^ E^lectric Regulator Corp.. TC 757 (1953).
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availed of for the proscribed purpose. The facts found 
to support the first finding of error can be described 
broadly as having been derived from* (1) a determination 
of the elements that qualified as reasonable business needs, 
and (2) the interpretation of the accounting concepts used 
to determine the value of those elements. Of course this 
holding removed the support of the section 533(a) presump­
tion from the Tax Court*s decision, but left untouched 
the regular burden of the petitioner to prove lack of pur­
pose. The Second Circuit's finding of error on the issue 
of purpose was supported by noting that the absence of 
unreasonable accumulations is the most persuasive fact 
that could show a lack of the purpose. Furthermore,
other factors were present that indicated a lack of the
36purpose.
Some significance must attach to the Court’s use 
of this traditional manner of disposing of purpose. The 
section 535 general credit was ignored. The year was 1964, 
and adding another potentially controversial element to 
the case would not have been wise. The risk in developing 
the boundaries of the reasonable needs of the business 
and in applying accounting concepts is great. A reversal 
predicated in part by criticism of the trial court’s use 
of accounting might be justified. However, the Second 
Circuit’s use of an erroneous calculation of "net cash
36l4 AFTR 2d 544?.
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available" in order to partially support its reversal of 
the Tax Court is at least mildly disturbing.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits
Three appeals were taken to the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Two were from the decided category 
and one was from the decided-but category. The former two 
were affirmed. One case affirmed was The Kirlin Company. 
The Tax Court noted that the petitioner’s statement con­
tained no dollar amounts to indicate the extent of the 
business needs, but concluded that the statement was ade­
quate to shift the burden to the Commissioner. The section 
535 credit was noted, too. . The Tax Court then methodically 
evaluated each ground alleged and determined the amount 
of the need thereof. An analysis of the company’s liquid­
ity in the light of its reasonable business needs revealed 
that accumulations were unreasonable. Finally, the Court 
found that the petitioner had failed to carry his burden
of proof on the ultimate issue of purpose. The Sixth 
39Circuit-'7 held that the decision was supported by substan­
tial evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Novelart
/L0
Mfg. Co. v. Comm. was similarly affirmed.
37Ibid., p. 5^51.
F-H Memo TC.
-^ The Kirlin Corp. v. Comm.. 17 AFTR 2d 1266 (6 
Cir. 1966).
^ 2 6  AFTR 2d 70-5837 (6 Cir. 1970), affirming 
52 TC 79^ (1969).
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The only case appealed in the decided-but group
£l1
was the Shaw-Walker Company case. The taxpayer's state­
ment contained five grounds attempting to justify the 
accumulations. The Tax Court found that the alleged facts 
were deficient in specificity and definiteness and that 
the .burden did not shift. Then came the hedge, "However, 
regardless of where the burden of proof lies, the affirma­
tive evidence of record is sufficient to determine this
ho
case on its merits." That evidence showed the accumula­
tions to be excessive, and it failed to negate the pro­
hibited purpose.
The Sixth Circuit evaluated the case under these 
four headingsi (1) burden of proof, (2) determination of 
working capital, (3) intent, and (40 accumulated earnings 
credit. Under the burden of proof heading, the Court 
analyzed the taxpayer’s statement. The Tax Court was 
sustained as to four of the grounds, but the Circuit Court 
found that the ground claiming a need for working capital 
was adequate to shift the burden of proof to the Commis­
sioner. This rejection of the Tax Court's finding led 
into an evaluation of the Tax Court's failure to make a 
detailed study of the working capital as it had done on 
the four other grounds. The result was a holding of error 
for this failure. In turning to the matter of intent, the
4i
5165,309 P-H Memo TC. 
^2Ibid., p. 1896.
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Sixth Circuit was unable to determine which purpose test 
had been applied and held the Tax Court had not made ade- 
, quate findings of fact on this issue. Finally, the section 
535(c) credit was considered. The Tax Court was upheld 
on the credit determined for three items, but some 
bewilderment was expressed over the manner in which the 
credits were applied. The case was remanded to the Tax 
Court to make further findings of fact consistent with
LL'i
the appellate opinion.
The single appeal from the undecided category went 
to the Tenth Circuit. That decision^ was affirmed with­
out discussion of the section 534 statement and the Tax 
Court's treatment thereof.
Other Relevant Appeals
Motor Fuel Carriers. Inc..v. U.S.^  was an appeal 
from a nonjury district court decision. The taxpayer had 
tried the case as though the entire accumulation was 
reasonable. The taxpayer made no effort to prove that it 
was entitled to accumulate some part of the earnings if 
not entitled to all of them. The claim for a section 535
ll'J
-'This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court 
and was remanded to the Sixth Circuit on the issue of the 
purpose test. See Comm, v. Shaw-Walker Co.. 23 AFTR 2d 
69-523, 393 U.S. 197^
Henry Van Hummell. Inc. v. Comm.. 18 AFTR 2d 
5500 (10 Cir. 1966)7 364" F. 2d 746, affirming $64,290 
P-H Memo TC.
^512 AFTR 2d 5554 (5 Cir. 1963), 322 F. 2d 576.
credit was raised for the first time in the appeal. The 
Fifth Circuit forgave the lateness of the claim and 
remanded in part because the Court felt the case might be 
a pilot case on that issue. Although section 53^ was not 
applicable to the case, the Fifth Circuit*s comment on 
the burden of proof and section 535 is interesting. The 
Court said, "The burden is no less as to a part than as
LA
to the whole." In spite of the substantial difference 
in the burden of proof in the district courts and the 
burden of proof under section 53 *^ this comment could 
apply just as well to a section 53^ case. Thus, if the 
burden of proof on the reasonableness of the accumulations 
shifts to the Commissioner, then it would appear that he 
should also bear the burden of proving the extent of the 
reasonableness•
McNally Pittsburg Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S. 
was a district court trial by jury. The taxpayer 
presented an exhibit that included the annual figure for 
cost of goods sold as a part of the current operating 
needs for a year. This computation showed that funds 
were not available to pay dividends. The government 
introduced a similar exhibit except that cost of goods 
sold was excluded from current operating needs. This 
approach showed a substantial amount of funds available
^ Ibid.. p. 5558.
^ 1 5  AFTR 2d W  (10 Cir. 1965). reversing 11 AFTR 
1578 (DC, Kans. 1963)*
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•to pay dividends. The instructions to the jury approved 
the taxpayer's approach* The jury decided in favor of the
JlO
taxpayer. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the inven­
tory turnover and collection period for accounts receivable 
did not support the taxpayer's method of calculation. The 
Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the 
erroneous instructions to the jury.
Apollo Industries. Inc. was a Tax Court case that 
was appealed to the First Circuit. A significant part of 
the appeal opinion was devoted to the development of an 
operating cycle approach to analyze working capital needs, 
which was merely suggested to the Tax Court in the remand. 
The last paragraph is an excellent summary of the basis 
for the remand.
The case must be remanded for answers, for each 
of the two taxable years, to the following questions: 
(1) was the reconstituted tobacco project a reasonably 
anticipated business need of Alles? (2) if so, what 
were its reasonable dimensions? (3 ) what were the 
practical needs of Alles for working capital? and 
(4-) even if accumulated earnings did not exceed 
reasonably anticipated business needs in one or both 
years, was avoidance of taxes on shareholders never­
theless a dominant purpose? In the meantime, we will 
retain jurisdiction.50
Item one evidences a concern in determining an element of
the reasonable needs of business. Items two and three
reflect a concern over the application of section 535 and
^8rbid., p. 486.
TC 1 (1965).
^°Apollo industries. Inc. v. Comm., 17 AFTR 2d 
518, 525 (1 Cir. 1966).
9^
the necessity for using accounting concepts therefore.
Item four must be taken as an indication that section 535 
will not apply to shield earnings accumulated for the 
reasonable needs of the business if the prohibited purpose 
also exists.
The approach in item four would be contrary to 
the Tax Court cases which have disposed of the purpose 
issue by applying section 535 Obviously, if purpose 
can be ignored when accumulations are made for reasonable 
business needs, then section 53^ becomes significantly 
more important. A related question would bet If the 
reasonable needs of the business are greater than the 
earnings accumulated, but a part of those earnings are 
used for something other than the reasonable needs of 
the business, how does section 535 apply? This problem 
confronted the Fifth Circuit in Mead’s Bakery.
The Tax Court had utilized the taxpayer's normal 
burden of proof in a roundabout approach to the decision. 
The Tax Court said, "Petitioner has failed to prove that 
its reasonable business needs . . . exceeded the amount 
of earnings retained . . . minus the amounts advanced 
Angus . . . ."52 a logical extension of this expression 
would be that upon a shov/ing of reasonable needs in 
excess of accumulated earnings, the earnings could be
5-^ John P. Scripps Newspapers, W  TC ^53 (1965). 
52Mead's Bakery, Inc., *064-, lOh P-H Memo TC,
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put to any use without incurring the tax. Perhaps the
Fifth Circuit recognized this possible construction for
the Court saidt
This holding is not supported by the Court's finding 
of needs which, added, exceed $^,000,000.00 and of 
retained earnings of only $550,000.00. The Tax Court 
didn’t question the bona fides of these needs. Instead, 
the gist of the Court's opinion . . .  is that regard­
less of the extent of taxpayer’s needs (or the fact 
that they mathematically exceed retained earnings), 
that part of its earnings advanced to Angus was not 
retained for the purpose of meeting those needs.53
The Fifth Circuit reversed for the taxpayer with­
out resolving this issue and held that its reasonable 
needs were greater than its accumulations. The Tax Court's 
finding that Angus was not actively engaged in a business 
was approved, but the Court nothd that similar cases had 
been determined by whether the accumulations were being 
held for business needs or the prohibited purpose. Here 
the'expenditures were believed to be a manner of holding
Zh,
funds for future business needs.^
Sears Oil Co., Inc. was remanded to the Tax 
Court by the Second Circuit "with particular attention 
to the question of reasonable needs."-^ This mandate 
required an evaluation of the extent of the reasonableness.
^ Mead's Bakery, Inc. v. Comm.. 18 AFTR 2d 5205,
5209 (5 Cir. 1966).
^Ibid.. pp. 5209-10.
65,039 P-H Memo TC.
ears Oil Co., Inc. v* Comm., 1? AFTR 2d 833,
838 (2 Cir.*- 1966).
EVALUATION OF THE CASES
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The largest number (1*0 of the Tax Court cases 
investigated fell into the decided category. This repre­
sents a substantial overt attempt to give some effect to 
the congressional intent of section 534. The interpreta­
tion of the other two categories is not as clear. The 
eight undecided cases could be taken as an indication 
that there is still a significant reluctance to permit 
the operation of section 534. The seven decided-but cases 
are the most difficult to interpret. The semantics used 
indicate a hedge or qualification of the section 534 
determination. This view would place the decided-but 
cases next to the undecided cases in terms of the attitude 
expressed. The perfect correlation between the 534 
determination and the final decision prompts another 
possible explanation. Perhaps the evidence in these cases 
was so one-sided that it was reflected in the section 534- 
statement. The Tax Court determined the section 534 issue, 
weighed the evidence, and was thereby moved to make some 
comment in passing. This explanation would place these 
cases next to the decided cases in terms of the attitude 
expressed.
Several suggestions may be made from the appeals 
taken in these cases. By tracing the appeals taken be­
tween the circuit courts and these three categories, one 
senses that the Second Circuit's position in Gsell has 
been a strong influence in causing the Tax Court to make
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a finding on the section 534 issue. An objective in 
reviewing the appeals was to acquire some feeling 
for the significance placed upon the Tax Court’s treatment 
of this issue. The reversals are generally more suitable 
for this task because of the greater discussion given to 
explain the decision.
The reversals have presented some difficult prob­
lems. One problem is to determine whether or not a given 
factor is a reasonable need of the business. Another 
problem is to choose the proper accounting concepts to be 
applied in determining the extent of those needs. The 
solution of the former problem is essential to a proper 
weighing of the evidence. Both problems must be solved 
in order to correctly apply the section 535 credit. 
Arguably, these matters have had a greater influence in 
effecting a reversal than the burden of persuasion has 
had. Support for this conclusion is found in the survey 
of the other appellate cases. Although the section 534 
statement was not an issue, reversals were predicated upon 
the same types of problems. Indeed, the overwhelming 
concern was with these problems and the section 535(c) 
credit. As these two types of problems are solved, the 
next logical step would be to devote attention to defining 
the relationship between sections 53b and 535* The weight 
of opinion examined above indicates that an adequate 
section 534 statement should shift the burden of deter­
mining the extent of the credit to the Commissioner.
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However, a clear indication of how the dual burdens will 
operate upon section 535(c) is not even upon the horizon. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis 
as to how these burdens should operate so as to best give 
effect to the Congressional intent. To this end, the close
case language of Gsell must be carefully analyzed in the
light of Holzman's conceptual explanation of the burden of 
persuasion.
THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION IN CLOSE CASES
The theory of the operation of the burden of
persuasion in close cases is easy to understand. Its 
pragmatic application is another matter. Two cases have 
specifically adopted the "close case" concept in making 
a determination under section 53 *^
<7
Gsell & Co., Inc. v. Comm* 1 was the first case 
in which the close case concept was wedded to the section 
53^ burden of proof. This case raises some perplexing 
questions: Was Gsell a close case? If it was, then why
did the Tax Court fail to recognize it as such? Why did 
the Second Circuit fail to expressly say that Gsell was 
a close case?
The quote from Gsell presented earlier leaves 
little room to doubt that it is a close case: The Second
& 8  AFTR 2d 5507.
Circuit's findings that the taxpayer's statement was suf­
ficient to shift the burden and that the Commissioner had 
not met his burden support the inference. Also, the 
Court relied in part upon the Commissioner's failure to 
meet his burden to support its finding that the taxpayer 
was not availed of for the proscribed purpose.-*® Yet, 
there are contrary indications.
The Second Circuit criticized the Tax Court fori
(1) basing its determination of unreasonable accumulations 
upon inadequate evidence, (2) overly emphasizing the sur­
taxes saved by the stockholders, and (3) relying upon 
the taxpayer to arrange financing from a sister corpora­
tion.-*^ If the evidence were truly weighted 50-50* there 
would be no need for these criticisms for the shift in 
the burden of persuasion to the Commissioner would 
effectively determine the issue of reasonableness for the 
taxpayer. Of course the determination of this issue in 
favor of the taxpayer fails to raise the section 533(a) 
presumption of purpose in the Commissioner's favor, and 
the taxpayer must meet only his regular burden of proving 
the lack of the prohibited purpose. Furthermore, in Gsell 
the Second Circuit restated the view that "a determination 
that accumulations were not unreasonable . . . amounts to
-*®Ibid., pp. 5511-13.
59Ibid.
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a finding favorable to the taxpayer on the most persuasive 
fact which would show that the corporation was not availed 
of for the purpose . . . . However, the first criticism 
noted above appears to be addressed to a new weighing of 
the evidence to show clearly that the accumulations are 
reasonable. The last two criticisms appear to be addressed 
to a new weighing of the evidence to show clearly that the 
proscribed purpose is absent. Thus the criticisms are 
an indication that Gsell is not a close case, but that 
the evidence had been incorrectly weighed. If the taxable 
years in Gsell had been under the 195^ Code and its pro­
vision for the section 535 credit, would the decision 
have been different? Shaw-Walker provides some insight 
for an answer to this question.
The earlier discussion of the Shaw-Walker case 
showed that section 535(c) was a factor to be considered.
The Sixth Circuit's opinion seems to strongly indicate 
that a remand would have been in order regardless of the 
Tax Court's determination on the 53^ issue. Yet, the 
Sixth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit's language in 
Gsell on close cases. Is this an indication that Shaw- 
Walker was a close case? What else does Shaw-Walker have 
in common with Gsell?
In Gsell the Tax Court had failed to determine 
the section 53^ issue. In Shaw-Walker the Tax Court ruled
6o8 ajftr 2d 5507, 5512.
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that the statement did not shift the burden and then 
added the familiar qualifying statement. Thus in both 
cases the Tax Court’s position weakened the effectiveness 
of section 53^* However, in Shaw-Walker the determination 
of section 53 -^ was necessary to fix the burden of persu­
asion upon the Commissioner on the working capital issue 
upon the remand.
Can a rational theory be developed to help explain 
the apparent contradiction in Gsell, the significance 
of the Tax Court’s three basic positions as seen since 
Gsell, and other related problems? To this end, the con­
ceptual relationship of the burden of persuasion to close 
cases is developed beyond the state presented above. 
Further development requires a definition of a close case. 
Holzman's comments make it clear than an example of a
close case would be one in which the evidence is split
50-50 between the parties. Likewise, he indicates that 
a split of 25-75 in the evidence would mean that a case
is not close, A case in which the evidence is split
^9-51 between the parties would be close in the sense that 
there is very little difference in the evidence in favor 
of each party. Although it would be difficult to measure 
evidence that precisely in practice, a determination of 
any difference, however small, would be adequate to render
61
Holzman, p. 332.
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a decision in favor of one party without calling upon
the burden of persuasion.
The confusion in this matter seems to arise at 
the appellate level. It seems to involve the difference 
between a review by a circuit court as to whether there 
is "substantial evidence" to sustain the trial court’s 
findings of fact, and a review by a circuit court as to 
whether the trial court's findings are "blearly errone­
ous." "Substantial evidence" is evidence of such quality 
and weight that a reasonable person would be justified 
in making the same conclusions of fact that the trial 
court made. The Supreme Court has explained "clearly 
erroneous" as follows:
A finding is 'clearly erroneous’ when although 
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Reasonable men might differ as to whether the evidence in
a case is weighted 49-51* or 51-49, between the respective
parties. In such a case, there is substantial evidence
to support either decision. However, an appellate court
could reverse a trial court decision under the clearly
erroneous rule, if the trial court weighed the evidence
between the parties as being 49-51* while the review court
/T p
Federal Sec. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259 F. 2d 294 
(10 Cir. 19^ 8)'.
^ U.S. v. United States Gysum Co.. 333 U.S. 364,
394.
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weighed the evidence as being 51-^9. between the re­
spective parties. Considering the preceding analysis and 
the fact that the clearly erroneous rule governs^ the 
scope of review of Tax Court cases, the following defi­
nition of a close case is adopted for the remainder of 
this chapteri A close case is one in which the evidence 
is weighted exactly 50-50 between the parties.
Conceptually, there are two distinct steps in 
weighing evidence. The first step is to assign some 
amount of weight to each element of the evidence. The 
second step requires a simple addition of the weights of 
the elements in favor of each party. A comparison of 
the weights will dictate a decision in favor of the party 
with the greatest weight of evidence. If there is no 
difference in the weights, then the burden of persuasion 
is called into play to reach a decision. An incorrect 
determination can result from an error made in weighing 
the evidence in the first step, the second step, or both 
steps. The relationship of possible errors in weighing 
evidence, the burden of persuasion in close cases, and 
the clearly erroneous rule seems to be shrouded in mis­
understanding. The following hypothetical case should 
help clarify the matter.
6k
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of civil
Procedure.
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The taxpayer, T, had filed a section 534 statement. 
The Tax Court had failed to determine whether T's state­
ment was adequate to shift the burden of proof to the 
Commissioner, C. The Tax Court erroneously weighed the 
evidence in favor of T as 30$ and in favor of C as 70?. 
Consequently, the decision was in favor of C. T appealed 
knowing that a circuit court will reverse only if the Tax 
Court decision is clearly erroneous. Given the situation, 
one of three basic situations would occur upon a weighing
of the evidence by an appellate court.
Case 1. Perhaps the evidence in favor of T is 
45$ and the evidence in favor of C is 55$* Since the 
error did not alter the outcome of the decision, there 
would be no reason to reverse. There would still be 
substantial evidence in support of the decision, and 
it would not be clearly erroneous.
If T's section 534 statement were to be deemed 
adequate by either court to shift the burden to C, then 
by either weighting C carried his burden and the out­
come would not be changed. If T's statement were to be 
deemed inadequate by either court, then by either weighing 
T failed to carry his burden, and the final result would 
be the same. Therefore, a determination by the Tax Court
on the section 534 issue in this case is irrelevant to a
decision upon appeal.
Case 2. Perhaps the evidence in favor of T is 
60$ and the evidence in favor of C is 40$. This means
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the decision was in favor of the wrong party. Such a 
situation would leave the appellate court "with the defi­
nite and firm conviction" that the Tax Court had erred.
The clearly erroneous rule would be used to reverse the 
decision and insure a just result.
Once again assumptions could be made about speci­
fic determinations of the 53^ issue, but the weight of 
the evidence would work to insure a just result. Thus, 
in this case a determination on the section 53^ issue by 
the Tax Court would be irrelevant to a decision upon 
appeal.
Case 3. Perhaps the evidence is split 50-50.
In this instance the burden of persuasion must be deter­
mined. If the Tax Court should determine the section 53^ 
issue in favor of either party, its erroneous weighting 
of the evidence would work to determine the outcome in 
favor of C. The appellate court would have to examine 
the section 53^ statement to see whether the burden of 
persuasion had been properly placed because it will de­
termine the outcome of the case. Even if the Tax Court 
had correctly weighed the evidence, the appellate court 
would have to examine the section 53^ statement for the 
same purpose and reason. Therefore, if the Tax Court were 
to correctly determine the section 53^ issue and correctly 
weigh the evidence, its decision would be sustained, but 
if the Tax Court were to incorrectly determine the 
section 53^ issue while correctly weighing the evidence
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its decision must be reversed in order to give the correct 
result. Thus the Tax Court’s determination of the section 
53^ issue in this case would be irrelevant to an appellate 
decision.
A Restricted Theory
A theory can be developed from this examples Re­
gardless of whether the Tax Court makes a correct deter­
mination, an incorrect determination, or fails to make 
a determination of the adequacy of a section 53^ state­
ment, the final result of an appellate decision will 
be unaffected.
There is support for this theory. Gsell fits 
the third case situation rather well. Also, a comment 
by the Ninth Circuit in Smith. Inc. v. Comm.^  is consis­
tent with the above analysis. The Court stated*
But if we should assume that the Tax Court in­
correctly determined that the burden of proof here 
rested with the taxpayer, no prejudice would have 
resulted unless a finding of fact adverse to peti­
tioner was predicated only on petitioner's failure 
to sustain the burden of proof . . . .
Perhaps the strongest support comes from the Second Cir­
cuit in a pre-Gsell case, Casey v. Comm.^
Both Gsell and Casey strongly indicate the Second
658 AFTR 2d 5119 (9 Cir. 1961), 292 F. 2d 4-90. 
66Ibid., pp. 5122-23.
673 AFTR 2d 1 ^ 0  (2 Cir. 1959).
Circuit's concern over the Congressional intent expressed 
in section 53^* However, immediately after the expres­
sion of that concern in Casey, the Court analysed the 
clearly erroneous rule in detail. The Court supported 
its belief that reviewing courts have used language 
indicating a restricted scope of review only when they 
agreed with the trial court decision. The conclusion is 
that the "definite and firm conviction" subjective test 
makes the clearly erroneous rule a powerful tool for re­
versal. One must realize that a close case is in the 
eye of the beholder. An exhortation for the Tax Court to 
make a determination of the section 53^ issue is meaning­
less, if the Tax Court is unable to see that a specific 
case is close.
There are two things that this theory does not 
suggest. There is no suggestion that the burden of per­
suasion is totally irrelevant. This burden is a very 
necessary instrument for the orderly and just disposition 
of close cases. It must be determined by the Tax Court 
when a close case is recognized. It must also be inde­
pendently determined by a reviewing court when that court 
recognizes a close case. Nor is there a suggestion that 
the Tax Court may ignore this burden in non-close cases. 
The importance of the theory and the attendant analysis 
is in clearly understanding the conceptual operation of 
the burden in order to make a better evaluation of its 
significance in practice.
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Standing alone, the burden of persuasion appears 
useless as a practical matter because, in spite of the 
rhetoric, no obviously close case can be found in this 
area. The pragmatic explanation might be that no court 
has had the courage to base its decision solely upon the 
burden of persuasion due to the difficulty in weighing 
the evidence— particularly the assignment of weights to 
the elements. The probability that a true close case 
would ever occur is infinitesimal due to the infinite 
number of possible variables. Therefore one may be 
reasonably certain that in any given case the evidence 
does preponderate in favor of one party or the other. 
However, in a case weighted, perhaps 4-5"55» one may be 
unable to determine which party should be assigned which 
proportion. Thus the measurement problem blurs a sub­
stantial number of cases such that the practical dilemma 
is the same as if the case could be exactly weighed as 
50-50. The burden of persuasion may be secretly called 
upon to remove the blur. Then one can see clearly how 
the weights should be assigned to the parties, Subse­
quently, one may announce that since the case was not a 
close case there was no need to determine who had the 
burden of persuasion.
Perhaps the biggest problem is in determining 
whether the burden of producing evidence should be drawn 
to the burden of persuasion. Given the wide margin for 
error in assigning weights to the evidence the presence
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or absence of a single piece of evidence can completely 
alter the final decision in a case. The high cost to the 
taxpayer of producing evidence and the substantially 
greater difficulty to the Commissioner of producing evi­
dence was set out earlier. Thus it becomes extremely 
important to determine who has the burden of persuasion 
before trial if the burden of producing evidence shifts 
with it.
A Proposal
One may agree that Congress intended to correct 
abuses, and that the purpose of section 53 -^ was to give 
effect to that intent. The part of the Senate report 
quoted previously indicates two distinctly different 
causes for the complaints. They were: (1) the Commis­
sioner's failure to carefully evalute the cases, and
(2) the Commissioner's use of the tax as a weapon. One 
will notice that the former results from passive behavior 
while the latter results from active behavior. Either 
one will make the taxpayer incur heavy costs. A solution 
designed to correct one type of behavior will not neces­
sarily correct the other type. If this duality had been 
recognised, perhaps the controversy would have led to an 
effective solution.
Most of the critics have focused upon the second 
cause. They have correctly recognized that the burden 
of producing evidence must be allowed to pass to the 
Commissioner in order to deprive him of a powerful weapon.
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Wagman and the courts seem to have concentrated upon the 
first cause. A knowledge that one must carry only the 
burden of persuasion should be adequate to make him care­
fully review his case. Furthermore, the burden of pro­
ducing evidence becomes a more powerful weapon in the 
hands of the taxpayer than it is when it is in the hands 
of the Commissioner— a result not likely intended by 
Congress. Finally, as guardians of justice, the courts 
are interested in weighing all of the evidence. All of 
the evidence is more likely to be presented if the tax­
payer has the burden of producing it.
The key to the solution appears to be in the 
"weapon” aspect of the burden of producing evidence. That 
is, if this burden could be neutralized as a weapon in 
the hands of the taxpayer, there would seem to be no sub­
stantial reason to prevent the burden of producing evi­
dence from shifting with the burden of persuasion to the 
Commissioner. Such a method should eliminate both causes 
of the abuses mentioned in the Senate report. Hopefully, 
with little to be gained through maneuvering for a weapon, 
both parties would seriously evaluate the case and reach 
a settlement without resort to litigation.
The Tax Court took a cautious step forward in 
68Chatham Corp. and held that the taxpayer's section 534
6848 TC 145 (1967).
statement had shifted the burden of proof to the Commis­
sioner. The significance of this step was that this
holding was made prior to trial. A similar motion had
69been denied in Shaw-WAlker Co. 7 The difference was that
in Chatham the motion was heard by the judge who was to
try the case while in Shaw-Walker the motion judge was
not to be the trial judge. Regardless of the soundness
in the reasoning for making the differentiation, the
change was a significant one.
Goldfein has reasoned that little benefit will
accrue to the taxpayer unless the burden under section
7G53^ extends to section 535(c). The cases reviewed indi­
cate that a specific determination of this relationship 
may be expected at any time. If a satisfactory solution 
is not found new criticism will probably be forthcoming. 
Therefore the following proposal is submitted for consi­
deration: Although the weight of authority is not con­
clusive, it does indicate that the section 53^ burden of 
proof should extend to section 535(c). The reasoning of 
that authority is sound and this extension of the burden 
is recommended. The practice of ruling on motions for 
a determination under section 53^ prior to trial should 
be expanded to all appropriate cases. Specifically, this 
burden of proof must be interpreted as including the two
6939 TC 293 (1962). 
^Goldfein, p.
burdens in order to take the weapon from the Commissioner. 
The weapon can be negated in the hands of the taxpayer 
by permitting a full interplay between sections 53^ and 
535■ If the two sections are to work together because 
"The burden is no less as to a part than as to the 
whole . • then it follows that the "facts supporting
the grounds" should be interpreted to require an estimate 
of the dollar amount for each need claimed. Arguably, 
this interpretation of the section 53^~535 relationship 
substantially reduces the burden placed on the Commis­
sioner from affirmatively proving the dollar amount of 
the need to disproving the dollar amount of the need 
as claimed bv the taxpayer. The idea is that the section 
53^ statement displays the taxpayer's hand to the Commis­
sioner and that the burden of proof makes the Commissioner 
carefully analyze that hand. As noted, others have urged 
that the Commissioner be saddled with the full load— the 
burden of persuasion and the burden of producing evidence 
as to the extent of the needs. A simple standard of fair­
ness requires that the taxpayer at least display his full 
hand. The taxpayer must always be required to disclose 
the dollar amounts for every business need upon which he 
relies.
This system should work for several reasons.
?112 AFTR 2d 5554, 5558.
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When the taxpayer knows that he must state specific a- 
mounts in his statement, he must carefully analyze his 
needs for he faces the possibility of having to subse­
quently prove the extent of those needs. When the Com­
missioner is confronted with having to disprove a speci­
fic amount, he must carefully analyze the case to deter­
mine his odds. If the statement is subsequently deemed 
adequate to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, 
he must produce the first evidence. Once he comes for­
ward with sufficient evidence to controvert the claimed 
amount, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer must then go forward with evidence 
for the claimed amount. The Tax Court will then weigh 
the evidence with the burden of persuasion in mind.
The critical feature of this proposal is that 
the Tax Court take an unequivocal position on fixing the 
burden of persuasion and shifting the burden of producing 
evidence. The conditional certainty of facing the burden 
of producing evidence is necessary to make both parties 
bargain in good faith. The degree of difficulty for the 
Commissioner to shift the burden of producing evidence 
back to the taxpayer is viewed as being roughly propor­
tional to the reasonableness of the taxpayer's claim.
The system has advantages for the Tax Court. If 
the Court supports the shifting nature of the burden of 
producing evidence, maximum opportunity for the presenta­
tion of all the evidence is maintained. By fully using
»
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the 535(c) credit( the magnitude of any error made in 
weighing the evidence is reduced because of the oppor­
tunity to secretly make an adjustment in the amount of 
the crdditt commensurate with the difficulty in weighing 
the evidence. This advantage should tend to reduce the 
possibility of being reversed because it should be less 
clear and definite that a mistake had been committed.
Most importantly, the system offers an opportunity to 
give full effect to the intent of Congress.
The Tax Court has acknowledged the significance
of dollar amounts in a section 534 statement, but has
72refused to make them a necessary requirement. As early 
as i960, the Tax Court noted that the dollar amounts al­
leged in the section 534 statement as needed for inven­
tory were completely out of proportion to the largest 
inventory held.7-^ In Kirlin Co.,7**- presented above, the 
Tax Court noted the absence of dollar amounts, but deter­
mined that the statement was adequate to shift the bur­
den* Hopefully, these various acknowledgements are a 
prelude to an appreciation of the impact a full interplay 
between section 534 and section 535(c) might have.
72Ted Bates & Co., Inc., 1165,251 P-H Memo TC. 
^ American Metal Products Corn.. 34 TC 89, 100
(I960).
7Nl64,260 P-H Memo TC.
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SUMMARY
Section 53^ was enacted by Congress in response 
to numerous complaints by taxpayers. It provides for 
a shift in the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the 
Commissioner under certain conditions. However> critics 
have charged that the Tax Court's treatment of this sec­
tion has frustrated the intent of Congress. The contro­
versy that developed involved the two elements of the 
burden of proof— the burden of persuasion and the burden 
of producing evidence.
Often the Tax Court made no determination of the 
section 53^ issue. At times the Tax Court refused to rule 
on the shift in the burden of proof until after the trial 
of the case. This practice insured that the burden of 
producing evidence did not shift to the Commissioner, and 
it was questionable that the practice permitted the bur­
den of persuasion to pass.
The Second Circuit duly noted the Congressional 
intent for adopting the provision and the Tax Court's 
treatment in Gsell. This Court of Appeals admonished 
the Tax Court of the necessity for making a determination 
of the 53^ issue, especially in close cases.
Several years after the first round of criticism 
the critics became aware of the potential impact of the 
relationship between section 53^ and section 535* The
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significant difference in the two elements of the burden 
of proof was again noted. The writers suggested that the 
burden of proof should extend to section 535 so that the 
Commissioner would have the burden of proving the extent 
of the reasonableness of accumulations in appropriate 
cases.
The cases since Gsell reveal a substantial change 
in the attitude of the Tax Court. The primary result has 
been a trend in determining the burden of persuasion aspect 
of the burden of proof. The burden of producing evidence 
has received relatively less attention. Arguably, the 
cases appealed since Gsell provide a suggestion that further 
development has been impeded by the preoccupation of the 
courts in determining the boundaries for the reasonable 
needs of the business and the proper application of ac­
counting concepts. These factors are essential for a 
determination under section 535*
The disparity between the comments of the critics 
and the opinions of the courts led to a critical analysis 
of the positions taken. From that analysis this restricted 
theory was developed: Hegardless of whether the Tax Court
makes a correct determination, an incorrect determination, 
or fails to make a determination of the adequacy of a sec­
tion 53^ statement, the final result of an appellate de­
cision will be unaffected. This theory enhances an aware­
ness of the importance of the burden of producing evidence, 
but does not negate the reasons for the Tax Court to deter­
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mine the section 53^ issue. An examination of the Senate 
Report on the complaints leading to the enactment of section 
53^ revealed that the Commissioner's passive behavior as 
well as his active behavior was responsible for the com­
plaints. Arguably, a failure to recognize this difference 
helps explain judicial solutions which emphasize the burden 
of persuasion, while critics emphasize the burden of pro­
ducing evidence.
A proposal was tendered to accomodate the various 
factions. The proposal calls for a full interplay between 
sections 53^ and 535* The essential features require that 
an adequate section 53^ statement include a dollar amount 
for estimated needs, that such a statement will shift both 
elements of the burden of proof to the Commissioner, and 
that the burden of producing evidence will shift back to 
the taxpayer upon the Commissioner’s presentation of 
evidence disproving the amount of the need claimed in the 
section 53^ statement.
CHAPTER IV
THE APPLICATION OF ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF THE REASONABLE NEEDS 
OF THE BUSINESS
The proper application of accounting concepts in 
the determination of the reasonable needs of the business 
requires a comprehensive understanding of those concepts. 
An understanding of accounting concepts requires knowledge 
as well as intelligence. While the intelligence and legal 
acumen of judges may be presumed by virtue of the position 
they have attained, a similar presumption of accounting 
knowledge may not be made. The judicial treatment of ac­
counting concepts, which is presented herein, is limited 
to the most basic ones. Although the concepts of earnings, 
depreciation, working capital, and appropriation of earn­
ings are basic, they are not necessarily easy to under­
stand* The definitions of these terras may appear simple, 
but the difficulty in understanding seems to involve the 
development of an awareness of the relationship of each 
account to all other accounts. This chapter presents an 
examinationoof the apparent judicial understanding of the 
nature of earnings, depreciation, working capital, and 
appropriation of retained earnings. A rationale, based 
upon accounting, is presented to support the court’s
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assumption of the relationship between liquidity and 
retained earnings*
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS
A thorough understanding of economic and ac­
counting concepts of income is essential for an under­
standing of the various definitions of income in the tax 
law area. An integral part of the law providing for the 
accumulated earnings tax is a matter of accounting. The 
following excerpts show the pervasiveness of income con­
cepts in this tax. Section 531 imposes the tax "for each 
taxable year on the accumulated taxable income," as 
presently defined in section 535• Section 535(a) provides 
for various adjustments to "taxable income" in arriving 
at "accumulated taxable income." The adjustment provided 
by subsection (c)(1) is a general credit for operating 
corporations equal to the portion of the "earnings and 
profits for the taxable year as are retained for the 
reasonable needs of the business." In addition to the 
emphasis on income or earnings, one should notice that 
although several taxable years may be subject to the tax, 
the tax is calculated upon the earnings of a particular 
year without inclusion of the earnings of any prior 
years. However, the significance of accumulations from 
prior years has not been overlooked. The Regulations 
expressly acknowledge the importance of prior accumula­
tions as follows:
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In determining whether any amount of the earnings 
and profits of the taxable year has been retained 
for the reasonable needs of the business, the accu­
mulated earnings and profits of prior years will be 
•taken into consideration. Thus, for example, if 
such accumulated earnings and profits of prior years 
are sufficient for the reasonable needs of the busi­
ness, then any earnings and profits of the current 
taxable year which are retained will not be consi­
dered to be retained for the reasonable needs of 
the business . . . A
The Nature of Earnings
The most basic misunderstanding of the nature 
of earnings stems from an assumption that "earnings" is 
a synonym for "cash." Even though a taxpayer elects to 
account for income on a cash basis, he may be required 
to reflect certain accrual adjustments in computing 
taxable income. A notable example is the accrual adjust­
ment required for depreciation. Therefore care must be 
taken to avoid confusing the term "earnings" with the 
term "cash."
Once the distinction between these two terms is 
overlooked, a number of erroneous statements appear plaus­
ible. Perhaps the most common expression alludes to 
paying dividends "out of earnings." Of course, cash divi­
dends must be paid in cash. The cash is provided by oper­
ations which also result in earnings. From this observa­
tion one may make the erroneous assumption that the terms
■^Income Tax Regulations, Section 1.535~3(b)(1)(ii).
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are synonymous. An example of this error is found in the 
memorandum decision, Hanovia Chemical & Mfg. Co. 
as followsi
Of the net income of $94-, 976 *4-7, $21,600 was 
paid out in dividends to stockholders and $10,605.09 
was paid for income taxes which were not deductible 
from gross income. The addition to surplus was 
only $62,725*39* Of this amount $4-2,218.82 served 
only to restore the surplus as it stood at December 
31. 1929*2
A logical extension of this type of reasoning is
to erroneously assume that earnings can "pay for" other
needs as well as dividends. For example, in Battlestein
Investment Co. v. U.S.^ the taxpayer sought to justify an
accumulation of earnings by claiming a need for long-term
debt retirement. As a partial answer, the court said:
These annual payments of $50,000 were made without 
impeding the steady growth of the plaintiff’s net 
earnings . . . .  plaintiff . . . could easily pay 
off its long-term obligations^out of current earnings 
as each installment came due.4.
If one assumes that earnings may be used to pay off debts,
then earnings may be used to make loans. The Tax Court
has said:
Even if we assume that Princeton did require 
funds from petitioner, such loans as would have 
been required could easily have been made out of 
petitioner’s accumulated earnings and profits of 
$289,054-. 15» as they existed at July 1, 1957. the 
beginning of the taxable years here involved . . . .
2<n4-3, ^ 35 P-H Memo TC.
323 AFTR 2d 69-784- (DC, Tax. i 1969). 
W ,  p. 69-788.
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The evidence convinces us that petitioners earnings 
of such years were not required for loans to 
Princeton.5
The part of the quotation from Battlestein which suggests 
that there is a direct connection between the annual pay­
ments on debt and the company*s annual income is an addi­
tional indication of misunderstanding. The words "with­
out impeding" lead this writer to suspect that the Court 
was under the false impression that the annual payment 
on the principal of $50*000 was a deduction from revenues 
on the firm*s annual statement of income. Thus, in spite 
of this "impediment, ■ the annual income continued to 
increase.
The Tax Court made a similar error in Gazette
Telegraph Co. The difference was that in this case the
Tax Court was comparing the total payments to the total
accumulations instead of comparing annual payments to
annual earnings. The Court said:
. . . petitioner accumulated a surplus of 
$97*633*03 fiscal 19^7 which had increased to 
$236,266.08 by the end of fiscal 19^8 despite the 7 
payments on principal of the Bank of America noteX
In this quotation the use of the word "despite" is con­
strued to indicate a belief by the Tax Court that the 
principal payments constitute a charge against the
^The Factories Investment Corporation. 39 TC 908, 
918 (1963T:
619 TC 692 (1953)*
7Ibid.. p. 707*
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surplus, or retained earnings account. This mistake could 
result from incorrect reasoning that does not directly in­
volve the statement of income. For example, the payment of 
a cash dividend does result in a reduction of the balances 
in the cash account and the retained earnings account. This 
knowledge could improperly be taken as support for the no­
tion that earnings are equal to cash. Therefore, since 
the payment of a cash dividend reduces the retained earn­
ings, one might erroneously deduce that the cash payment of 
a debt would reduce the amount of retained earnings.
Of course words may be subject to more than one 
interpretation. The following quote from Southland In-
Q
dustries, Inc. is an example.
When petitioner carried $86,925*^6 of its 
earnings for the taxable year (19 -^0) to surplus, 
it then had a surplus theretofore acquired of 
$1^5»8^7-22, and in addition assets (much of same 
liquid) many times that amount.°
The words "in addition" could mean that the Tax Court 
literally meant for the balance in the surplus account 
to be added to the balance of the asset accounts. Yet, 
the words "in addition" constitute a transitional phrase 
and could have been used to indicate merely that the 
assets are another factor to be considered. Neverthe­
less, several paragraphs later the former construction
8<n46,262 P-H Memo TC.
^Ibid., p. 903.
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clearly appears as follows:
If the reasonable needs of petitioner's business 
had required an expenditure for new equipment, expan­
sion or installation of additional facilities, no 
reason was shown why, In addition to the $145,000 
surplus theretofore acquired, all or a substantial 
part of its large nonoperating assets could not have 
been used for this purpose.10
Although the cases presented above indicate a
shallow comprehension of the nature of earnings, some
courts have made laudable attempts to understand the
nature of earnings. Particularly noteworthy is this
comment by the Fourth Circuit in Smoot Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Comm.t
Thus, the size of the accumulated earnings and profits 
or surplus is not the crucial factor* rather, it is 
the reasonableness and nature of the surplus. Part 
of the surplus may be justifiably earmarked in the 
form of reserves, for specific, necessary business 
needs. Again, to the extent the surplus has been 
translated into plant expansion, increased receivables, 
enlarged Inventories, or other assets related to its 
business, the corporation may accumulate surplus 
with impunity . . . .  Where, on the other hand, the 
accumulation of surplus is reflected in liquid 
assets in excess of the immediate or reasonably 
forseeable business needs of the corporation, there 
is a strong indication that the purpose of the 
accumulation is to prevent the imposition of income 
taxes upon dividends which would b&ve been distri­
buted to the shareholders . . . .
This statement represents a recognition that earnings can
only be expressed in the form of assets. Unfortunately,
the decision provides no instructions as to how the
earnings can be related to specific assets. This Court
10Ibid.
U 5 AFTR 2d 626, 630 (4 Cir. 1?60). The ellipses 
represent the omission of the authorities cited.
125
just assumes that excess liquid assets are evidence of 
excess accumulated earnings.
The Second Circuit has realized that the retained 
earnings account does not represent a source of funds 
for making payments. This Court has learned the relation­
ship of retained earnings to specific assets. In Electric
12Regulator Corp. v. Comm. the Court said*
As a practical matter, a retained earnings account 
may embody a cross-section of the assets of the 
corporation. See Paton & Dixon, Essentials of 
Accounting 652-53» 667-68, (1958). Particularly is 
this true where, as here, the corporations £sic3 
growth has been financed through its own earnings 
rather than through additional shareholder invest­
ment or borrowing.1-*
The practical impossibility of tracing retained earnings 
to specific assets creates a dilemma for the courts. If 
a corporation has assets that are not needed or used in 
the business, as well as assets that are needed, how may 
one determine the extent to which earnings, versus paid- 
in capital, have provided for either group of assets in 
order to assess the accumulated earnings tax? Is the 
assumption that excess liquid assets should be matched 
with accumulated earnings consistent with accounting con­
cepts? The answer to this query is presented after the 
nature of earnings, depreciation, working capital, and 
appropriation of earnings have been examined.
12lk AFTR 2d 5 ^ 7  (2 Cir. 196^). 
^ Ibid., p. 5^50-
The Nature of Depreciation
The preceding examination of the nature of earnings 
revealed that the chief difficulty for the courts is a 
lack of understanding of the relationship of earnings to 
the liquid assets— especially the cash account. Interest­
ingly, the chief difficulty in understanding the nature 
of depreciation is in understanding its relationship to 
the liquid assets. The interesting point is that earnings 
and depreciation share a common obstacle to understanding 
although their conceptual natures are completely different. 
The treatment of depreciation as a deduction on the income 
statement in determining the earnings for a period seems 
to be adequately understood by the courts. The lack of 
comprehension seems to be primarily limited to its effect 
upon the asset and equity accounts on the balance sheet.
In fairness to all concerned parties, the account­
ing profession must bear at least a small part of the 
blame for the confusion about depreciation. For an inde­
terminable number of years the balance sheet account, re­
lated to the depreciation charges on the income statement, 
had the word "reserve" associated with the word "deprecia­
tion” in its title. An example of this title would be 
"Reserve for Depreciation." The unfortunate thing about 
the use of the word "reserve" in the account title was 
that "reserve" was also being used in the title of 
four other different types of accounts. The five types 
of "reserves" used were*
12?
1. To value asset accounts,
2. To disclose an estimated liability,
3* To recognize a contingent liability,
To distribute equitably certain costs and ex­
penses , and
5* To disclose the extent earnings have been 
retained.
The treatment of the effect of depreciation upon the 
balance sheet falls within the first category listed.
The modern terminology for this account is "Accumulated
i h,
Depreciation." The use of the word "reserves" is 
discouraged, but if it is used at all it should be limited 
to the fifth category. The preferred title for usage in 
this last category would be "Appropriation of Retained 
Earnings for
The word "reserve" has a general meaning in which
it refers to "money or its equivalent kept in hand or set
16apart usually to meet liabilities." Perhaps this mean­
ing was partially responsible for this improper statementi
Petitioner had theretofore made depreciation reserve 
of $152,299 on its transmitter which could have been
1 Welscfa, Zlatkovich, and White, Intermediate 
Accounting (3d ed.; Homewood, 111.1 Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1972), pp. 825-27.
^Committee on Terminology, AICPA, "Review and 
Resume," Accounting Terminology Bulletin No. 1 (New Yorki 
AICPA, 1961), p. 27.
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. (Spring­
field, Mass.": G. & C. Merriam Co., 1970), p. 29^.
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used in buying and installing a new transmitter if it
Viflrt t n  r?r» an.-**'had desired o do so. '
The erroneous application of the general meaning of reserve 
can be seen more clearly in this expressioni
A corporation is not required to use, as operating 
capital, the funds set aside for depreciation reserve 
but rather it should be permitted to save and accumu­
late earnings and profits and retain them in some 
form of liquid assets in an amount equal to the 
reserve for depreciation.
Besides the impression that accumulated depreciation re­
presents a cache of cash, the idea that the taxpayer 
"should be permitted" to set aside liquid assets equal to 
the accumulated depreciation is especially interesting.
How did such an idea occur? What implications does it 
have for the present context?
Mohawk did not set aside as permitted by law a 
separate depreciation reserve but carried this deduc­
tion under 'working capital*. Thus, working capital 
had to finance its daily operations as well as its 
additions to fixed assets.20
The first sentence in the quotation reveals that the
answer to the first question posed is to be found some-
A clue to answering both questions is found in 
Mohawk Paper Mills, Inc. v. U.S.19
•^Southland Industries. Inc.. <846,26 
TC, p. 900.
18Churchhill Construction Co. v. U.5 
2d 045, 04a (1965J.
2 P-H Memo
17 AFTR
1918 AFTR 2d 6111 (DC, N.Y*i 1966).
20Ibid., p. 6116.
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where in the law. The statement probably arises out of 
the Court's interpretation of the provision permitting a 
deduction of depreciation for tax purposes. The second 
sentence is an example of reasoning from an erroneous 
premise. Hopefully, an understanding of the topics pre­
sented in following subdivisions will enable one with a 
limited knowledge of accounting to appreciate the effect 
of depreciation upon working capital.
The preceding quotations regarding depreciation 
show relatively obvious errors. As a judge's understand­
ing of the matter increases, it becomes more difficult 
to ferret out the degree of understanding that he pos­
sesses. This is one reason that the quotation below is 
longer than usual. Another reason for the length is that
the quotation is a part of the charge to the jury in The
21Donruss Co. v* U.S. which was given to guide the jury 
in making its decision on the ultimate section 531 issue 
of "purpose."
This concept of allowing a taxpayer a deduction over 
a period of time on the cost of the equipment is 
called depreciation. Under the concept of deprecia­
tion, * * . a taxpayer is permitted to use any bene­
fits therefrom in any manner he desires.
During the Donruss Company's years ending January 
31, I960 and January 31, 1961 it, as the Court under­
stands from the proof, claimed and was allowed by way 
of depreciation aggregate amounts of $137,634.98 and 
$150,437.74, respectively, these amounts were not 
included in the plaintiff corporation's accumulations 
of earnings and profits. These benefits, when claimed 
by the taxpayer, may be utilized by the taxpayer for
2115 AFTR 2d 896 (DC, Tenn. I965).
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replacement of plant equipment or diversification pur­
poses, among other things.
As of the end of January, 19^1 the Donruss Company, 
it is contended by the defendant, could expect to re­
cover similar depreciation deductions for future years 
in amounts in excess of $120,000 per year. Such 
deductions, as I say, could be utilized for replace­
ment of equipment or other purpose of the corporate 
taxpayer.
So, it is necessary that you understand . . . that 
each tax year in question The Donruss Company was 
allowed deductions as depreciation on equipment it 
owned and was free to take advantage of same as it saw 
fit in the operation of its business. The purpose 
of the depreciation allowance, to further explain, is 
to afford the owner of a wasting asset used in any 
trade or business, a means of recouping, tax-free, his 
investment in that property. *
Several observations are made. The Court has not used the 
words "cash" or "liquid assets" in reference to deprecia­
tion. This is some indication that the Court was aware 
of the false assumption that "cash" equals "depreciation." 
The specific words used in several references to depre­
ciation were "benefits" and "deductions." These words 
seem appropriate in the sense that they are general 
enough to allow the reader to either draw from his know­
ledge the proper interpretation, or assume the Court 
understands the nature of depreciation. Such a ploy will 
not stand a close scrutiny. For example, "deductions" 
cannot be used "for replacement of equipment." This idea 
is expressed twice, and it is construed as revealing a 
mistaken belief that depreciation does directly relate to 
cash or liquid assets, or that the Court has a shallow
22Ibid.. pp. 902-03.
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understanding of depreciation. Finally, the Court recog­
nized that the purpose of the depreciation deduction is 
to permit a qualified taxpayer to recover his investment 
free of taxes. Although the tax-free recovery of invest­
ment results under the law, it is not the conceptual
23basis in accounting for the depreciation deduction. J
oh
The Steele*s Mills v. Robertson case is one in 
which the facts seem to have had a direct bearing upon 
the Court's manner of expressing the pertinent accounting 
concepts. Briefly, the relevant facts for present pur­
poses arei The plaintiff spent over $110,000 on plant 
and equipment during 1938, the taxable year in dispute. 
During 1938, the expenditures permitted for section 531 
needs were greater than earnings plus depreciation charges. 
For a ten year period, 1932-41, the plaintiff expended 
over $900,000 for plant and equipment. Finally, there 
had been no significant increase in the plaintiff's 
quick assets since 1923* Thus the Court's findings of 
fact appear adequate to support its decision for the 
plaintiff. However, the Court's reasoning expressed in 
its other findings is subject to question. The Court 
stated*
2-^ See, Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory 
(Homewood, 111.* Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 306- 
335 for a presentation of the various accounting concepts 
of depreciation.
2Zf32 AFTR 1734 (DC, N.C. I 1943).
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■ . . that it was in accordance with sound business 
practice and a reasonable need of the business . . . 
to withhold from distribution to its shareholders 
assets in cash . . . to equal its reserve for depre­
ciation for the purpose of having the funds readily 
available withj-which to replace machinery and other 
items
Later the Court reaffirmed this view and said*
If the corporation is forced to use the funds set 
aside for reserve* EsicJ for depreciation for operating 
capital* there will be no assurance that it will have 
funds to replace . . . machinery* and while . . . 
the corporation has been able to operate successfully 
by using its reserve for depreciation as operating 
capital, the court does not think it should be foreed 
to do this, and that it should be allowed to carry 
. . . liquid assets to equal its reserve for depre­
ciation . . .  .2°
The unanswerable question is whether this Court would
also sanction an accumulation of liquid assets equal to
accumulated depreciation in a situation in which there .
was no reasonably anticipated need to replace plant and
equipment assets. In such a case it would appear that
the answer should be "no."
The courts have had an irksome task in disposing
of the fact that replacement cost is greater than either
original cost or accumulated depreciation. The Tax Court
27in Metal Office Furniture Co. ( made the accumulated de­
preciation equals liquid assets error in stating, "The
25Ibid.. p. 1735.
26Ibid.. p. 1736.
27ll52,313 P-H Memo TC.
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amount of the depreciation reserves would have been in­
adequate to replace the depreciating facilities because
? ft
costs had increased." This mistake is somewhat under­
standable because in this case the Court apparently felt 
the taxpayer had a need to fund the accumulating depre­
ciation. However, there is a significant difference in 
that need as perceived in Steele»s Mills and as perceived 
in Metal Office. In the former case the impression re­
ceived was that the company had an ongoing relatively 
pressing need to replace old equipment. In the latter 
case the taxpayer expressed the need to fund accumulated 
depreciation in addition to needs including normal expan­
sion and a new division. The Court*s attitude in Metal 
Office was to accept all needs claimed, noting that 
"eventually" the taxpayer*s plants would have to be re­
placed.
The mistakes are compounded in Battlestein 
Investment Co.29 District Court in Battlestein
relied on a passage from Smoot^0 to support its reasoning. 
However, the passage on which the Court relied misinter­
prets the meaning of appropriation. The confusion is com­
pounded by the fact that the Battlestein trial court fails
28Ibid.. p. 953.
2923 AFTR 2d 69-784-.
^°5 AFTR 2d 626. This passage will be analyzed 
in depth under the subsequent heading "The Nature of 
Appropriations."
to distinguish between "appropriations of surplus" and 
"depreciation allowances.'* It appears that the Court 
is assuming that these are identical items. Finally, 
total confusion reigns on this topic as the Court appar­
ently misconstrues the nature of accumulated depreciation 
The Court found that the taxpayer had definite and speci­
fic plans to replace certain fixtures. In a specific 
interpretation of the aforementioned passage in Smoot 
and a deduction thereon, the Court saidt
The authorities hold that a taxpayer is not entitled 
to duplicate the depreciation allowance with accumu­
lated earnings for the purpose of replacing assets 
. . . .  Thus, the only justifiable accumulation in 
this instance would be the difference between the 
total amount of depreciation recoverable and the 
higher replacement cost . . . . Finally, assuming 
that the price of fixtures has risen, the $137#558 
which the taxpayer had in working capital at the 
close of the 1$62 fiscal year was certainly more than 
enopgh to cover the spread between original and 
replacement cost.-*1
A logical inference from this statement is that the Court
has fallen into the trap that accumulated depreciation
is equal to cash.
The proper method for evaluating accumulated 
depreciation and its relation to the replacement of 
assets is covered in Revenue Ruling 67-6 .^ Two cases-^ 
have partially quoted that Revenue Ruling. The same
3123 AFTR 2d 69-?8*f, 787.
•^The Dahlem Foundation, Inc. v. U.S.. 22 AFTR 
2d 5962, 5969 (6 Cir. 19681T Battlestein Investment Co. 
v. U.S., 2? AFTR 2d 71-713. 716 (5Cir.l971).
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paragraphs were quoted in both cases. The material quoted 
wast
Although the reserve for depreciation itself may 
be considered and given appropriate weight as a part 
of the facts and circumstances in considering the 
reasonable.needs of the business, the concept that a 
noncash deduction for depreciation based on historic 
costs requires the setting aside for an indefinite 
period a cash fund adjusted for economic fluctuation 
in order to provide for total replacement of plant 
assets is not within the meaning of the term 'reason­
able needs of the business.'
Accordingly, a corporation may not include a fund 
equal to its depreciation reserves escalated for the 
economic factor of increased replacement costs in 
justifying the reasonable needs of its business pur­
suant to section 537 of the Code. However, the 
reserve for depreciation itself may be considered 
and given appropriate weight as a part of the facts 
and circumstances in each case.33
In this writer's opinion the two cases show that the 
effectiveness of this Ruling has been severly restricted 
by granting that "the reserve for depreciation itself 
may be considered and given appropriate weight . . . ." 
Conceptually, there is no difference in the economic 
significance between the need to expend funds to expand 
the business and the need to expend funds to replace 
assets— both needs refer to the future. The original 
cost of assets currently held is irrelevant in making a 
decision to replace those assets. Therefore the accumu­
lated depreciation upon those assets is irrelevant, too. 
The acknowledgement that "accumulated depreciation" is a 
mere valuation account is consistent with economic 
reality. Since there is no conceptual difference between
^Rev. Rul* 6?-64, 1967-1 CB 150.
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expansion and replacement, then the tax principles which 
apply to expansion should apply to replacement. The 
Revenue Ruling recognizes the substance of this view.
In the paragraph immediately preceding the above quotation 
this position is stated as follows*
Section 537 of the Code provides that the tern 
"reasonable needs of the business? includes the rea­
sonably anticipated needs of the business. Section 
1.537-1(10 of the Income Tax Regulations provides 
that in order for a corporation to justify an accumu­
lation of earnings and profits for reasonably anti­
cipated future needs, there must be an indication 
that the future needs of the business require such 
accumulation, and the corporation must have specific, 
definite, and feasible plans for the use of such 
accumulation. Where the future needs of the business 
are uncertain or vague, where the plans for the
future use of an accumulation are not specific,
definite, and feasible, or where execution of such a 
plan is postponed indefinitely, an accumulation cannot 
be justified on the grounds of reasonably anticipated 
needs of the business. These regulations express the 
legislative intent as stated in Senate Report 1622,
83d Congress, 2d Session, 69, and House report 1337,
83d Congress, 2d Session, A172-A173*-*
In the light of economic reality no weight should be given
to accumulated depreciation. The failure of this*Ruling
to unequivocally express this proper view of accumulated
depreciation may be expected to impede understanding of
this important aspect in determining the reasonable needs
of a business. As noted, two cases have already quoted
the misleading passages, rather than the correct one.
The Nature of Working Capital
The courts have erred in assuming that retained
I^bid.
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earnings and accumulated depreciation were directly related 
to liquid assets. That mistake cannot be made with work­
ing capital. Working capital is defined as the excess 
of current assets over current liabilities. It is com­
posed of liquid assets. Since working capital is merely 
a matter of arithmetical computation, then its nature is 
determined by the nature of current assets and current 
liabilities. The most common errors involve the relation­
ship between current assets and current liabilities# The 
courts have been inclined to express this relationship 
in "rules of thumb" without always making a careful 
analysis of the applicability of those rules based upon 
the current ratio, acid-test ratio, or one year's operating 
expenses.
The Tax Court reviewed a number of cases in John
'iC
P. Scripps Newspapers-^ for various applications and 
views of rules of thumb. The Tax Court particularly 
noted the use of the current ratio as an indication of 
reasonable accumulations. Also, the Court observed the 
use of a rule that accumulations to cover operating 
expenses for one year are reasonable. However, this rule 
has been qualified by a judicial awareness that different 
businesses have different requirements. Therefore, this 
rule "should not be given any greater weight than a
3 5 ^  TC ^3 (1965).
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36rule of administrative convenience."^
The danger in relying upon this rule of thumb was
the cause for reversal and remand in McNally Pittsburg
37Manufacturing Corp. v. U.S. The District Court submitted 
instructions to the jury that approved the annual figure., 
for cost of goods sold as a part of the current operating 
needs for a year. Under this assumption no funds were 
available to pay dividends. The government showed a sub­
stantial amount of funds available to pay dividends by 
excluding the annual cost of goods sold from current 
operating needs. The case was remanded in part because 
of the potential effect of a possible credit under section 
535 upon the decision.38
The advent of the general credit provision of ■ 
section 535 has increased the necessity for a more accurate 
measurement of working capital needs than rules of thumb 
can provide. The rules of thumb are expedient, but they 
essentially represent a static analysis of the dynamic 
needs of business. Perhaps the first court to give ade­
quate notice of this difference between the techniques of 
analysis and the nature of business was the Fourth Circuit
36Ibid.f p. 4-71.
3715 AFTR 2d (10 Cir. 1965), reversing 11 AFTR 
1578 (DC. Kans. 1963).
38Ibid., p. k86.
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in Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Comm.^9 In that case
the Court said*
Working capital needs of businesses vary* being 
dependent upon the nature of the business, Its 
credit policies, the amounts of inventories and 
rate of turnover, the amount of accounts receivable 
and the collection rate thereof, the availability 
of credit to the business, and similar relevant 
factors.^0
A new approach for evaluating the working capital 
needs of the business was adopted by the Tax Court in a 
memorandum decision, Bardahl Mfg. Corp. The company’s 
operating cycle was used to evaluate its need for 
working capital. In this regard the Court statedi
Manufacturing’s operating cycle, consisting of 
the period of time required to convert cash into 
raw materials, raw materials into an inventory of 
marketable Bardahl products, the inventory into 
sales and accounts receivable, and the period 
required to collect the outstanding accounts, 
averaged approximately b.2 months during the k 
years here in question.
Petitioner required working capital as of the 
end of each of the years in question at least in 
an amount sufficient to cover its reasonable anti­
cipate^ costs of operation for a single operating 
cycle. ^
After the Tax Court adopted the operating cycle approach,
3950 AFTR 1612 (2 Cir. 1957).
^°Ibid., p. 1622.
hi .
■^L'jj65.200 P-H Memo TC.
I lo  ,
Ibid.. p. 65-1130.
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43 44three circuit courts ^ and four district courts also
adopted it. However, the operating cycle approach con­
tains its own problems in evaluating working capital needs. 
Several arei
1. Should an average cycle, or a peak cycle, be used?
2. How should the peaks of various cycles be treated
when they fall within different months?
3- How should the credit cycle be evaluated?
4. Should the decimal expression of the cycle be 
applied to all other expenses as well as to the 
cost of goods sold?
A discussion of these problems and others and a comparison
of the differences between the cases in applying the
Ilc:
operating cycle has been made by Joseph H. Trethewey.
He has also developed a financial comparison of the 
various approaches based upon the same hypothetical data.
In his example the working capital needs as shown by the 
different approaches range from $172,041 to $675*050.^ 
When the possibility exists that the upper limit
43^Apollo Industries, Inc. v. Comm.. 17 AFTR 2d 
518 (1 Cir. 1966); Shaw-Walker Co. v. CominT, 21 AFTR 2d 
655 (6 Cir. 1968); Bahan Textile Machinery v. U.S.. 29 
AFTR 72-418 (4 Cir. 1972).
44Schenuit Rubber Co. v. U.S., 22 AFTR 2d 5794 
{DC, Md.; 1966); New England Wooden Ware Corp. v. U.S.. 
22 AFTR 2d 5465 (DC. Mass.; 1968); Eberle Tanning Co.~"v. 
U.S., 29 AFTR 2d 72-1153 (DC, Pa.* 1971) 1 Amer. Trading" 
& Production Corp. v. U.S., 29 AFTR 2d 72-1301 (DC, Md.j 
1972).
•^Joseph H. Trethewey, "Accumulated Earnings Tax 
Working Capital," Tax Management #187-2nd (1971).
^ Ibid., p. B-17, 18, and 19.
l*u
of working capital needs can be four times the size of the 
lower limit, then it is questionable that the operating 
cycle approach is superior to the old rules of thumb. The 
answer could be "yes'1 if the trial judge has a sufficient 
knowledge of accounting to permit him to properly weigh 
operating cycle presentations. Otherwise, the working 
capital needs would probably be decided by unknown consi­
derations as in Schenuit Rubber Co. v. U.S.^
Schenuit Rubber is an example of the type of di­
lemma that judges might face. The taxpayer called the 
resident partner of one of the "big eight" accounting firms 
as an expert witness. This expert used an operating cycle 
approach and found working capital requirements for the end 
of fiscal 1961 at $2,939,288 and for fiscal 1962 at 
$3,206,156. The government countered with a professor from 
a prestigious university's school of business. This expert 
criticized the operating cycle approach used by the tax­
payer’s witness for ignoring the cycle of current liabi­
lities. The professor used a different operating cycle 
approach that showed working capital needs as $1,532,12*1- 
and $1,159,280 for 1961 and 1962, respectively. The 
difference in the experts* calculations is roughly 
$1,500,000 for 1961 and $2,000,000 for 1962.
The Court stated, "In making its analysis and
/f722 AFTR 2d 579^.
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findings the Court has been guided by the following prin-
48ciples . . . The principles set forth by the Court
were merely other judicial observations to the effect 
that every case is different and must be evaluated with 
a good business judgment without relying wholly upon a 
cursory view of a company’s accounts. Then, without ex­
plaining the analysis used in arriving at a decision, 
the Court said*
All factors considered, the Court finds that 
the amount of working capital taxpayer reasonably 
needed for current operations as of April 30, 19&1 
was $2,250,000. The similar needs as of April 
30, 1962 were $2,000,000.^9
The working capital needs as determined by the Court are 
approximately midway between the positions taken by the 
experts. Whether this decision was made in a comprehen­
sive understanding of accounting concepts, or in an at­
tempt to split the difference in a manner reminiscent of 
the wisdom of Solomon, cannot be ascertained,
A distinctive approach is presented in Electric 
Regulator Corp. v. Comm.'*0 by the Second Circuit. The 
Tax Court had rejected a claimed need for a working capi­
tal reserve in cash of $430,000. The Tax Court noticed 
that the cash balance at the end of the company’s fiscal
48
Ibid., p. 5802. 
^9Ibid., p. 5803.
5014 AFTR 2d 5447.
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year, October 31, 1957, was about $821,000, and that for 
fiscal years 1957 and 1958 the average monthly cash bal­
ances were $^79,600 and $354,700, respectively. The Tax 
Court's evaluation was that "based on all the evidence, 
petitioner's anticipated working capital requirements 
could be amply cared for by its accumulations from prior 
years plus the cash-generating transactions of its going 
b u s i n e s s . T h e  Second Circuit concluded that the cash 
available was not adequate to pay the dividend that the 
Tax Court held should have been paid. The attack upon the 
Tax Court's position on this issue was supported in two 
ways. First, the Second Circuit observed that the actual 
cash balance had fallen to $190,000 on April 30, 1958. 
Second, the Second Circuit calculated "net cash available" 
at $320,000 before deducting needs for cash in the coming 
year. Significantly, the "net cash available" was deter­
mined in this manner:
Cash available, October 31, 1957, after
payment of current liabilities. . . . .  $231,000
Net income, fiscal 1958 ...................  89.000
Net cash available.  .............$320,000^
The addition of "net income, fiscal 1958," determined by
an accrual system of a c c o u n t i n g , i n arriving at "net
Cl
Electric Regulator Corporation, 40 TC 757, 766- 
67 (1963).-------------------------------
52l4 AFTR 2d 5447, 5451.
^340 TC 757.
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cash available" represents a touch of irony. The irony
is that shortly before this calculation the Second Circuit
specifically pointed out that retained earnings does not
KIl
necessarily represent liquid funds.
The First Circuit has correctly summed up the pro­
per approach to be taken in evaluating working capital 
needs. The explanation in Apollo Industries. Inc. v.
Comm. is:
Business decisions are not made on the basis of 
information collected at arbitrary dates. They 
take into account the timing of needs and availa­
bility of resources. And so should judicial at­
tempts to deal justly with these decisions. But 
to ascertain such needs and the resources available, 
we are required to go behind the simple balance 
sheet presentation of assets and liabilities.
The Court's idea of fulfilling this statement is an oper­
ating cycle approach similar to the one followed in Bar- 
dahl Manufacturing. Although operating cycle approaches 
consider the duration of time that assets will be in a 
noncash form, they do not consider the timing of needs 
and the availability of liquid assets. The calculation of 
available cash in Slectric Regulator is subject to the 
same criticism. In regard to timing, the operating cycle 
approaches and the Electric Regulator approach can hardly 
be considered superior to the old rules of thumb.
AFTR 2d 5447, 5450.
7 AFTR 2d 518 (1 Cir. 1966).
56Ibid., pp. 521-22.
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A belief in the operating cycle approach as a tool 
of management is not limited to the courts. For example, 
Stephen S. Ziegler has expressed concern that the precision 
desired from operating cycles for management purposes may 
be greater than the precision deisred for section 531 
cases. Consequently, he suggests some leeway before as­
sessing the accumulated earnings tax against a corpo­
ration.^ The courts are aware of the need for some lee­
way to protect businesses from undue governmental inter­
ference. The Second Cirucit has expressed its awareness 
of the need in this fashion:
Although Section 102 should be rigorously applied 
to make it impossible for individuals to abuse the 
corporate form for the purpose of lowering their 
individual tax rates, the Commissioner may not use 
Section 102 as a device to enable him to look over 
the shoulder of the corporate manager and assess a 
penalty any time the Commissioner believes that a 
corporation has not been generous in its dividend 
policy or has temporarily invested its surplus 
in a manner not entirely acceptable to the Commis­
sioner. 58
Ziegler's plea for a margin of freedom for taxpayers in 
this area of taxation is commendable, but his faith in the 
precision of the operating cycle is misplaced.
Astute management practices call for budgets for 
effective planning and control. Budgets are particularly
"^Stephen S. Ziegler, "The 'New* Accumulated Earn­
ings Tax: A Survey of Recent Developments,V Tax Law Re­
view, 22:77,102 (1966).
58Gsell & Co.. Inc. v. Comm., 8 AFTR 2d 5507, 55H-
12 (2 Cir. 1961).
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applicable when a matter as crucial as timing is involved.-^ 
However, two caveats are necessary with respect to evalu­
ating working capital needs through a budgeting approach 
for tax purposes. Since management is able to control 
the timing of needs to a degree, a judge must determine 
whether good business judgment, or good tax judgment, is 
responsible for the timing in a given case. On the other 
hand, a judge must not be misled by the hindsight that 
liquid assets were not used for working capital as bud­
geted. The solution to both of these potential problems 
is an adequate margin for error in which management can 
operate. Thus, if a reasonable leeway is provided for 
managements, then the taxpayer should not feel pressed to 
manipulate the timing to protect reasonable accumulations 
from the tax. However, if a court determines that timing 
has been manipulated in order to shield accumulations, then 
the amount of leeway should be appropriately reduced. Yet, 
a reduction should not be made to the extent that the tax 
would be applicable to accumulations represented in 
transactions that would occur.
The Mature of an Appropriation 
of Retained Earnings
The preceding topics have shown the misunderstanding 
<o
-"Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accountingi A Manage­
rial Emphasis (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jerseyt Pren- 
tice-Hali, Inc., 1972). See Chapter 5. Budgeting in Gener­
al » Profit Planning.
14?
of earnings, depreciation, and working capital. As a 
special classification of retained earnings, an appropria­
tion may be misinterpreted in the same ways that earnings 
have been misconstrued. Thus, the basic pitfall in under­
standing the concept of "appropriation'! is that it nece­
ssarily has a direct relationship to cash or other liquid
assets. This error was apparently made by the district
60
court in World Publishing Co. v. United States.
The taxpayer decided to build an addition on an 
adjacent lot. A new press and related equipment were 
needed for the planned building. The Court noted the cor­
poration's practice of "paying for such improvements out
of its earnings" and that the company "had begun accumu-
6 ?lating a fund for that purpose." Also, the Court noted 
that in December of 1939 " . . .  a resolution to set aside 
a fund for the purpose was passed." v In regard to a simi­
lar director's meeting in December of 1941 the Court saidi
Accordingly, a resolution was passed to withhold 
dividends and to set aside $150,000 for the pur­
chasing of the press and accessory equipment, and 
$100,000 for the press building, bringing the ear­
marked accumulations for expansion to $500,000.°4
Whether these references are to a fund of cash, to an
appropriation of retained earnings, or to both cannot be
6°35 AFTR 1671 (DC, Okla.j 1947).
6lIbid., p. 1675* 62Ibid.
63Ibid. 6^Ibid., p. 1676.
148
ascertained. Unfortunately, the actual resolution was 
not quoted. However, in a footnote given for this latter 
meeting, several paragraphs of the minutes of the meeting 
were quoted. The quotation relates the comments of the 
president. Therein the president seems to urge an appro­
priation of retained earnings of $500,000 while he appears 
to suggest, less strongly, that in connection with the 
appropriation the problem of conserving cash be considered. 
Subsequent statements of the Court are particularly en­
lightening.^
The book value of stocks, bonds, and cash less 
liabilities at December 31, 1941, was about $427,000. The 
market value of the same was not available. However, on 
the same date for 1942 and 1943 the comparable figures 
given were market values of approximately $496,000 and 
$646,000, respectively. The Court's conclusion was that 
these amounts were convincing that adequate assets were 
available for the planned expansion. Immediately, this 
view was followed by a citation of the retained earnings 
balances for the three years in the approximate amounts 
of $563#000, $643,000, and $740,000, respectively. Then 
the Court emphasized that the beginning balance of retained 
earnings for 1942 was greater than the cost estimate of the 
improvements at the end of 1942.^ This emphasis given
65Ibid. 66Ibid.. p. 1677.
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by the Court provides a basis for the inference that it 
has erred by assuming that earnings represent liquid as­
sets. Finally, the Court's misunderstanding seems clear 
as it relates funds in the treasury to profits and accu­
mulations of earnings in this fashioni
The determination of the question in the instant 
case depends chiefly upon the sufficiency of the funds 
for the expansion plan in the corporate treasury 
before adding the profits of 1942 and 1943* and the 
immediancy of the need for any funds, or more speci­
fically, for the 1942 and 1943 additions to the 
accumulations« {
Thus a logical extension of this improper construction
seems to be that an appropriation of retained earnings
automatically provides a.fund of liquid assets.
68This case was affirmed upon appeal to the Tenth 
Circuit. Significantly, Judge Phillips dissented. He 
properly compared liquid assets, net of the dividends that 
the Commissioner claimed should have been paid, to the 
estimated cost of expansion. Those assets were inade­
quate for the expansion, leaving nothing for working capi­
tal needs at the end of 1942. Increases in costs offset 
the earnings for 1943* Judge Phillips observed the strong 
reliance given to the comparison of retained earnings to 
the cost estimates and stated his conviction that the Dis­
trict Court had thereby erred. Also, he disagreed with
67Ibid.. p. 1679.
6837 AFTR 150 (10 Cir. 1948).
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the trial court's reliance on the indefiniteness of 
the time for implementation of the proposed improvements.^9 
Arguably, the District Court used this last point only to 
buttress its findings on the adequacy of accumulations.
The two appeals taken to the Fourth Circuit in 
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corn, v. Comm.70 are notable for their 
sagacious treatment of accounting principles and concepts. 
However, even these excellent opinions contain a misinter­
pretation of accounting. In the earlier discussion of 
depreciation, reference was made to a misinterpretation by 
the Court in Smoot. That statement is as followst
Replacement of assets which are fully depreciated or 
depleted requires available cash but does not require 
a second appropriation of surplus. It is only when 
rehabilitation plans involve replacement of old 
equipment with equipment costing more than the 
original, or when additional equipment is required, 
that appropriation of surplus.is justified.71
The sentences apparently represent an unclear appreciation 
of the nature of an appropriation as it relates to depre­
ciation and replacement of asBets. This point is rela­
tively insignificant in this case as the Court properly 
concentrated upon a comparison of liquid assets to needs 
in evaluating the reasonableness of accumulations. Yet, 
as explained in the preceding topic on depreciation, this
69Ibid.. pp. 15^-57•
7°50 AFTR 1612 (4 Cir. 1957) ( 5 AFTR 2d 626 (4*
Cir. I960).
715 AFTR 2d 626, 633*
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point of misunderstanding became the basis for further 
misconstruction.
An Accounting Rationale
Since earnings cannot be directly traced to speci­
fic assets, then assumptions must be formulated in order 
to relate earnings to specific assets. In Smoot the 
Fourth Circuit took the position that earnings could be 
accumulated to the degree that they were translated into 
assets related to the business. This case also presented 
the view that liquid assets greater than reasonably fore­
seeable business needs strongly indicate an improper accu-
72mulation of earnings. Of course, the assumption implied 
in this view is that earnings should be matched first with 
excess liquid assets.
The' taxpayer sought to overcome this assumption by 
substituting a contrary assumption in the appeal of Battle- 
stein Investment Co. v. U.S.^  The taxpayer's assumption 
was also based upon the Smoot language that earnings could 
be accumulated without limitation to the degree the earn­
ings were translated into assets needed for the business. 
The taxpayer’s assumption is that accumulated earnings 
should be matched against the cost of depreciable assets, 
first, as if paid for out of assets provided by the profit
72
Ibid., p. 630,
7327 AFTR 2d 71-713 (5 Cir. 1971).
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element of operations. The Court correctly recognized an 
implicit premise in the taxpayer’s position that a corpo­
ration has the right to retain liquid assets equal to the
74accumulated depreciation.r Perhaps the following part of
the taxpayer's brief will enable one to understand the
dilemma of a Court having a limited knowledge of accounting!
With respect to the year January 31> 1962, which 
dollars paid the $50,000 debt principal, the earnings 
of $44,92? or the depreciation cash flow of $46,477? 
Obviously if earnings were used to pay this debt, 
the earnings have been reasonably used and Taxpayer 
cannot be penalized under Section 531*
We submit that as a matter of law the principal 
of debt incurred to purchase plant and equipment 
assets must be viewed as having been paid first by 
the dollars produced by earnings, not depreciation 
cash flow as the court below assumed.75
The Fifth Circuit did not accept the taxpayer's arguments, 
and the taxpayer lost upon the appeal.
Under the going concern concept all depreciable 
assetB must be replaced ultimately. Thus the idea of ac­
cumulating liquid assets equal to the accumulated depre­
ciation in order to provide for the future replacement of 
depreciable assets has some appeal. However, many depre­
ciable assets have a useful life of several decades. If 
a business grows, assets will be needed for expansion.
Given that assets provided by recovery of depreciation 
charges and by earnings are each sufficient to support a
7**Ibid.. p. 71-715.
7^Ibid., p. 71-716 {see footnote 4).
company's expansion, the source of the dollars used is 
irrelevant considering the "business as an entity. There­
fore the only significance of the above question posed to 
the Fifth Circuit results from tax considerations. If 
the remaining useful life of a given asset extends beyond 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of the business, then 
assets representing a recovery of the investment in that 
asset through depreciation charges should be assumed to be 
those used for expansion. The rationale is that all tax­
payers should not be expected to subsidize the expansion 
of a particular taxpayer's business while that taxpayer 
withdraws his investment from active duty in his business 
under the pretense of awaiting the occurrence of an evant 
that is at best a mere possibility. This rationale is 
supported by an awareness that an asset having a long life 
is often not specifically replaced at the end of its life 
because it has been replaced gradually by the expansion 
that occurred. Consequently, the position taken by the 
courts to match accumulated earnings to the excess of 
liquid assets over the reasonably foreseeable needs of the 
business is sound.
SUMMARY
The nature of earnings, the nature of depreciation, 
and the nature of an appropriation of retained earnings 
have all been misunderstood by the courts in varying 
degrees. The most pervasive misunderstanding of these
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concepts has been the relationship of each to cash or 
liquid assets. The cases presented in this chapter have 
shown that one aspect of a concept may be understood 
while another aspect of the same concept is misconstrued.
The nature of working capital has also been con­
fusing to some courts. The basic misinterpretation of 
this concept has been a failure to appreciate the differ­
ence between a static measurement of working capital at 
a moment of time and the dynamic changes in working capital 
during a period of time. A suggestion was presented for 
a better analysis of working capital needs.
The approach by some courts to evaluating the 
reasonableness of accumulations by comparing liquid 
assets to reasonably foreseeable business needs was ex­
amined. A contrary approach was presented. Finally, 
a rationale to support the judicial approach on this issue 
was presented. The rationale is that all taxpayers should 
not be expected to subsidize the expansion of a particu­
lar taxpayer's business while that taxpayer withdraws his 
investment from active duty in his business under the 
pretense of awaiting the occurrence of an event that is at 
befit a mere possibility.
CHAPTER V
AN INVESTIGATION OF FINAL DETERMINATIONS 
CLASSIFIED BY JURISDICTIONS
The preceding three chapters have shown the great 
difference in factors that often arise in accumulated 
earnings tax cases. In addition to these broad factors 
there are numerous smaller factors, such as loans to stock­
holders and redemptions of stock, that might be present 
in varying degrees in any given case. Consequently, a 
specific case is a composite of elements taken from an 
infinite number of possibilities. Therefore, care must 
be Oxercised in drawing conclusions or making suggestions 
based upon the decisions in the accumulated earnings tax 
cases. This chapter presents four tables in which the 
final determinations are classified in different ways in 
order to obtain several views of the decisions.
FINAL DETERMINATIONS IN THE TRIAL COURTS
Chapter II presented a sketch of the legislative 
history involving the accumulated earnings tax. Several 
changes were noted which could have had some discernible 
effect in the administration of the tax. The tax rate went 
from 25 percent in the 1921 Act to 50 percent in the 1924 
Act. The 50 percent rate was in effect until it was
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reduced to graduated rates of 25 and 35 percent in the 
193^ Act. A 100 percent increase in this tax rate is an 
indication of a substantial increase in the harshness of 
the tax with a possible increase in the reluctance of 
judges to impose the tax. Of course the harshness of the 
tax is interdependent with the personal income tax rates 
and the point in the graduation of personal tax rates of 
the stockholders of a corporation. Too much significance, 
therefore, must not be placed upon the change in the 
accumulated earnings tax rates. Another potentially 
significant change was the change from the "prima facie 
evidence of purpose" provision to the "evidence determina­
tive of purpose" provision in the 1938 Act. However, it 
is questionable whether or not the human mind can apply 
the difference in these two rules with any reliable degree 
of precision, even if a significant difference is per­
ceived. Finally, the relatively extensive changes incor­
porated into the 195^ Code offered the greatest potential 
for change in the administration of the tax.
Table 2 presents the final determinations of 
accumulated earnings tax incidents classified by trial 
court jurisdictions and revenue acts. The various revenue 
acts have been grouped for classification in a manner com­
patible with the preceding discussion of potentially 
significant changes. The trial court jurisdictions are 
subdivided in Table 2. The Board of Tax Appeals and Tax 
Court incidents are separated into those resulting from
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memorandum decisions and those resulting from full court 
decisions. The district court incidents are separated 
into those resulting from jury trials and those resulting 
from nonjury trials. The number of incidents arising out 
of the Court of Claims is too insignificant to consider.
Table 2 shows that prior to the Revenue Act of
1938 the 5^ incidents are almost evenly divided between
the taxpayer and the government at 25 and 29, respectively. 
However, the 5^ incidents are quite unevenly divided 
between the trial courts. Only five of these incidents 
arose in the district courts, and only one of the five 
was a jury trial. A comparison of the incidents arising 
under the column headed 1939-,38 to the earlier incidents 
reveals several interesting results. One result is an 
increase in the rate of incidents. The total number in 
the 1939-f 38 group is 121 with 6? for the taxpayer and 5*4- 
for the government. The number arising from Board of Tax 
Appeals and Tax Court decisions remained rather evenly
divided between the taxpayer and the government at 5*4- and
51. respectively. The most noticeable change seems to be 
the increase in the district court incidents. Perhaps 
significantly, the distribution of the final determinations 
is disproportionate between the taxpayer and the government 
at 13 and 3» respectively. The 13 incidents in favor of 
the taxpayer include the 5 incidents rendered by juries.
These results may be compared with the results 
under the 195^ classification. Because of the important
Table 2
Final Determinations of Accumulated Earnings Tax Incidents^- 
Classified by Trial Court Jurisdictions & Revenue Acts
Incidents Determined in Favor of Taxpayer (T) & Government (G) 
Arising Under Revenue Acts for the Years :
Trial Court 1954
T G S'
Full BTA4 & TC5 Incidents 10 9 -
Memo. BTA & TC Incidents 27 14 4
Sub--total 37 23 4
1939- '38 1936- '34 1932- '24 1921
T G T G T G T G
14 16 2 2 15 18 0 3
40 35 A 3 1 1 0 0
54 57 6 5 16 19 0 3
District Courts:
Nonjury Incidents 19 19 1
Jury Incidents 14 4 1
Subtotal 33 23 2
Total Incidents 70 46 6
8 3 1 1 1 1 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
11 _3 1 1 J. _1 1 0
67 54 7 6 17 20 1 3
^As defined in CHAPTER I. Court of Claims incidents omitted due to the insignificance of the 
number thereof.
2
In a very few incidents the time period involved years covered by Revenue Acts in adjoining 
columns. Such incidents are classified in the column representing the older applicable Revenue Act.
3
S denotes cases in which the decision was split between the taxpayer and government due to 
the section 535(c) credit.
4
Board of Tax Appeals.
■’Tax Court.
departure from previous statutes of the general credit 
provision of section 535(c), a heading in addition to 
those provided for the taxpayer and government is provided. 
The additional heading represents decisions which were 
split between the taxpayer and the government by the 
application of section 535(c). The total incidents 
under the 195^ classification are 122. This number in­
cludes only six decisions classified as "split.H The 
remaining 116 incidents show 70 in favor of the taxpayer 
and in favor of the government. In contrast to the 
1939-*38 column, the 195^ column might represent the 
beginning of a trend in favor of the taxpayer in Tax 
Court cases. The 195^ - column reveals 37 incidents for 
the taxpayer and 23 for the government arising from the 
Tax Court. The incidents arising out of memorandum 
decisions account for almost all of this difference as 
the incidents arising from a full review are 10 for the 
taxpayer and 9 for the government. The district court 
incidents are similarly divided with 33 in favor of the 
taxpayer and 23 in favor of the government. All of this 
difference arises out of the jury trials as the nonjury 
incidents are evenly divided at 19 each for the parties.
The indication of a possible bias in favor of 
taxpayers in jury trials is strengthened by a continua­
tion of the trend shown in the 1939-*38 column. Whether 
or not the bias is real, the change in the dispersion of 
incidents between trial court jurisdictions is some
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indication that taxpayers believe that it exists. This 
suggestion is made as a logical inference from the obser­
vation that the total incidents for the 195^ column and 
the 1939-*38 column are almost the same at 122 and 121, 
respectively, while the proportion of district court 
incidents increased with an attendant decline in the pro­
portion of Tax Court incidents.
FINAL DETERMINATIONS IN THE APPELLATE COURTS
Since appeals from the Tax Court and the district 
courts go to the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, 
an examination of the results of the appeals from all of 
the incidents provides an additional basis for evaluating 
the incidents. Table 3 separately presents the appeals 
taken by the taxpayer and the government from the Board 
of Tax Appeals and Tax Court incidents to various Circuit 
Courts of Appeals. This table reveals a total of 72 
appeals, with 69 taken by the taxpayer and 3 taken by the 
government. This division of the appeals is in striking 
contrast to the relatively even division of incidents 
between the taxpayer and the government as shown by Table 
2. The taxpayer was able to obtain a reversal 15 out of 
69 times, for a rate of 21.7 percent. The government did 
not win any of its three appeals.
In Table k the appeals taken upon the district 
court incidents are presented. The total number of ap­
peals taken is 21. Of this number, 15 were taken by the
TABLE 3
The Number of Incidents Appealed^ and Reversals^ Obtained by the Taxpayers and
the Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Originally Before the
Board of Tax Appeals^ and the Tax Court^ Since the Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921
1st
The
2nd
United
3rd
States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total
Number of Appeals by 
Taxpayers 8 20 5 4 9 3 3 8 6 3 69
Reversals Obtained 4 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 15
Percentage Reversed 50.0% 20.0% 40.0% 50.0% 11.1% 33.3% 0% 0% 16.7% 0% 21.7%
Number of Appeals by 
the Government 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3
Reversals Obtained 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Percentage Reversed - 0% - 0% - - V* 0% - 0%
^Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted.
Mases classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed 
outright.
Memorandum decisions are included.
taxpayer and 6 taken by the government. The taxpayer 
obtained three reversals for a rate of 20 percent. This 
rate is quite close to the 21.7 percent reversal rate for 
taxpayers shown in Table 3* However, the appeals by the 
government indicate some significant differences, although 
the absolute numbers are small. In contrast to the re­
sults presented in Table 3» Table 4 shows that the number 
of government appeals doubled for a total of six, while 
the total number of appeals decreased to 30 percent of the 
total appeals presented in Table 3» This increase in 
appeals by the government may be interpreted as indicating 
a bias in favor of taxpayers in the district courts. When 
one considers that four reversals were obtained upon the 
six appeals taken by the government, the suggested bias 
becomes more credible. Table 5 is a compilation of Table 
3 and Table 4, and it is presented to give an overview of 
the appeals.
The idea of judicial bias is somewhat repugnant 
to ideals of justice. However, a deliberate bias is not 
suggested. Instead, the suggested bias is believed to 
be a subconscious one that is expressed in the attitude 
of a judge,* or jury member, as he views any given issue. 
For example, the different interpretations of the sub-
See Sheldon Goldman, "Conflict and Consensus in 
the United States Courts of Appeals," Wisconsin Law Re­
view. 1968, p. 461 and other studies cited therein.
Table 4
The Number of Incidents Appealed’*- and Reversals^ Obtained by Taxpayers and the
Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Originally Before the
District Courts Since the Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921
1st 2nd
The
3rd
United States
4th
Circuit Courts of Appeals 
5th 6th 7th 8th 9 th 10th Total
Number of Appeals by 
Taxpayers 0 2 0 2 4 2 1 1 2 1 15
Reversals Obtained 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
Percentage Reversed - 0% - 0% 50.0% 50.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20%
Number of Appeals by 
the Government 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 6
Reversals Obtained 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 4
Percentage Reversed - 0% - - - 50.0% - - - 100,0% 66.7%
^Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted*
2
Cases classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed
outright,
Table 5
The Number of Incidents Appealed^ and Reversals^ Obtained by Taxpayers
and the Government in Accumulated Earnings Tax Cases Since the
Passage of the Revenue Act of 1921
1st 2nd
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals 
3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total
Number of Appeals by 
Taxpayers 8 22 5 6 13 5 4 9 8 4 84
Reversals Obtained 4 4 2 2 3 2 0 0 1 0 18
Percentage Reversed 50.0% 18.2% 40.0% 33.3% 23.1% 40,0% 0% 0% 12.5% 0% 21.4%
Number of Appeals by 
the Government 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 9
Reversals Obtained 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 4
Percentage Reversed - 0% - - 0% 50.0% ** m 0% 100.0% 44.4%
Cases dismissed by agreement of the parties have been omitted.
2Cases classified as reversed include those vacated and remanded as well as those reversed
outright.
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stantive rules of law presented in CHAPTER II are believed 
to be the result of judicial attitudes which are based upon 
subconscious values of the individual judges. The effect 
of a probable bias must be considered in an evaluation of 
equity.
SUMMARY
This chapter has presented four tables in order 
to draw conclusions and inferences from the final deter­
minations in the accumulated earnings tax cases. Table 2 
showed that the number of accumulated earnings tax inci­
dents began to increase with the Revenue Act of 1938*
The results of jury trials indicated a probable bias in 
favor of taxpayers. An examination of the appeals taken, 
as presented in the subsequent tables, tends to support 
the suggestion of bias. Furthermore, the reversals ob­
tained tend to corroborate the bias suggested.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter contains a summary and conclusions 
based upon the results of this study. The conclusions con­
tain an ohjective and subjective evaluation of equity as 
revealed in the cases investigated. In addition to an eval­
uation of equity as it has existed, an evaluation of the 
future prospects of equity is presented. Finally, recom­
mendations are made in the light of past proposals and re­
lated criticisms and the results of this study.
SUMMARY
This study was introduced with a presentation of 
various aspects of the problem, definitions of some terms 
limited to this study, a review of the relevant literature, 
and a statement of the methodology to be used in this study. 
CHAPTER II presented a brief legislative history of the ac­
cumulated earnings tax and the judicial development of two 
substantive rules of law. CHAPTER III examined the devel­
opment of a procedural rule of law, the burden of proof 
under section 53^» and its relationship to section 535- 
CHAPTER IV presented some applications of accounting con­
cepts in determining the reasonable needs of the business. 
CHAPTER V investigated the final determinations as clas-
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sified in different ways. Each of these chapters is sum­
marized in the following discussion.
Introduction to the Study
The primary purpose of this study was to make an 
evaluation of equity in the judicial administration of the 
accumulated earnings tax cases. Specific objectives were 
to examine these cases in order to determine the charac­
teristics of conflicting decisions, to determine the ju­
dicial basis for such decisions, to evaluate equity in 
those cases, and to evaluate future prospects for equity. 
Proposals for tax reform are constantly being presented. 
This study should contribute some evidence in weighing pro­
posals for judicial reform in the federal tax area. The 
study was limited to three broad topics involving two 
substantive rules of law, a procedural rule of law, and 
applications of accounting concepts. In addition, an in­
vestigation of the final determinations was presented.
Three terms were specifically defined for this study. They 
arei equity, reasonable classification, and incident.
The review of the literature began with a presen­
tation of the Traynor and Surrey proposals for judicial 
reform. They made three significant suggestions which were 
as followst
(1) To transfer the original jurisdiction of the Dis­
trict Courts and the Court of Claims to the Board 
of Tax Appeals, thus giving the Board exclusive 
original jurisdiction in all income, estate, and 
gift tax cases*
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(2) To decentralize the Board of Tax Appeals) and
(3) To create a single Court of Tax Appeals and limit 
appeals to this Court with appeal from the Court 
of Tax1Appeals by certiorari to the Supreme 
Court.
The views of various critics of these proposals were given. 
However, six years after the Traynor and Surrey proposal, 
Professor Griswold revived the controversy. Griswold 
limited his efforts to supporting a single Court of Tax Ap­
peals although he suggested refinements to the related 
proposal by Traynor and Surrey. Professor Griswold was
concerned about the long time period during which the con-
o
flicting decisions remained unsettled. Critics of Gris­
wold's proposal concentrated their attention upon the as­
pect of time, rather than the fact of conflict. Madeline
.v*
Remmlein conducted a study of conflict cases in order to 
evaluate the time period in which a conflict might go un­
resolved. Remmlein interpreted the data to indicate a fal­
lacy in the charge that conflicting circuit court decisions 
delayed settlement of tax controversies.-^ A second study**"
^R. J. Traynor, "Administrative and Judicial Pro­
cedure for Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes— A Cri­
ticism and a Proposal," Columbia Law Review. 38:1392, 
1425-28, 1938.
2
Ervin N. Griswold, "The Need for a Court of Tax 
Appeals," Harvard Law Review, 57:1153* 1944.
^Madeline Remmlein, "Tax Controversies," George 
Washington Law Review, 13*416, 1944-45.
4Madeline Remmlein, "A Time Study of Certain Tax 
Controversies," George Washington Law Review, 16:238, 
1947-48.
by Remmlein for a time period contiguous to the time 
period of her first study supported the prior study, but 
it did indicate a possible trend toward a greater total 
elapsed time until settlement of a case. In spite of the 
Remmlein studies, Judge Walter Pope concluded that the 
weakness at the circuit level, noted by Traynor and Gris­
wold, was still in existence. Judge Pope believed that 
the strongest objections were based upon the process for 
appointing judges to a Court of Tax Appeals, and he set 
forth a plan which he hoped would avoid the objections 
he perceived.^ Professor Lowndes reviewed all of the fed­
eral income, estate, and gift tax cases going to the 
Supreme Court since ratification of the Sixteenth Amend­
ment through the 1959 term. He classified these cases into 
the three categories of criminal cases, constitutional 
cases, and construction cases. Lowndes concluded that 
the Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction of cases in 
the first two categories. However, cases involving the 
construction of statutes, which is a preponderance of the 
cases, should be within the jurisdiction of a Court of 
Tax Appeals.^ Finally, Professor Del Cotto conducted a
e
■'Walter L. Pope, "A Court of Tax Appealsi A Call 
for Reexamination," American Bar Association Journal, 39: 
275-76, 1953*
^Charles L. B. Lowndes, "Federal Taxation and 
the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Review, pp. 222-226,
257, I960. ------------------
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study similar to those made by Remmlein. Del Cotto*s study 
followed the first Remmlein study by 16 years. He found 
that the time required to settle conflict cases had in­
creased since Remmlein*s study. Professor Del Cotto be­
lieved that the time period in which tax questions remained 
in doubt was far too long.'7
The basic methodology of the studies reviewed 
was an analysis of conflicting cases from the Supreme 
Court down to the circuit courts. In contrast to this 
methodology, the present study examined cases at the trial 
court level for conflicting decisions on each one of three 
broad topics previously set forth. Analysis of these 
conflicts proceeded from the trial court up to the Supreme 
Court in applicable cases. This analytical approach 
provides some Insight for the existence of conflicts that 
have not reached the appellate level. Such conflicts 
would go undetected by the approaches taken in the other 
studies* An objective comparison of important conflicting 
issues permits judicial attitudes to be ascertained for 
an evaluation of equity.
Two Substantive Rules of Law
The basic statutory provision for the accumulated 
earnings tax throughout its existence is that it will be 
levied against a corporation if that corporation has been
'Louis A. Del Cotto, "The Need for a Court of Tax 
Appealsi An Argument and a Study," Buffalo Law Review. 
12:5, 1962-63.
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formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding income 
taxes upon its stockholders* The term "purpose" has 
been interpreted in several different ways during a period 
of almost four decades* In the order of decreasing 
favorableness to the taxpayer, the interpretations are:
1. The "sole" or "express" purpose test,
2. The "primary" or "dominant" purpose test,
3* The "one of the determining purposes" test, and
The "a," "any," or "one of the purposes" test,
compatible with the "complete absence of purpose"
test.
The Supreme Court settled the conflict among these inter­
pretations in favor of the fourth construction in Donruss 
in 1969*
Another substantive rule of law governs the rela­
tionship of the reasonable needs of the business to the 
purpose. The fact that earnings had been accumulated be­
yond the reasonable needs of the business was "prima 
facie" evidence of the prohibited purpose prior to the 
Revenue Act of 1938* Beginning with the 1938 Act the 
same fact became "determinative" of the prohibited pur­
pose. Under either of these provisions the relationship
between the reasonable needs of the business and the pur­
pose is subject to interpretations that yield eight 
possible paths to a final determination in an accumulated 
earnings tax case. In CHAPTER II these paths were presented 
in Table 1.
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Section 53^ and Section 535
Section 53^ provides for a shift in the burden 
of proof from the taxpayer to the Commissioner under 
certain conditions. Early critics charged that the Tax 
Court's treatment of this section had frustrated the in­
tent of Congress. The Second Circuit duly noted the Con­
gressional intent for adopting the provision and the Tax 
Court's failure to determine the section 53^ issue in 
Gsell. This Court of Appeals admonished the Tax Court 
of the necessity for making a determination of the section 
53^ issue, especially in close cases. A second round of 
criticism developed as writers became aware of the potential 
impact of the general credit provision of section 535(c) 
upon section 53^* Critics suggested that the burden of 
proof should extend to section 535 so that the Commissioner 
would have the burden of proving the extent of the rea­
sonableness of accumulations in appropriate cases.
The cases since Gsell reveal a trend in determining 
the burden of persuasion element of the burden of proof.
The burden of producing evidence has received relatively 
less attention. Arguably, the cases appealed since Gsell 
provide a suggestion that further development has been 
impeded by the preoccupation of the courts in determining 
boundaries for the reasonable needs of the business and 
the proper application of accounting concepts.
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An analysis of the comments of the critics and the
opinions of the courts led to a restricted theory that
regardless of the Tax Court’s treatment of a section 53^ 
issue, the final result of an appellate decision will be 
unaffected- However, this theory does not negate the need
for the Tax Court to determine the section 53^ issue.
Finally, a proposal was tendered to accomodate the various 
factions. The proposal calls for a full interplay between 
sections 53^ and 535* The essential features require that 
an adequate section 53^ statement include a dollar amount 
for estimated needs, that such a statement will shift both 
elements of the burden of proof to the Commissioner, and 
that' the burden of producing evidence will shift back to 
the taxpayer upon the Commissioner's presentation of evi­
dence disproving the amount of the need claimed in the 
section 53^ statement.
Applications of Accounting Concepts
The accumulated earnings tax cases were examined 
for the judicial treatment of basic accounting concepts.
The nature of earnings, the nature of depreciation, and the 
nature of an appropriation of retained earnings have all 
been misunderstood in varying degrees. The most pervasive 
misunderstanding of these three concepts has been the rela­
tionship of each to cash or liquid assets. The cases pre­
sented revealed that one aspect of a particular concept 
may be understood, while another aspect of the same concept 
is misconstrued. The nature of working capital has also
17*
been confusing to some courts. The basic misinterpre­
tation of this concept has been a failure to appreciate 
the difference between a static measurement of working 
capital at a moment of time and the dynamic changes in 
working capital during a period of time. A suggestion 
was made for a better analysis of working capital needs.
The courts’ approach to evaluating the reasonableness of 
accumulations by comparing liquid assets to reasonably 
foreseeable business needs was examined. Although a con­
trary approach was presented, a rationale to support the 
judicial approach on this issue was presented.
An Investigation of Final Determinations
The final determinations in the accumulated earnings 
tax cases have been classified in different ways in order 
to obtain several views of the decisions. Table 2 showed 
that the number of accumulated earnings tax incidents be­
gan to increase with the Revenue Act of 1938* The results 
of jury trials indicated a probable bias in favor of tax­
payers. An examination of the appeals taken, as presented 
in the subsequent tables, tends to support the suggestion 
of bias. Furthermore the reversals obtained tend to 
corroborate the bias suggested.
CONCLUSIONS
Evaluation of Past Equity
An objective evaluation of equity requires that 
the constraints imposed by the definitions of equity and
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reasonable classification be satisfied. These constraints 
can seldom be satisfied in a comparison of different cases. 
However, the constraints may be satisfied by isolating 
identical issues in cases which would not otherwise be 
comparable. An evaluation of equity must proceed by deduc­
tion from an objective comparison of the judicial treatment 
of identical issues. As one step to this end the develop­
ment of two substantive rules of law was examined.
During a period of almost four decades, four dis­
tinctly different interpretations of the prohibited pur­
pose were used by the courts. The application of the 
accumulated earnings tax is predicated upon the existence 
of the proscribed purpose. Thus the interpretation of 
purpose is the most important issue to be determined. With 
four different interpretations of purpose in use, inequi­
table treatment of taxpayers is a highly probable result. 
Inequitable results do not necessarily follow from the 
existence of different constructions of statutory pro­
visions because other factors can be such that the same 
result would occur regardless of the interpretation 
utilized. For example, if the facts of a case were to be 
such that the express purpose test would result in a 
decision for the Commissioner, the one of the purposes 
test would be in favor of the Commissioner, too. Therefore, 
the existence of equity in these cases has been partially 
a matter of chance.
A most significant factor affecting the probability
of equity has been the relationship of the reasonable needs 
of the business to the purpose because the statutory pro­
visions have provided that accumulations in excess of 
those needs were either prima facie evidence of the pur­
pose, or were evidence determinative of the purpose. Pre­
viously, eight paths were presented to show the possible 
ways to reach a final decision assuming only one definition 
of purpose. Two of these paths treat the reasonableness 
of the accumulations as determinative of the final decision 
without consideration of the purpose. Thus six paths 
require a determination of purpose. Since four interpreta­
tions of purpose have existed, each of the six paths can 
be reproduced for each interpretation. Therefore, twenty- 
four paths involving purpose, plus two paths involving 
only the reasonableness of accumulations, gives a total 
of twenty-six possible paths. Considering this large 
number of possible paths to a final decision, the proba­
bility of equity for past years is quite low.
The operation of the burden of proof under section 
53^ presents a different aspect of the cases for evalua­
tion because it involves a procedural rule of. law. Inequity 
has resulted from the Tax Court's failure to make a 
determination of the section 53^ issue in all appropriate 
cases. The magnitude of the inequity is substantially 
less than in the instance of the substantive rules of law 
discussed above. The reasons for the smaller magnitude 
of inequity under the section 53^ issue are: (1) the
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provisions of section 53^ were incorporated into the law 
for the first time in the 195^ Code, (2) section 53^ 
applies only to cases coming before the Tax Court, and
(3) the Tax Court has been increasingly making section 53^ 
determinations.
A determination of the reasonable needs of the 
business has required the application of such basic 
accounting concepts as earnings, depreciation, working 
capital, and appropriation of earnings. The dilemma pre­
sented to a judge attempting to determine the reasonable­
ness of accumulations is as follows: Reasonable needs of
the business must be satisfied out of the assets of a 
corporation, but accumulations are measured as equities 
which must also be satisfied out of the assets. The 
confusion over the accounting relationships has been 
apparent in the cases in which the courts have explained 
the application of accounting concepts. Of course in 
most cases accounting concepts have not been explained, 
and this writer had initially assumed that accounting 
concepts were properly applied in those cases. However, 
the misunderstanding of accounting evidenced by so many 
explanations of these concepts has eliminated the assump­
tion of proper application by the courts. The judicial 
awareness of the need to assume a relationship between 
liquid assets and accumulated earnings in the i960 Smoot 
case was a significant improvement. Overall the courts' 
treatment of accounting concepts is considered to be an
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additional indication of a lack of equity, or at least 
further evidence that equity is a matter of chance in the 
accumulated earnings tax cases.
The investigation of final determinations enables 
the evaluation based upon a comparison of identical issues 
to be placed in perspective. Different interpretations 
of any given issue almost inevitably means that one inter­
pretation will be favorable to one party while a different 
interpretation will be less favorable to that party. The 
different interpretations are believed to result from 
different judicial attitudes toward the government and the 
taxpayer. The increasing percentage of cases taken to the 
district courts by taxpayers indicates that taxpayers 
believe they will receive more favorable treatment in the 
district courts than in the Tax Court. The final deter­
minations of incidents decided by jury trials seems to 
support this apparent difference in attitudes. The pattern 
of appeals suggests that both the Commissioner and tax­
payers sense the difference in attitudes among the forums. 
The reversals obtained corroborate the suggestion of 
bias. Thus the conclusion is made that in the past equity 
has been mostly a matter of random chance, rather than 
the inexorable process of justice.
Evaluation of Future Equity
The prospects for future equity must be based 
upon the most recent developments. The developments will 
be considered in the topical order followed to this point.
The 1969 Supreme Court decision in Donruss finally elimi­
nated all interpretations of purpose except for the "one 
of the purposes" test. However the relationship between 
purpose and the reasonable needs of the business has not 
been settled. Specifically, a whole new series of con­
flicting decisions involving the relationship of purpose 
to the general credit provision of section 535(c) is 
predicted. Additional conflicting interpretations on the 
interaction of section 53^ with section 535 are expected. 
Furthermore, misinterpretations of accounting concepts are 
expected to continue. If section 535 increases in impor­
tance, which seems probable, the application of accounting 
concepts will play a more important role in determining 
equity in the accumulated earnings tax cases. The adop­
tion of an assumption for relating liquid assets to 
retained earnings was an improvement, but the courts’ 
poor ability to evaluate working capital needs through an 
operating cycle analysis is disheartening. Thus on the 
whole only a small improvement may be expected. However, 
statutory changes could completely alter this outlook at 
any time.
Recommendations
Equity in the judicial administration of the 
accumulated earnings tax cases is not the natural product 
of justice as it should be. No individual judge or court 
can be singled out as being responsible for the lack of
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equity. The judicial system for federal tax cases must 
bear the blame. Several suggestions made by previous 
writers were presented in a review of the literature. 
Several of those views will be examined in the light of 
this study.
Most of the critical comments concerning the 
judicial system in tax cases have emphasized the length 
of time that uncertainty prevails until conflicts are 
settled. After the controversy over the Traynor and 
Surrey proposals subsided, the time and uncertainty argu­
ments centered upon the need for a single court to hear 
all tax appeals. The analysis in CHAPTER III of the 
case development of section 53^ - since the Second Circuit's 
Gsell case is relevant to a determination of this need.
The Tax Court decisions showed a substantial change in 
policy toward making section 53^ determinations in about 50 
percent of the cases examined. More importantly, the 
appeals taken disclosed that in all appeals taken to the 
Second Circuit the section 53^ issue had been decided, but 
the appeals taken upon cases in which that issue had not 
been resolved went to other circuit courts. This disclo­
sure is not startling, but it emphasizes the effect that 
a Court of Tax Appeals could have in reducing the time 
and uncertainty that attends conflicting decisions. This 
study also supports the position of Professor Lowndes 
that there is no reason to have the Supreme Court exercise 
jurisdiction in construction cases. So as noted earlier
181
the Supreme Court's decision in Donruss settled only the 
issue involving the construction of purpose while leaving 
the relationship of purpose to the reasonable needs of 
the business unresolved. Furthermore, this writer feels 
that the results achieved by the Supreme Court in National 
Grocery Co. and Chicago Stock Yards Co* were no better 
than could have been achieved by a Court of Tax Appeals. 
For example, in Chicago Stock Yards (19^3) the Supreme 
Court passed an opportunity to adopt a construction of 
purpose only to face that task in Donruss (1969). Thus 
a single Court of Tax Appeals is recommended.
In addition to this recommendation, another 
recommendation initially made by Traynor and Surrey is 
hereby endorsed. The other recommendation is to grant 
the Tax Court exclusive original jurisdiction in all 
income, estate, and gift tax cases. Although a Court of 
Tax Appeals would substantially reduce the uncertainty 
in tax cases, this writer believes that there would still 
be.too much leeway at the trial court level for judges 
to interpret tax law within the framework of their per­
sonal attitudes until precedents could be set by the 
Court of Tax Appeals. The operation of the Tax Court in 
which full court decisions are rendered, as well as 
memorandum decisions, provides a vehicle for the cry­
stallization of judicial viewpoints that is missing under 
the present system. Furthermore, the need for specialists 
in tax matters is quite evident from the applications of
basic accounting concepts presented in CHAPTER IV. A 
program to appoint such specialists to all of the district 
courts is not feasible. Thus a single court for the 
trial of federal tax cases as well as a single court for 
tax appeals is recommended.
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